Six choses impossibles avant le petit-déjeuner
Dans un monde saturé des antagonismes du capital, une politique basée exclusivement sur l’ouverture et l’affirmation est vouée à l’échec. Mais la Free Association suggère que tenter de fonder nos pratiques sur l’antagonisme comporte aussi une série de problèmes.
Mildred: What’re you rebelling against, Johnny?
Johnny: Whaddya got?
The Wild One (1953)
Alice riait. “Il est inutile d’essayer,” dit-elle. “Personne ne peut croire une chose impossible.”
“J’ose dire que vous n’avez guère de pratique,” dit la reine. “A votre âge, je m’y entraînais chaque jouir pendant une heure et demi. Ainsi, parfois je parvenais à croire à jusqu’à six choses impossibles avant le petit déjeuner.”
Alice au Pays des Merveilles
Une des principales nouveauté du mouvement des mouvements durant la dernière décennie a été son ouverture, son unité-dans-la-diversité et son sens de l’affirmation. Depuis les alliances étincelantes dans les rues de Seattle jusqu’aux expérimentations de nouvelles formes politiques, nous avons été frappés par sa portée mondiale et son sens de l’opportunité. Mais plus récemment, des thèmes plus anciens semblent réémerger: l’antagonisme, la colère, la haine de classe et la rupture. On a l’impression de retrouver un vieil ami perdu depuis longtemps. On l’amène dans un bar pour renouer l’amitié avec quelques boissons et on finit souls en chantant « Les riches… les riches… on va s’en débarrasser!’
Nous sommes ici sur un sol instable. Peut-être est-il tentant de se retirer sur de vieillles certitudes bien établies. Mais est-ce que ce sont des certitudes parce qu’elles expriment des vérités sur notre monde? Un éclair de réalisme qui charifie un problème? Nous ne voulons pas perdre le sens d’ouverture et l’engagement à l’experimentation que nous avons découvert avec les protestations du tournant du siècle. Cependant, ce cycle semble toucher à sa fin. Le mouvement des mouvements a atteint une impasse; l’innovation et l’expansion semblent impossibles à retrouver. Dans ces circonstances, un ré-examen de concepts intemporels comme l’antagonisme et la haine de classe peut être opportun.
NOUS SOMMES LES DESTRUCTEURS
Bien sûr la rupture et l’antagonisme n’ont rien de nouveau dans le mouvement anti-capitaliste. Ils ont été des lignes continues de San Cristobal à Seattle et de Gêne à Oaxaca. Mais la façon avec laquelle ils ont été tissés a énormément changé.
Les protestations lors des sommets, par exemple, ont atteint un point minimal lors du sommet du G8 à Gleneagles en 2005 avec la campagne ciblée sur les médias « Make Poverty History ». Toute la contestation politique avait été écartée, au point que les « demandes » de la campagne étaient de celles que tout le monde peut accepter. Avant 2005, les manifestations lors des sommets avaient au moins été des protestations, voire des tentatives concertées de bloquer physiquement la réunion. En contraste net, Make Poverty History a souhaité la bienvenu aux leaders du G8 en Ecosse et a ainsi piétiné toute une longue histoire de tentatives de stopper ces sommets.
Les leçons de 2005 n’ont pas été perdues pour le mouvement. Deux années plus tard, lorsque le G8 s’est réuni à Heiligendamm, le but explicite de toutes les principales actions autour du sommet était de délégitimer le G8. Pour certains, la stratégie était claire: une résistance ouverte au monde que le G8 représente. Une manifestation de masse à Rostock s’est transformée en petite émeute lorsque des banques ont été attaquée et des voitures brûlées. L’antagonisme pur et simple.
Mais est-ce aussi simple? Certes, le message était clair, mais la destruction de propriété à cette échelle lors d’un sommet n’a rien de nouveau. Et malgré les affirmations que les violences « avait rendu la résistance incalculable pour la police et pour l’appareil d’Etat”, l’évidence suggère que c’était totalement calculable – non seulement en terme de coût financier pour les dommages causés, mais aussi dans son timing et sa localisation. Dans ce sens, un retour aux tactiques du Black Bloc ne représentait pas l’émergence de quelquechose de nouveau, mais la retraite vers des modes de comportements familiers, avec les résultats habituels. L’antagonisme comme identité, avec ses propres codes vestimentaires.
D’autres ont pris des lignes plus innovantes. Block G8, par exemple, a été une large coalition de plus de 200 organisations depuis les groupes autonomes et la « gauche radicale » jusqu’à des organisations religieuses, mais, un aspect crucial est qu’il était basé sur un clair antagonisme vis à vis du G8. Après plusieurs mois de discussions, un accord a pu être dessiné; une des clauses était l’affirmation que le G8 n’était pas légitime, une autre traitait des niveaux acceptables de militance. Ceci a ouvert des perspectives excitantes de transformation, avec des gens agissant en dehors de leur zone habituelle, mais cela a aussi créé certains problèmes. D’abord, il y avait des différences claires entre les signataires sur ce que cet antagonisme sur lequel on s’était mis d’accord pouvait signifier en pratique. Des fissures sérieuses ont émergées dans la coalition à la suite des violences à Rostock. Pour certains, attaquer des banques et se battre avec la police signifiait amener l’antagonisme trop loin. Cependant, plus tard dans la semaine, lorsque le sommet a été complètement assiégé par les Block G8ers et lorsqu’une atmosphère de festival s’est installée bien à l’intérieur de la « zone rouge » , d’autres ont critiqué les manifestants pour leur manque d’antagonisme. Pourquoi n’avons nous pas organisé une attaque concertée sur la clotûre elle-même? L’antagonisme contre le G8 avait été maintenue dans des limites nettement définies.
Un second problème pour s’organiser à partir d’antagonismes pré-établis est que cela limite notre mobilité lorsque la situation change. A Heiligendamm, le succès initial du blocage des routes a dépendu d’un groupe fermé qui suivait un plan secret. Mais déplacer des milliers de personnes d’un campement jusqu’à des routes c’est une chose, maintenir des blocages effcicaces une fois là-bas en est une autre. Sur la porte Est il y a eu un bon nombre de réunions très frustrantes le mercredi soir alors que le « comité d’action » de Block G8 dominait les discussions – prenant avantage de leur contrôle sur les mégaphones et le système de sonorisation, et de leur autorité comme organisateurs. Ils ont suggéré que ceux qui n’étaient pas d’accord avec eux minaient le « consensus d’action » (c’est à dire l’accord sur l’antagonisme établi avant) et constituaient de pures tentatives d’ « escalade » (de la violence). En fait, le blocage était sur le point de se démanteler quand Block G8 a proclamé la « victoire » et a demandé à tout le monde de se retirer. Cette retraite n’a été stoppée que lorsque deux personnes se sont assises sur la route devant la sono pour l’empêcher de sortir: bloquer les bloqueurs!
Enfin, une critique plus générale des mobilisations de 2007 fut que l’antagonisme tendait à rester au niveau du G8 lui-même, plutôt qu’à remettre en cause les relations sociales capitalistes comprises de façon plus large. De fait, ces dix dernières années on observe plutôt un rétrécissement, plus qu’une expansion, de la cible de l’antagonisme. Le mouvement s’est réuni à Seattle autour d’une opposition commune aux politiques néolibérales que le G8, l’OMC et la banque Mondiale mettaient en place au niveau mondial. Cela a permis une résonnance des mouvements éclosant à partir de divers lieux. Les institutions internationales néolibérales étaient habituées à résister à des processus beaucoup plus larges; mais en retour, la zone rouge est devenue comme un aimant pour nos désirs. La réponse du G8 a été de changer de cible, en essayant de se présenter comme un lieu clé de la bonne gouvernance. De la même façon qu’à Gleneagles en 2005 le G8 s’est présenté comme l’institution la mieux placée pour combattre la pauvreté mondiale, à Heiligendamm ils ont voulu donner l’impression que c’étaient les leaders des plus grandes économies capitalistes du monde qui allaient apporter une solution au changement climatique. Ils ont évacué l’antagonisme que nous avions créé en changeant le sujet vers un thème si étendu que les solutions proposées par le mouvement étaient plus difficiles à envisager.
LES EFFETS DE l’EFFET DE SERRE
Les inquiétudes à propos du changement climatique sont maintenant partagées par tous. Le film d’Al GoreAn Inconvenient Truth, les rapports successifs de l’IPCC, la rapport Stern, tous expliquent clairement la gravité du défi. C’est un changement énorme par rapport à il y a quelques années lorsque des scientifiques et d’autres militants écologistes se battaient pour faire reconnaître l’existence du problème. Dans ces conditions, la question n’est plus comment « sensibiliser l’opinion », mais comment pousser les portes pour ouvrir de nouvelles problématiques.
De manière typique, les mouvements sociaux partent d’‘espaces fermés’, c’est à dire de situations qui sont caractérisées par l’impossibilité du monde existant et pour lesquelle les voies de sortie sont à peine imaginables. Mais précisément parce qu’ils sont fermés, ces espaces sont comme des incubateurs ou des serres pour la créativité et l’innovation – “la création naît dans les goulets d’étranglement”. Les mouvements sociaux qui naissent de ces espaces peuvent se former sur des demandes antagonistiques (plus d’argent, un meilleur logement, le retrait de la police) mais ils produisent aussi leurs propres problématiques. Ils rejettent des concepts, des désirs, des formes de vie qui ne font pas sens au sein de la société existante et appellent ainsi à la création de nouveaux mondes. Mais lorsque les mouvements sociaux ralentissent et perdent leur base, ces problématiques s’arrêtent elles-aussi. Ce qui avait été nouveau devient codifié. C’est un cercle vicieux: lorsque des problématiques s’enlisent, elles acquièrent une charge; lorsqu’elles acquièrent une charge, elles ralentissent. Au lieu d’être innovante et productive, la problématique perd sa cible et devient un cliché. Elle devient saturée de sens.
Le succès de la bataille pour la prise de conscience sur le changement climatique a eu des conséquences étranges. Lorsqu’on a pendant longtemps cassé ses poings sur un mur, il est difficile de savoir quoi faire lorsque ce mur tombe. Certains se sont focalisés sur la poignée de ceux qui continuaient à nier le changement climatique. D’autres se sont tournés vers les gouvernements et les institutions internationales pour leur demander d’apporter des solutions, de la même façon que Make Poverty History avait demandé au G8 d’apporer une solution à la faim dans le monde. D’un côté, ceci est amené par un sens de l’urgence et la notion (erronée) que le problème est si massif que seul un organe centralisé peut y faire face. Mais à un niveau plus large, c’est symptomatique d’une ‘politique sans antagonisme’, où nous pouvons faire connaître nos opinions (en manifestant, en portant des bandeaux au bras ou en refusant de prendre l’avion) et tout le reste c’est de l’administratif.
Cette idée de la politique sans antagonisme est une illusion. La plupart des « solutions » imaginées par les gouvernements – et que certains militants écologistes réclament – vont limiter notre liberté et notre autonomie, elles vont nous appauvrir, vont nous imposer de travailler plus. Elles supposent le transfert de nouvelles richesses des pauvres vers les riches. L’individualisme de la consommation ‘éthique’ par exemple mène à un antagonisme implicite entre ceux d’un côté qui vont faire les ‘mauvais’ choix, et/ou le lobbying militant auprès des gouvernements pour que ceux-ci imposent le ‘bon’ choix aux gens. Lors du campement climat de 2007 au Royaume-Uni, l’un des intervenants les plus connus a prévenu que ‘nous’ devions être prêt à nous opposer à des émeutes contre l’austérité (Nous pensons faire l’exact contraire.)
LE CHAT MANGE LA SOURIS, LE MAQUEREAU BAT LA PUTAIN
Evidemment nous ne pouvons pas suggerer qu’il faut plus d’antagonisme? N’y a-t-il pas assez de haine et de violence dansle monde? N’y a-t-il pas déjà assez de séparation et de rupture? Oui. Et c’est bien le sujet. L’histoire qui se poursuit jusqu’à aujourd’hui de la séparation de l’humanité et des bien communs est écrite en “lettres de sang et de feu”. Dans le monde entier, que vous soyez en train de ramasser des ordures dans un bidonville ou en train de vous démener pour payer la prochaine échéance de votre emprunt, la relation du capital est faite de violence, de séparation et d’antagonisme.
Cet antagonisme incessant et débilitant est central dans le mode de fonctionnement du capitalisme. En comparaison avec féodalisme ou l’esclavage, le capitalisme est un système social dynamique et relativement résilient pour deux raisons. La première est sa capacité à se nourrir de l’antagonisme, d’utiliser l’antagonisme pour booster son propre développement. Un exemple de cela est le passage de la production d’une valeur de surplus absolue à une valeur de surplus relative. Le mouvement des travailleurs devenant plus fort en Angleterre au 18e et 19e siècle, les propriétaires d’usine ont été obligés de passer d’une stratégie d’exploitation extensive (de longues journées de travail et de courtes pauses) à une exploitation intensive (en utilisant des machines pour accroître la productivité). Cela a lancé un nouveau cycle d’accumulation, célébré comme la Révolution industrielle. Cette stratégie a atteint son sommet avec les lignes de production mobiles de Henry Ford.
Une relation différente à l’antagonisme peut être vue dans les Etats-providences de l’après-guerre et dans les politiques keynesiennes qui les ont impulsés. Ces sociétés ont institutionalisé l’antagonisme entre le capital et la classe des travailleurs de l’industrie; des mesures assurant un certain niveau de bien-être ont été négociées en échange d’une productivité croissante. Les luttes autonomes féroces des années 1960 et 1970 ont fait exploser cet antagonisme gelé en mettant en lumière de nouveaux problèmes et de nouveaux antagonismes.
La seconde raison qui explique la capacité de résilience du capital est le fait que son antagonisme essentiel est sans cesse déplacé. Le capitalisme en tant que relation sociale domine nos vies, et pourtant il est presque impossible de le localiser. Certains ont affirmé que c’est juste un problème de ‘fausse conscience’, comme si il suffisait de lever le rideau et de montrer l’homme qui actionne les manettes. Mais il ne s’agit pas d’idéologie. Le capitalisme n’a pas besoin que nous croyons que les marchandises ont une vie propre ou que le capital produit de la richesse. Nous devons simplement agir comme si cela était vrai lorsque nous travaillons ou consommons. La réalité ne peut ainsi qu’apparaitre capitaliste. Rien d’autre ne ‘fait sens’, du fait des présupposés que le capital place sur nous. C’est la même chose avec la violence qui nous sépare des biens communs, lorsque les gens sont forcés à quitter leurs terres dans le Sud, ou lorsque, dans le Nord, ils voient leur temps de travail transpirer sur tout le reste de leur vie. “Il est très difficile de nommer la violence parce qu’elle se présente toujours comme pré-accomplie… Du point de vue à l’intérieur du mode de production capitaliste, il est très difficile de dire qui est le voleur et qui est la victime, ou même où la violence réside.”
Même sur le lieu de travail le plus exploitateur, il est difficile de dire précisément où est l’antagonisme. Etes-vous contre le contre-maître? Le cadre? Le fond de pension étranger où d’autres travailleurs investissent leur épargne? Via sa stratégie de décomposition de classe, de marchandisation, d’individualissation etc, le neo-libéralisme oblige à une intensification de la compétition: cela signifie, l’intensification de la concurrence entre tous les travailleurs du monde. Avec la libéralisation commerciale, un producteur de café de l’Equateur est maintenant en concurrence directe avec un autre en Indonésie, cependant que la croissance des marchés financiers mondiaux signifie que tous les deux sont en compétition avec des professeurs de Leeds et des employés de call center à Bangalore. Ainsi, la nature antagonistique du capital se manifeste moins comme un clash entre le travailleur et le patron que comme une lutte amère entre travailleurs, chacun essayant d’être la hauteur de la norme déterminée par le marché (voire de la dépasser pour établir ainsi une nouvelle norme plus élevée).
Cet antagonisme déplacé est aggravé par le changement climatique – et pas seulement du fait des guerres sur l’eau ou d’autres ressources. Comme nous l’avons aperçu, la solution imposée par le capital est un nouveau cycle d’austérité, une redistribution de la richesse des travailleurs vers le capital. Des mesures comme les taxes sur la carbone ou le payage sur les routes vont augmenter le coût de nécessités de base comme l’alimentation, le chauffage et le transport, limitant ainsi notre mobilité et notre autonomie. Le changement climatique est une double calamité pour la grande majorité de la population du monde. Non seulement nous allons souffrir de ses effets – les riches ne doivent pas vivre dans des régions menacées par les inondations et de toutes les façons ils ont toujours une bonne assurance – mais aussi nous allons souffrir des solutions du capital face au problème. De plus, étant données les relations sociales capitalistes, la meilleure réponse individuelle est de tenter de gagner plus d’argent (car l’argent achète la mobilité, etc), tout comme la meilleure réponse individuelle dans une entreprise est de marcher sur la tête des autres travailleurs. C’est ‘logique’. L’effet est d’intensifier la compétition, la guerre de tous contre tous est le sang qui coule dans les veines du capitalisme.
Les changements énormes dans les structures de relations capitalistes ces trente dernières années ont aussi eu une implication majeure sur comment l’antagonisme apparait dans nos vies quotidiennes. Avec les délocalisations et les privatisations, il est de moins en moins facile d’identifier qui est nore ennemi à un moment déterminé. La gouvernance est à étages multiples, les reponsables sont toujours ‘ailleurs’. Les politiques et les preneurs de décisions à tous les niveaux, du conseil municipal aux gouvernements nationaux, peuvent dire en toute honnêteté “nos mains sont liées”. La politique, ce mot compris dans son sens traditionnel, est remplacée par l’administration, avec pour résultat que l’antagonisme politique est souvent totalement vain. Prenez l’Initiative Finance Privée qui opère dans des écoles, des hôpitaux, des prisons et autres au Royaume-Uni: c’est une façon d’injecter du capital privé dans des services publics en échange de contrats à long-terme. Pour les écoles par exemple, la municipalité n’est pas propriétaire du bâtiment, mais le loue à une entreprise. Alors que l’Initiative est largement perçue comme un désastre, il est presque impossible de s’y opposer : “Il n’y a pas d’autre source de financement…” C’est le cri fondamental du néo-libéralisme: There Is No Alternative. Il n’y a pas d’alternative. Le néo-liberalisme est un totalistarisme qui n’est pas basé sur une croyance, mais simplement sur l‘efficacité’, sur le fait que la tâche est réalisée.
LA COLERE EST UNE ENERGIE
Cependant, malgré tout cela, la haine contre les riches et les puissants persiste. Les gens détestent les ‘chats gras’. La BMW mise en feu est un cri de refus, de rage. NON! C’est un courant qui a une longue histoire, qui existe en parallèle à des politiques plus affirmatives. A côté du cri des Anabaptistes ‘Omnia sunt communia’ [Tout est commun] et de la notion que les terrassiers avaient d’une république immanente du paradis sur terre, allait la haine de la bourgeoisie et de tout ce qu’elle représentait.
La violence peut jouer un rôle dans l’antagonisme, mais ce sont deux notions différentes. Il est difficile de les différencier car nous sommes habitués à une notion très restreinte de la violence. Il est aisé de voir la violence dans un vol à l’étalage; il est plus difficile de voir comment elle nous est imposée au cours de notre vie professionnelle; et il est quasiment impossible de la reconnaître dans la façon dont nous sommes quotidiennement séparés des biens communs.
Mais pouvons-nous fonder une politique de l’antagonisme formulée de cette façon? Il y a trois problèmes fondamentaux. Le premier est tout simplement d’identifier notre ennemi. C’est trop simple de dire que l’ennemi c’est le capital. Le capital est terriblement réel, il domine nos vies, mais c’est une abstration. Nous en faisons l’experience dans ses effets, ce qui signifie que les antagonismes qu’il produit ont lieu jusqu’à l’intérieur de nous-même. Le problème n’est pas tant de révéler l’antagonisme, comme si nous devions juste montrer aux gens la vraie nature du capital comme relation sociale. Le problème est de re-composél’antagonisme dont nous faisons l’expérience.
Cela nous amène à une seconde difficulté: il est difficile de recomposer cet antagonisme sans tomber dans le piège de personnaliser le capital. Dans le film sorti en 2004 The Edukators, l’un des personnage explique, “Il ne s’agit pas de celui qui a inventé le revolver. C’est celui qui appuie sur la gachette.” Il y a une contradiction ici. Pour nous, un des moments les plus libérateurs pendant les années 1980 a été la façon dont des anarchistes ont donnés les noms (et les adresses) des personnes qui dominaient nos vies. Cela a cassé les règles du jeu. Cela a renversé le déséquilibre des forces entre les riches et les pauvres, l’asymétrie d’un monde où les profits sont privatisés mais les pertes toujours socialisées. (Regardez la crise actuelle du crédit: alors que les victimes des subprimes sont mis à la rue, les banquiers ont juste à vendre leur troisième maison ou un de leur yacht de luxe) D’une façon bizarre, nommer les riches réaffirme une humanité commune en leur niant la capacité de se cacher derrière des entreprises à responsabilité limitée, des paradis fiscaux off-shore et des systèmes de gestion à étages multiples. C’est un écho à ce que disait Lucy Parsons en 1885 “Allons dévaster les avenues où les riches vivent.”
Cela cache un grand nombre de dangers. Mis à part l’impasse manifeste du terrorisme, cette approche peut facilement glisser dans le populisme. Nommer le capital (une relation sociale) comme l’ennemi n’offre pas une ligne d’action facile; nommer les riches simplifie le champ social, et cela nous offre un peu de prise sur le monde. Mais ce faisant cela produit des boucs émissaires. Ce peut être l’aristocracie, la classe dirigeante ou les banquiers d’investissement – n’importe quel élément vu comme ‘parasitique’ ou ‘improductif’. Dans l’histoire, cela a souvent été lié à un antisémitisme violent.
Le populisme retourne soigneusement sa veste dans les moments de piété qui passent pour ‘la politique’ sous le néo-libéralisme. La première minute nous demandons au G8 de résoudre la faim en Afrique, la suivante nous condamnons des jeunes mères pour donner de la mal-bouffe à leurs enfants. Chaque vague de panique morale absout le capital de sa responsibilité dans l’état du monde qu’il domine. Cependant, parce le néo-liberalisme ne dépend d’aucune de ces croyances en particulier, elles meurent chacune tour à tour et leur nature sériale nous arrache toute croyance. La politique dépolitisée est précisément ce balancement sauvage entre d’un côté la piété, comme Make Poverty History, et de l’autre un cynisme rampant.
Le troisième problème est encore plus fondamental. En eux-même la colère, l’antagonisme, etc, ne nous mèneront pas bien loin. Parce qu’une relation antagonistique avec le capital reste une relation avec le capital, elle suppose encore que nous nous définissions en relation au capital. Mais nous ne voulons aucunerelation avec le capital (ou l’Etat), antagoniste ou autre. Nous voulons détruire ces relations, tout comme nous refusons la définition. Nous voulons l’exode, l’autonomie. Et là est le paradoxe. Bien que l’autonomie soit un mouvement pour “par nos propres efforts nous mener au bonheur”, elle doit encore contenir une certaine forme de ‘Non’, une rupture avec le monde tel qu’il est. Il est difficile de se propulser pour nager quand on est au milieu de l’eau, c’est beaucoup plus facile de pousser contre quelquechose. L’antagonisme fournit ce ‘Non’ en simplifiant l’espace social suffisamment pour offrir un peu de prise sur le monde et ainsi rendre possible l’action politique.
Nous ne pouvons pas prétendre que l’antagonisme n’existe pas. Mais nous devons agir en toute conscience de cet antagonisme pour réussir à le dissoudre. Ces simplifications sont en excès, ce qui pourraient nous faire penser à des impossibilités. C’est la gène que contient chaque problématique. Et c’est dans ces espaces trop étroits que nous pouvons créer de nouvelles problématiques, tracer un chemin entre les impossibilités… et ainsi ouvrir de nouvelles possibilités.
LA REVANCHE DE LA REINE ROUGE
Si nous nous trouvons dans une impasse quand nous tentons de penser l’antagonisme, peut-être n’est-ce pas la faute du concept mais plutôt de l’impasse dans laquelle nous sommes placés à la fois “dans nos vies et dans nos pensées” par le capital et l’Etat. La problématique de l’antagonisme rend un sens un peu différent lorsque placée à côté de celle de l’exode. Après tout, l’antagonisme peut nous aider à dire ce que nous sommes, mais il ne peut pas nous dire ce que nous pouvons devenir.
Les concepts politiques traditionnels tels que la solidarité ou l’alliance impliquent un calcul des intérêts pré-existants. Ils reposent sur des corps séparés, avec un début et une fin, dont les chemins peuvent être tracés à l’avance. C’est comme si les identités engagées n’étaient pas transformées par la relation que ces concepts représentent. C’est pourquoi nous défendons l’idée de l’amour comme concept politique, parce que l’amour implique une transformation réciproque. C’est une relation de devenir mutuel. En tant que tel, il opère au-delà d’un calcul rationnel d’intérêt. Littéralement, on se perd dans l’amour car les frontières entre les corps séparés deviennent indistinctes.
Nous pouvons faire l’expérience d’une telle politique dans les pics périodiques d’intensité partagée, que nous pouvons vivre, par exemple, dans l’action politique collective. Pendant ces moments d’excès, les fictions du fétichisme du capital se dissolvent et nous faisons face à un monde re-potentialisé. L’antagonisme du capital devient plus clair, et cependant il perd sa force d’attration sur nous. A la place, nous sommes animés par l’affect d’une capacité collective accrue. Nous réussissons à échapper de notre identité antagonistique et à nous transformer en quelquechose de nouveau.
Bien sûr nous ne pouvons pas seulement souhaiter une relation politique d’amour dans la vie de tous les jours. Les policiers anti-émeute qui s’avancent vers nous sont entraînés à résister à toute relation de transformation mutuelle (lorsqu’il ne va pas dans les deux sens l’amour est assez douloureux). De telles epxériences sont concrètes et spécifiques, elles ne peuvent pas être universalisées. Nous ferions mieux de les voir comme des entrainements à l’amour. Vécu de façon a-historique et non-spécifique, l’amour peux glisser vers la piété et s’ouvrir à une administration néo-libérale. Si nous voulons atteindre un amour matérialiste, nous aurons besoin du réalisme d’un antagonisme recomposé.
Embourbés comme nous le sommes dans les fictions mortifères de ce monde, une politique basée sur l’amour peut sembler impossible. Tout juste comme la politique de l’antagonisme est une impossibilité face au néo-libéralisme. Mais cela ne devrait pas trop nous préoccuper. Comme la reine rouge, nous devons nous entraîner à croire à “six choses impossibles avant le petit déjeuner”. Quand une problématique devient saturée, nous regardons la prochaine impossibilité pour nous ouvrir une prise. C’est comme cela que nous nous échapperons, avec AMOUR tatoué sur une main et HAINE sur l’autre.
The Free Association
English original here.
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The following can be used as web banners to link either to the Turbulence website, or the respective Turbulence issue (1, 3 or 4).
e-Newsletter 8
Turbulence e-Newsletter 8
1) Serbian and Greek Translations of ‘Do You Remember the End of History?’
2) Turbulence @ Berlin ‘We Won’t Pay for Their Crisis’ Demo in March
3) Turbulence on Twitter
4) Turbulence Editor Interviews from G20 Protests
5) New Section on Turbulence Website
6) Spanish Translation of ‘The Movement is Dead, Long Live the Movement!’
7) Turbulence on Facebook
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1) SERBIAN AND GREEK TRANSLATIONS OF ‘DO YOU REMEMBER THE END OF HISTORY?’
Serbian and Greek translations of the Turbulence article, ‘Do You Remember the End of History?’, originally written for Mule magazine, are now available. German and Swedish translations have already been previously announced via this email list. The various translations can be found here:
English | German | Swedish | Serbian | Greek.
Other Turbulence translations can be found here.
2) TURBULENCE @ BERLIN ‘WE WON’T PAY FOR THEIR CRISIS’ DEMO IN MARCH
Turbulence were among the publications, extra-parliamentary networks, left-wing groups, trade unions, political parties and others to call for and participate in simultaneous demonstrations in Berlin and Frankfurt on March 28, 2009. The slogan was, ‘We Won’t Pay for Their Crisis’.
You can read the reports from the event here.
Copies of the following German-language economic crisis Turbulence special, with articles by David Harvie and Christian Frings, distributed at the demonstration can be found here.
3) TURBULENCE ON TWITTER
Turbulence have started using Twitter, the micro-blogging site, to send out regular updates about both our projects and other news. You can visit our site here.
4) TURBULENCE EDITOR INTERVIEWS FROM THE G20 PROTESTS
Turbulence took part in April’s protests around the G20 meeting in London. Turbulence editor, Tadzio Mueller, was interviewed from the protests by both Deutsche Welle radio and KPFA community radio. The interviews can be listened to via the Turbulence website here.
5) NEW SECTION ON TURBULENCE WEBSITE
We have opened a new section on the Turbulence website where we will be publishing links to articles elsewhere on the web that we feel resonate with the problematics thrown up by the various issues of Turbulence published so far.
The first text is entitled ‘We won but we lost’ and is an interview with Raquel Gutiérrez. It was originally published by Ukhampacha Bolivia in March 2008. It deals explicitly with the question of winning, which we tried to address in Turbulence 1, in the context of Latin America.
6) SPANISH TRANSLATION OF ‘THE MOVEMENT IS DEAD, LONG LIVE THE MOVEMENT!’
A Spanish translation of Tadzio Mueller’s article, ‘The Movement is Dead, Long Live the Movement’, published in Turbulence 4, has been published by Centre Tricontinental. It can be found here.
Other translations (as well as the original) are also available in the follow languages:
7) TURBULENCE ON FACEBOOK
Turbulence now have a Facebook Page. On the page, we’ve set up a series of discussion boards where you can talk about our various issues, room for reviews, and uploaded the artwork from the last three issues. We’ll be announcing (and opening for discussion!) future articles via the page too.
To become a ‘Fan’ (that’s Facebook’s term, not ours!), log-in to your Facebook account – unfortunately, if you don’t have one, you’ll have to set one up first – and then search for ‘Turbulence: Ideas for movement’. The rest is self-explanatory.
(17 May 2009)
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www.turbulence.org.uk // www.myspace.com/turbulence_ideas4movement // www.twitter.com/turbulence_mag // editors@turbulence.org.uk
To stay informed about future ‘Turbulence’ publications and projects, subscribe to our (very!) low-traffic e-newsletter here: https://lists.riseup.net/www/info/turbulenceannouncementslist
Turbulent Twitter
You can also subscribe to Turbulence’s ‘Tweets’ via our Twitter page: twitter.com/turbulence_mag
Irregular updates are also sent out via our low-traffic email list. You can subscribe here.
¡El movimiento ha muerto, viva el movimiento!
por Tadzio Mueller
¡El movimiento ha muerto! Más precisamente: el movimiento alter-mundista como lugar común de encuentro de movimientos y “activistas” y como oportunidad de transformarse en otro, en conjunto, a partir de la vinculación de sus luchas bajo y contra el referente común de la globalización neoliberal, está muerto. No es que las luchas particulares hayan muerto. Ni que hayamos visto el fin de las movilizaciones contra las cumbres: mientras escribo esto, se está trabajando arduamente, elaborando planes para impedir la realización de una u otra cumbre: el G8 en Italia en 2009, los festejos por los 60 años de la OTAN en Francia, y así podríamos seguir: nosotros somos las contra-cumbres.
Pero de alguna manera estas movilizaciones ya no tienen el mismo impacto que una vez tuvieron: ¿cuántos veces hemos gritado el último hurra? y ¿cuántas veces nos hemos movilizado y pensado, “si esta vez falla, dejaremos de hacerlo”? Incluso el comparativamente poderoso movimiento alemán poco pudo hacer contra la cumbre del G8 en Heiligendamm, aparte de reconocer que una cosa es sacar decenas de miles a la calle, y otra muy distinta conseguir que sus acciones tengan resonancia más allá del círculo inmediato de los participantes.
No me entiendan mal: el movimiento no murió la muerte ignominiosa de la derrota. En muchas formas, también ganó. Y para los movimientos, que para sobrevivir necesariamente deben moverse, también las victorias a menudo son la muerte, ya que viven y respiran en el antagonismo, necesitan un enemigo. ¿Qué pasó con nuestro enemigo? Preguntémosle a Martin Wolf, el ideólogo del Financial Times, portavoz respetado y elocuente de la ofensiva neoliberal. Refiriéndose al día en el que el Banco Central de Estados Unidos salió de garante de un gran banco para impedir que la crisis financiera se generalizara, escribió: “Recordemos el viernes 14 de marzo de 2008, ese fue el día que murió el sueño del capitalismo de libre mercado”. Es así que de cierta forma el neoliberalismo ha muerto, al igual que (nuevamente de cierta forma) también ha muerto el movimiento que se le oponía, del cual la corriente explícitamente anti-capitalista desde el seno de la cual escribimos este artículo, era solamente una parte. Parece haberse perdido precisamente eso que es capaz de forjar un movimiento a partir de una irreductible multiplicidad de luchas, eso que puede contrarrestar la descomposición de la resistencia, que el capital y el Estado buscan permanentemente imponernos. Para movernos necesitamos una historia, una esperanza, un gancho –y en este momento, el movimiento anti-globalización o altermundista es claramente un movimiento sin gancho, sin un enemigo, sin una meta.
¿El nuevo “gran movimiento”?
Pero así como hay un movimiento sin una historia, hay también una historia sin movimiento: el cambio climático. Un número cada vez mayor de políticas (incluso muchas que difícilmente tienen que ver con el tema) están siendo justificadas en términos de su relación con “el clima”. Y tras haberse visto marginados por el G8 y especialmente por la Canciller Merkel en Heilingendamm, los movimientos europeos desde entonces se han dado cuenta que deben desarrollar una posición y una práctica en torno al problema del cambio climático, o de lo contrario se volverán irrelevantes en el nuevo ’mundo feliz’ de los temas ambientales. Las fracciones más avanzadas del capital y los aparatos de Estado han descubierto una manera muy inteligente de generar apoyo político para una nueva “solución verde”, tanto para la crisis de sobre-acumulación (el problema de que haya demasiado dinero en pos de escasas oportunidades de inversión redituable) que ha sido la causante del actual caos financiero, y para la crisis de legitimad que sufren las autoridades mundiales desde que la fuerza del cuento del “terrorismo mundial” comenzó a desvanecerse. De alguna manera, el hecho que todos estén hablando ahora de este tema es una enorme victoria del movimiento ecologista, pero al mismo tiempo es también el clavo final que cierra el ataúd del movimiento: cada gran ONG ecologista está involucrada hasta el cuello en las negociaciones del tratado pos-Kioto, de manera tal que es improbable que articule una posición política que diverja significativamente de las agendas dominantes en el tema.
Así que hay un movimiento sin historia, y una historia sin movimiento –lo que significa que en la situación actual, hay pocas esperanzas de que el cambio climático sea tratado de alguna forma que no implique simplemente agenciar los intereses de los Estados y de cualquiera sea la fracción dominante del capital. Y como la posición anticapitalista por defecto sobre el cambio climático es que existe una contradicción fundamental entre los requisitos de la acumulación continua del capital (es decir el crecimiento económico) por un lado, y los requerimientos de enfrentar el cambio climático por el otro, esto parecería constituir una oportunidad perfecta para revitalizar una política anticapitalista que consiga nutrirse de las preocupaciones generalizadas de la gente sobre el cambio climático y la impresión de que lo que se está haciendo (Kyoto, Bali, comercio de emisiones, etc.) es demasiado poco y demasiado tarde. Es precisamente en estas situaciones donde los movimientos sociales radicales tienen la mayor capacidad para actuar y “hacer historia”, cuando los enfoques habituales de solución de problemas (en estos días: la creación de un mercado en torno suyo, o reprimir el problema) no parecen ofrecer una manera creíble de abordar algo que es ampliamente percibido como problema. Es precisamente cuando parece imposible encontrar ninguna solución, que se abren oportunidades para que los movimientos sociales amplíen los límites de lo posible. De cara a ello, la tormenta perfecta…
La política del sin sentido
… o al menos así parece. En realidad, si tomamos como punto de referencia las dificultades prácticas que enfrentan la mayoría de los intentos que se hacen para contribuir a la emergencia de un movimiento anticapitalista efectivo alrededor del tema del cambio climático, las cosas son bastante más difíciles. Si lo analizamos desde la perspectiva del Norte global, definitivamente existen intentos de desarrollar una política de cambio climático anticapitalista, pero cada uno de ellos enfrenta un conjunto creciente de dificultades. Vistos desde aquí, todo comienza en el Reino Unido en 2006, con el campamento para la acción por el clima, cuyo objetivo era cerrar por un día una estación de energía eléctrica a carbón en el Norte de Inglaterra, pero, además, y lo que es más importante, proporcionar un espacio para el desarrollo de nuevas ideas y prácticas para una política de cambio climático anticapitalista. Desde entonces, la idea de organizar campamentos para la acción por el clima de este tipo ha inspirado a distintos grupos en Alemania, Suecia, Estados Unidos, Chile, Australia, Nueva Zelanda y otros países, y actualmente parece ser la principal “arma” del repertorio de acción del movimiento del clima emergente (irónicamente, la idea inicial del campamento fue también producto de las lecciones aprendidas de las carencias y defectos de las protestas puntuales contra las cumbres).
Realmente no quiero menospreciar la importancia de estos campamentos –después de todo, inspirar a tantos en tantos países diferentes no es poca cosa- pero entre las muchas críticas a los campamentos del clima, hay una que se destaca: la pregunta es si estos campamentos efectivamente hacen algo, además de dar curso al deseo de hacer algo. Parece algo bueno estar en el campamento con compañeros y compañeras, pero está presente igual esa molesta pregunta. ¿Qué buscamos? ¿Qué podemos lograr? Y ¿todo este asunto de los campamentos –de tratar de cerrar las plantas de energía eléctrica una por una, al tiempo que constantemente luchamos para que nuestra voz no sea sofocada por las voces más poderosas que predominan en esta arena política—está acaso a la altura de la magnitud del problema del cambio climático? Esta es la clase de pregunta que probablemente hace que la gente se sienta bastante frustrada.
Seamos claros: no se trata de decir que la gente no debe organizar campamentos del clima –sólo decimos que necesitamos ser parte de un proyecto más amplio que nos dé algún sentido político más allá de la intervención específica y muy localizada. Podríamos, por supuesto, esperar que este significado más amplio –una cierta globalidad política- emergiera de los lazos que se están formando entre los distintos campamentos del clima que tienen lugar este año, pero este tipo de coordinación es limitada o sencillamente no existe. No hay demandas comunes (aparte de estar “contra el cambio climático”, que es prácticamente tan inútil y distintivo políticamente como estar contra la matanza de focas bebes), no hay historia común, no hay una consigna del tipo “terminar con la OMC”, ni siquiera hay un compromiso vago del tipo“o se la arregla o se la deja”: no hay un “otro mundo es posible”!
Si la forma de lidiar con el problema del cambio climático del movimiento en el Reino Unido aparece de cierto modo como limitada en su alcance político, al otro lado del espectro está la forma en que se ha abordado el tema en Alemania. Los intentos de dar inicio a un proceso de campamentos por el clima aquí no sólo han anegados por las clásicas rencillas y disputas internas de la izquierda, incluida una división en el proceso, sino que además se han enfrentado a otro problema político clave: aquí la izquierda radical es tan académica y está tan empapada de la “teoría crítica” y la deconstrucción, que su principal respuesta al problema del cambio climático es desarrollar una “crítica”al discurso dominante sobre el cambio climático y al “rol hegemónico del conocimiento científico” en la interpretación del cambio climático como crisis. Seguro que es importante recordar que los informes del Panel Intergubernamental sobre Cambio Climático provienen de una institución profundamente conservadora, y reflexionar de manera crítica sobre cuán a menudo se recurre a los “conocimientos científicos” para acallar a los “no expertos” en los debates políticos, pero el “Diskurskritik” no puede ser la única respuesta al problema del cambio climático. Algo así como tirarle copias de textos de Adorno y Foucault a una inundación en ciernes, con la esperanza que las aguas simplemente desaparezcan.
De la intemporalidad a la efectividad
Pero la izquierda anticapitalista del Norte global tiene largamente asumido que es políticamente inefectiva y marginal, a pesar de algunos brotes de poder transformador en algunos momentos de exceso específicos. ¿En qué contribuye un “centro social” en Hackney, Kreuzberg o Las Ramblas a la lucha contra la especulación inmobiliaria y el aburguesamiento edilicio en las ciudades? ¿Una manifestación contra la guerra en San Francisco, tal como afirma una película hecha en ese momento, acaso “interrumpe este Imperio”? ¿El saqueo en las tiendas, aunque se lo haga de manera masiva, distorsiona acaso de manera significativa el proceso de circulación de mercancías del capitalismo? Para hacer honestos: no lo sé, y creo que muy pocos de los que participan en estas prácticas tienen clara la respuesta. Pero –y este es el punto que importa—cuando hablamos de ”capitalismo”, los anticapitalistas no necesitan en realidad tener una respuesta para esta pregunta. Una manera de abordar el tema es señalar la dinámica no lineal del cambio en los sistemas sociales complejos, lo que significa que no podemos saber qué efectos tendrán nuestras acciones hoy sobre el mañana (pensemos en la mariposa en Bali y el huracán en Haití). O, hacer referencia a un argumento que se ha convertido casi en dogma en las discusiones anticapitalistas:“mira, el capitalismo no ha existido siempre, comenzó en algún lugar y en algún momento, y por lo mismo también terminará en algún momento” – ¡lo mismo podríamos decir del universo! Y así podría seguir enumerando las distintas argucias intelectuales que existen para racionalizar nuestra relativa irrelevancia política, pero espero haber aclarado el punto que quiero destacar: que la política anticapitalista en el Norte global existe en una suerte de intemporalidad debido a que no podemos o no nos animamos a pensar sus efectos en el futuro. Me vienen a la mente los avestruces. O el graffiti pintado sobre la pared de una escuela en Gotemburgo tomada por asalto por la policía: “Pero al final, venceremos”!
Y es aquí donde volvemos a porqué parece tan difícil para el movimiento anticapitalista desarrollar una política en torno al cambio climático: cualquier racionalización que haga posible pensar que al final venceremos al capital, es prácticamente imposible con relación al cambio climático. En contrate con la habitual intemporalidad de la política anticapitalista, el cambio climático es una cuestión urgente. Y el problema entonces pasa a ser como enfrentar esa urgencia. Las dos posiciones que describimos arriba son intentos de hacerlo, y las dos son muy poco satisfactorias. La primera se toma la urgencia demasiado en serio, y se apura a saltar a un campo político dominado por jugadores que son mucho más poderosos. La segunda posición reconoce que la construcción de la urgencia y la política de miedo resultante son a menudo estrategias de dominación –pero luego se contenta con criticar esa construcción, en vez de enfrentar la urgencia que reclama el problema detrás del discurso. Y esta urgencia emerge precisamente de un conflicto de tiempos, de temporalidades, entre la temporalidad exponencial del capital (en la cual el capital perpetuamente acelera la producción y la vida social) y la temporalidad de los complejos sistemas ecológicos y sociales, que por supuesto no son estáticos, y que pueden adaptarse a circunstancias nuevas, pero en general no a la velocidad que requiere el capital –si el cambio es muy rápido, entonces se llega a los infaustos “momentos de inflexión”, en los que las modificaciones a determinados ecosistemas se vuelven irreversibles y catastróficas (un ejemplo, la desaparición de la Corriente del Golfo; otro, el deshielo de las capas heladas de los polos).
¿Cómo enfrentamos entonces este problema de la urgencia? Primero, admitiendo que es improbable, en realidad, imposible, que una izquierda radical marginal sea capaz de desacelerar de manera significativa la producción de gases de efecto invernadero como el CO2, en un mundo en el cual la acumulación de capital es inseparable de la quema de combustibles fósiles. Tampoco podemos de alguna manera forzar una adaptación más rápida de los sistemas ecológicos a la velocidad del capital. Pero podemos intervenir en la temporalidad de la política, de la política de cambio climático de los gobiernos, cuyo rol es aislar de la crítica social la aceleración provocada por el capital, creando la ilusión de que la acumulación sistemática de capital es compatible con la estabilidad social y ecológica: en otras palabras, que sólo necesitamos hacer unos pocos ajustes (preferentemente en función del mercado), y que de esta forma podremos seguir adelante más o menos como estábamos. El resultado de este aislamiento es que se logra contener, e incluso cooptar la fuerza potencialmente explosiva de la conciencia crecientemente generalizada del antagonismo que existe entre el capital y una humanidad que forma parte de sistemas ecológicos complejos. Cooptada para que respalde una nueva ronda de acumulación (pensemos en el “capitalismo verde”) y una nueva ampliación de las reglamentaciones políticas que calarían aún más profundo en nuestras vidas.
¡Olvidemos Kioto!
Una vez más: la izquierda anticapitalista en el Norte global no puede “parar” o siquiera mitigar de manera significativa el cambio climático. Asumir que podríamos, nos dejaría obligadamente atrapados en nuestra intemporalidad, ya que solamente podríamos esperar lograr nuestra meta en un momento lejano, muy lejano del futuro –fuera del tiempo real, en el mundo del nunca jamás. Pero sí podemos, con nuestras fuerzas y recursos limitados, intervenir sobre la “lentitud” de la democracia genuina para romper el aislamiento protector del tiempo del capital que el Estado pretende imponer. Si una vez más dejamos la desalentadora certidumbre de nuestra propia descomposición e intemporalidad, si recordamos que como movimientos tenemos la capacidad de ser más rápidos que el Estado, entonces podemos evitar la cooptación e intervenir en su internalización de las energías antagónicas.
¿Y cómo lo hacemos? ¿Cómo mantenemos abierto el espacio político que genera la preocupación cada vez más generalizada por el cambio climático, que tiene la potencialidad de producir nuevas ideas y soluciones, nuevas posibilidades, que a su vez podrían ser una promesa de avanzar más allá del capitalismo? ¿Cómo se puede intervenir en las presiones poderosas hacia la constitución de un nuevo ”capitalismo verde” hacia un “eco-Imperio”, un eco-Keynesianismo autoritario mundial? Si la urgencia nos obliga a pensar en términos de efectividad, y más aún, de eficiencia, ¿cómo puede nuestro movimiento, pobre en recursos, desplegar de manera efectiva sus fuerzas limitadas para maximizar resultados en función del objetivo de crear y/o mantener un espacio para el desarrollo de múltiples soluciones no capitalistas, no impuestas de arriba hacia abajo, para la crisis del clima?
La respuesta a esta pregunta comienza con otras dos preguntas, y de esta forma nos retrotrae al comienzo de toda la argumentación. Primera pregunta: ¿Cuál es probablemente el proceso más importante en sí mismo por el cual los gobiernos del mundo intentan aislar el capital de la crítica pública con respecto al cambio climático? Respuesta: casi ciertamente los procesos de Kioto/Bali, con los cuales se invita al mundo a presenciar los dramas de la alta política internacional, pero que al final producen poco o nada que efectivamente sirva para proteger el clima (sólo un comentario: desde la firma de los acuerdos de Kioto, las emisiones mundiales de CO2 han excedido incluso los peores escenarios proyectados por el PICC), y donde una reducción mínima de las emisiones legitima la producción continuada de un enorme volumen de gases de efecto invernadero –y ni que hablar de la creación de todo un nuevo mercado en créditos de emisiones (que se espera que valga alrededor de doscientos billones de dólares estadounidenses para 2020), para deleite del capital mundial. Está previsto que el proceso de seguimiento de Kioto, comenzado en Bali en diciembre de 2007, se firme en una cumbre internacional en Copenhague en diciembre de 2009.
Segunda pregunta: ¿Dónde radican las fortalezas de los movimientos radicales mundiales, tanto en comparación con nuestros enemigos como con nuestros aliados más moderados? Respuesta: en la organización de movilizaciones a gran escala contra las cumbres. Es precisamente en las movilizaciones en las cumbres que hemos desarrollado lo que podríamos llamar nuestra “mejor práctica”, donde hemos alcanzado antes un efecto político sustancial. En Seattle, no sólo logramos cerrar el centro d convenciones manifestando en las calles, también exacerbamos los múltiples conflictos existentes en el interior de la cumbre entre los distintos gobiernos que estaban negociando. Si logramos hacer lo mismo nuevamente, y construir una coalición política alrededor de la consigna “Olvidemos Kioto” e impulsarla como fuerza de cambio, podríamos al mismo tiempo mantener abierto el espacio político para discutir“soluciones” posibles al cambio climático que vayan más allá de la agenda orientada por el mercado que hoy reina, y ofrecer asimismo un punto focal y una demanda común por la cual pueda luchar el movimiento mundial emergente por el clima. ¡Olvidemos Kioto. Impidamos Copenhague 2009!
¿Pero por qué sugerimos organizar una protesta contra otra cumbre después de argumentar que las contra-cumbres se han vuelto cada vez menos efectivas en comparación con lo que eran? Debido a que la política del cambio climático en 2008 parece muy diferente a la política de la globalización neoliberal de 2008 –en realidad, se parece más a lo que hacía la política de la globalización antes de que fracasara la cumbre de la OMC en Seattle. En aquella época, durante la década del “fin de la historia”, muchos sabían que el capitalismo neo-liberal tenía fallas, pero nadie reconocía, tampoco la “izquierda”, la existencia de un movimiento, ni siquiera un“movimiento de movimientos” que se le pudiera oponer. Seattle creó la posibilidad de reconocer los elementos comunes a muchas luchas diferentes, de reconocer que todos enfrentaban al mismo enemigo. De un “movimiento” en primer lugar, que es donde el argumento cierra el círculo: el ciclo de las luchas alter-mundistas quizás se haya terminado, pero sus lecciones no han sido en vano, por ejemplo, la importancia de evitar el problema del movimiento de “una semana al año” que significa centrar todo exclusivamente en los grandes eventos. El movimiento emergente por el clima debe estar arraigado en prácticas sostenibles y cotidianas de resistencia y transformación en todos los niveles, no sólo en el ámbito mundial, sino en el regional, el nacional y el local. Pero antes de que pueda verse a sí mismo como ’un movimiento’, es necesario marcar la cancha, demostrar que existe una posición sobre el cambio climático que es más radical que el simple pedido de más y mejor comercio de emisiones. Que hay a quienes no sólo les preocupa el cambio climático, sino también su causante: el capitalismo. Y para que eso suceda, podríamos necesitar lo que alguna gente llamó un“momento de exceso” , en el cual el tiempo se acelera, y se vuelven posibles cambios que antes eran imposibles. Una contra-cumbre puede lograrlo. En ese sentido, entonces: ¡el movimiento ha muerto – viva el movimiento!
Tadzio Mueller vive en Berlín, donde milita en el movimiento emergente de acción por el clima, y enseña ciencias políticas en la Universidad de Kassel. Es editor de Turbulence, www.turbulence.org.uk
The Spanish translation of this article was originally published by Centre Tricontinental. The English original, published in Turbulence 4 can be found here. A Danish translation is here, and a Finnish here.
Elsewhere on the Web…
In this section, we will be publishing links to articles elsewhere on the web that we feel resonate with the problematics thrown up by the various issues of Turbulence published so far.
This first text, We Won But We Lost, an interview with Raquel Gutiérrez, was published by Ukhampacha Bolivia in March 2008. It deals explicitly with the question of winning, which we tried to address in Turbulence 1, in the context of Latin America.
We Won’t Pay for Your Crisis
Photo credit: Turbulence
On March 28, 2009, up to 30,000 people took part in the Berlin demonstration, We Won’t Pay for Your Crisis; with a further 25,000 in Frankfurt am Main. Turbulence, who were among the 100+ groups, organisations, networks and publications to call for the demonstrations, took part in the Berlin events.
The demonstration formed part of the Global Day of Action, called for by both a number of civil society and social movement organisations who signed up to the Paris Declaration as well as participants in the Assembly of Social Movements at the 2009 World Social Forum in Belem, Brazil.
The short, English language call for the demonstrations in Berlin and Frankfurt can be found below. Further calls for the demonstration are online here: 1, 2, 3 and 4.
WE’RE NOT PAYING FOR YOUR CRISIS!
FOR A SOCIETY OF SOLIDARITY!
International Day of Action
March 28, 2009
Country-wide Demonstrations in Berlin and Frankfurt
THE CAPITALIST CRISIS…
…reaches evermore people in everyday life in 2009. It is not just a problem of the poor regulation of banks - the crisis is capitalism and has many faces: poverty, hunger, climate catastrophe, war over access to raw materials, financial market crash and economic crisis.
We demand that the agents and profiteers of the crisis foot the bill. We will not accept that it be paid by employees, the unemployed, retirees, school and university students, and the people of the global South.
On March 28th we are demonstrating for a society of solidarity and fundamental changes of the economy. We want democratic control of the economy and it’s orientation towards people’s needs rather than that of profit. Immediate appropriation and socialization of the banks rather than nationalization of the losses! Social security for all people worldwide, not security for profits!
The compulsion to permanent economic growth, competition and profit accumulation stands counter to an economy geared towards social and ecological aims. We need alternatives beyond capitalism — the way it is, is not how it will remain.
WHO IS CALLING THE DEMO?
A wide societal coalition is mobilizing for the demonstration on March 28th - a plurality of non-govermental networks, social-political initiatives, unions, political parties, immigrant associations, anti-capitalist groups, development and environmental organizations and groups of the unemployed, as well as school and university students. Together, in Frankfurt and Berlin, and as part of an international day of action, we are calling for a society of solidarity, because “We won’t pay for your crisis!”
List of participating groups here.
The following links are to mainstream and alternative media coverage of the events in both cities:
Sueddeutscher Zeitung | taz | Indymedia | Financial Times Deutschland | Antifa.de (with links to photos) | Tagesschau | Spiegel Online | Die Linke | B.Z. | Freitag | Tagesspiegel and here | Junge Welt | Neues Deutschland | Bild Zeitung | We Won’t Pay For Your Crisis demo coalition (press release) | Berliner Kurier | attac | Frankfurter Allegemein Zeitung and here, here and here | NPR (English) | Yahoo!/Associated Press (English) | Flickr (including video of the Interventionist Left’s banner drop on the route of the demonstration in Berlin) | Berlin Mayday Coalition (press release) | Freundeskreis Videoklips | YouTube |
For more information, see: www.28maerz.de or www.kapitalismuskrise.org
We’re Not Paying for Your Crisis
The following is the short Call for the demonstrations in Berlin and Frankfurt - supported by Turbulence and many, many others - on March 28, 2009.
We’re not Paying for Your Crisis!
For a Society of Solidarity!
International Day of Action
March 28, 2009
Country-wide Demonstrations in Berlin and Frankfurt
The Capitalist crisis…
…reaches evermore people in everyday life in 2009. It is not just a problem of the poor regulation of banks - the crisis is capitalism and has many faces: poverty, hunger, climate catastrophe, war over access to raw materials, financial market crash and economic crisis.
We demand that the agents and profiteers of the crisis foot the bill. We will not accept that it be paid by employees, the unemployed, retirees, school and university students, and the people of the global South.
On March 28th we are demonstrating for a society of solidarity and fundamental changes of the economy. We want democratic control of the economy and it’s orientation towards people’s needs rather than that of profit. Immediate appropriation and socialization of the banks rather than nationalization of the losses! Social security for all people worldwide, not security for profits!
The compulsion to permanent economic growth, competition and profit accumulation stands counter to an economy geared towards social and ecological aims. We need alternatives beyond capitalism — the way it is, is not how it will remain.
Who is Calling the Demo?
A wide societal coalition is mobilizing for the demonstration on March 28th - a plurality of non-govermental networks, social-political initiatives, unions, political parties, immigrant associations, anti-capitalist groups, development and environmental organizations and groups of the unemployed, as well as school and university students. Together, in Frankfurt and Berlin, and as part of an international day of action, we are calling for a society of solidarity, because “We won’t pay for your crisis!”
List of participating groups here.
Meeting points:
Berlin: 12:00, Rotes Rathaus. Rathausstraße 15, 10178 Mitte.
Frankfurt: 12:00, Hauptbahnhof (Central Station) & Bockenheimer Warte U-Bahn Station.
For more information, see www.28maerz.de or www.kapitalismuskrise.org
Other calls for the demonstration can be found here: 1, 2, 3, 4.
e-Newsletter 7
CONTENTS
1) Brand New Turbulence Article: ‘Do You Remember the End of History?’ Published in Mule Magazine
2) German-Language Economic Crisis Special
3) Spanish Translation of ‘Et tu Bertinotti?’
4) Finnish Translations of ‘The Movement is Dead, Long Live the Movement’ and ‘The Crazy Before the New’
5) French Translations of John Holloway’s ‘1968 and Paths to New Worlds’
6) Free Association Article on the Crisis
7) All the Usual Requests
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1) BRAND NEW TURBULENCE ARTICLE: ‘DO YOU REMEMBER THE END OF HISTORY?’ PUBLISHED IN MULE MAGAZINE
Turbulence have written a short article on the economic crisis, ‘Do You Remember the End of History?’ for Mule magazine. We are happy to be able to share the article with you here. It can also be found online here.
There have been a number of requests floating around over email lists asking for introductions to the financial (or as we prefer to call it, world economic) crisis. We’d like to think that this article could be useful as such a ‘primer’ – it also contains a few very tentative ideas about what the crisis could mean for radicals.
We’ve turned the article into an A5 flyer which you can download as a PDF, print out, photocopy and leave in your local bookshop – or anywhere else which seems sensible.
The flyers can be found on our website: www.turbulence.org.uk
A German translation of the text can be found here.
And a Swedish translation here.
Here’s the article…
DO YOU REMEMBER THE END OF HISTORY?
By Turbulence
It was all the rage in the 1990s. Neoliberal capitalism, sometimes called Thatcherism or Reaganism, was supposed to represent the pinnacle of history. The slogan then, as the Iron Lady was fond of saying, was ‘There Is No Alternative’. The task of overturning this totalitarian cant started a long time ago. The Counter-Globalisation Movement that arose at the turn of the century and is associated with the protests in Seattle and Genoa, refused to accept that history was over. It put forward the slogan ‘Another World is Possible’. We were part of those movements and now amidst a momentous world economic crisis we can say quite clearly that we were right and they were wrong.
This is not about gloating – it goes right to the heart of what this crisis really means. Above all, neoliberalism was successful in that most ideological of manoeuvres: claiming the centre ground. Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve who oversaw much of the de-regulation that contributed to the present crisis, has admitted that he’s had to re-examine his entire life’s dearest beliefs. The essential dogma of neoliberalism – that markets are the best way to allocate social wealth and resources, because only there can individuals’ pursuit of their self-interest be magically transformed into social progress – has been thoroughly disproved. It is no longer common sense, or the only sensible position: it’s now clear that it was a partisan ideology (rather than neutral ‘science’) all along. To hear someone like Greenspan recognise that is like hearing the Pope say, ‘maybe I’ve been wrong about this whole God business’. This is neoliberalism’s ‘fall of the Berlin wall’ moment.
But to say that the world is going to change doesn’t mean that this will be the end of capitalism, or even necessarily the beginning of anything ‘better’ than neoliberalism. It means that now is the moment when a certain economic and political arrangement created in the late 1970s became unsustainable.
The rise of neoliberalism was partly a response to a politically strong and demanding working class, used to the idea that its basic needs should be met by the welfare state, that real wages would rise, and believing itself entitled to more. Since then, real wages have stagnated or declined, welfare provision has been rolled back and restricted, insecurity and fear have become widespread. In return we got cheap credit, thanks to low interest rates and deregulated financial markets – underwritten by rising house prices (the ‘bubble’ where this crisis began) –, private insurance and pensions, and (particularly in the UK and US) a feast of consumption fuelled not by rising wages, but by rampant personal debt. A very few speculators got very wealthy. Some of us got houses and a pension. Most of us got deep into debt.
Now this whole ‘deal’ has collapsed. The name ‘credit crunch’ says it all: the days when cheap credit compensated for losses in all other areas are over. We face the grim reality of those stagnant wages, precarity, rising prices and ever-shrinking social provision. In short, we in the global North face what most of the world’s population experienced in the 1980s, when the IMF and the World Bank roamed the globe selling ‘structural adjustment’.
It was around this ‘adjustment’ that the initial struggles against neoliberalism took place in the 1990s, and the same could happen now. We can’t know exactly where these new social conflicts will erupt, or in what form; whether they will take hold and become generalised. Perhaps around rising food and utility prices, as people reinvent a centuries-old tradition of price-setting, informed by a ‘moral economy’ of ‘fair prices’ that opposes the ‘political economy’ of the market. Perhaps around housing, remembering lessons from the anti-poll tax movement, as people organise to prevent evictions and reclaim physical space.
But this also means that the shape of the restructuring which will be being designed and debated by the G20 and others over the coming months will depend on how people will react to the situation. Everybody’s talking about a ‘New Deal’: well, the deal we get can only be as good as our capacity to demand – and reclaim – what we want.
History, then, is up for grabs. But we knew that all along.
2) GERMAN-LANGUAGE ECONOMIC CRISIS SPECIAL
We’ve also recently produced a German-language ‘economic crisis special’, featuring the two articles addressing the issue in Turbulence 4. Both pieces, by David Harvie and Christian Frings, are available in English and German online here.
The flyer can also be downloaded as a PDF.
The special is featured as a supplement to the latest issue (No. 39) of arranca!, published by the group FelS in Berlin, on ‘militant investigation’. It was published on December 19 2008.
Copies of the special issue will be available at the Interventionist Left’s mini-conference on the crisis in Frankfurt Main this Sunday, January 25 2009. Further copies can be ordered (for a small donation to help cover costs, see website for details) via the usual email address: editors@turbulence.org.uk
3) SPANISH TRANSLATION OF ‘ET TU BERTINOTTI?’
A Spanish translation of Sandro Mezzadra’s article, ‘Et tu Bertinotti?’ published in Turbulence 4 is now available online, along with the introductory note by Keir Milburn and Ben Trott. The article was translated by Bárbara Iniesta.
4) FINNISH TRANSLATIONS OF ‘THE MOVEMENT IS DEAD, LONG LIVE THE MOVEMENT!’ AND ‘THE CRAZY BEFORE THE NEW’
A Finnish translation of Tadzio Mueller’s article in Turbulence 4, ‘The Movement is Dead, Long Live the Movement!’ is now available on our website. It was originally published at http://fifi.voima.fi
A Finnish translation is now also available of Kay Summer and Harry Halpin’s article, ‘The Crazy Before the New’ from Issue 1 of Turbulence. The article was translated by Soile Koskinen and published in Väärinajattelija # 3.
5) FRENCH TRANSLATION OF JOHN HOLLOWAY’S ‘1968 AND PATHS TO NEW WORLDS’
A French translation of John Holloway’s article in Turbulence 4, ‘1968 and Paths to New Worlds’ is now available at the Turbulence website.
The text will soon be made available by the French network, Infokiosques.
6) FREE ASSOCIATION ARTICLE ON THE CRISIS
The Free Association, some of whom are also involved with Turbulence, have a new article out on the current economic crisis. It was written for Shift magazine and can be found on their website here.
7) ALL THE USUAL REQUESTS
As ever, we are desperately in need of donations. If you can make a contribution, no matter how small, via the PayPal button on our website, it would be tremendously appreciated.
If you would rather send us money some other way, get in touch at editors@turbulence.org.uk
We are also always looking out for people who can help with translations. If you can, get in touch at the usual address.
Other than that, we are of course always delighted when people link to our website, become our MySpace friends, and help out with distribution. We’d like to thank all the people who’ve already done so!
(January 23, 2009)
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www.turbulence.org.uk // www.myspace.com/turbulence_ideas4movement // editors@turbulence.org.uk
To stay informed about future ‘Turbulence’ publications and projects, subscribe to our (very!) low-traffic e-newsletter here: https://lists.riseup.net/www/info/turbulenceannouncementslist
Minns du historiens slut?
Turbulence
Det låg mycket i ilskan på 90-talet. Nyliberal kapitalism, ibland kallad Thatcherism eller Reaganism, skulle utgöra kulmen på historien. Slagordet då, som ”Järnladyn” gillade att använda, var ”det finns inte något alternativ”. Utmaningen att vända denna totalitära jargong inleddes för länge sedan. De globaliseringskritiska rörelserna, som uppstod vid århundradets slut och som förknippas med protesterna i Seattle och Genua, vägrade att acceptera historiens slut. De förde fram att ”en annan värld är möjlig”. Vi är en del av dessa rörelser och nu, mitt i en enorm global finanskris, kan vi tydligt konstatera att vi hade rätt och att de hade fel.
Det här handlar inte om skryta – det handlar om vad kärnan i denna kris egentligen innebär. Framförallt lyckades nyliberalismen ideologiskt sätta sig själv i centrum. Alan Greenspan, tidigare chef för den amerikanska centralbanken, som styrde en stor del av avregleringen som bidrog mycket till den nu pågående krisen, har erkänt att han har behövt omvärdera sitt livs mest kära övertygelser. Nyliberalismens grundantagande, att marknaden är det bästa sättet att sprida välfärd, för endast på marknaden kan individers strävan efter sina egna intressen magiskt omvandlas till en social process, har blivit starkt motbevisad. Det är inte längre sunt förnuft, eller det enda alternativet - det står nu tydligt att det snarare handlat om en viss grupps intressen. Att höra en person som Greenspan identifiera detta är som att höra påven säga ”kanske har vi haft fel om det här med Gud”. Detta är alltså nyliberalismens ”Berlinmurens fall”.
Men att säga att världen kommer att förändras innebär inte kapitalismens slut, eller ens nödvändigtvis början på något bättre än nyliberalismen. Det betyder att nu är stunden då en viss ekonomisk och politisk ordning, skapad på slutet av 70-talet, blivit instabil.
Uppkomsten av nyliberalism var delvis ett svar på en politiskt stark och krävande arbetarklass, som var van vid tanken att välfärdsstaten skulle tillgodose grundläggande behov, att reallönerna skulle öka och som dessutom ansåg sig förtjänta av mer. Sedan dess har reallönerna stagnerat, sociala försäkringar har blivit restriktivare och osäkerhet och rädsla har spridit sig. Mot detta fick vi billiga krediter bekostade av stigande huspriser (bubblan där denna kris uppstod), privata försäkringar och pensioner, och delvis (särskilt i Storbritannien och i USA) en konsumtionsfest triggad inte av höjda löner utan av stigande privata skulder. Ett fåtal spekulanter blev väldigt rika. Vissa fick hus och pension. De flesta av oss blev bara djupt skuldsatta.
Nu har hela denna ordning kollapsat. Tiden då billiga krediter kompenserade för förluster på alla andra områden är över. Vi måste nu möta den dystra verkligheten av stagnerande löner, osäkra anställningar, högre priser och ständigt minskande sociala rättigheter. Kort sagt, vi i nord har framför oss det som största delen av världens befolkning upplevde under 80-talet när IMF och Världsbanken som starkast propagerade för strukturanpassning. Det var runt tiden för denna anpassning under 90-talet som de första striderna mot nyliberalismen ägde rum, och detsamma skulle kunna hända nu. Vi kan inte exakt veta vart dessa nya sociala konflikter kommer att bryta ut eller i vilken form, eller om de blir konstanta. Kanske över stigande mat och bränslepriser, triggade av krafter som motsatt sig politisk styrning av ekonomin av marknaden. Eller kanske kommer dessa konflikter uppkomma kring frågan om bostad, då människor organiserar sig för att förhindra vräkningar och för att återta fysisk plats.
Men detta betyder också att formen på omstruktureringen som kommer att designas och debatteras av G20 och många andra över de kommande månaderna kommer att vara beroende av hur människor reagerar på situationen. Många pratar om en ”new deal”, men den nya deal vi kommer att få kommer bara att vara så stor som vår kapacitet att kräva – eller ta – det vi vill ha.
Historien är fri att forma. Men det visste vi ju hela tiden.
Turbulence (översatt: turbulens) är ett sporadiskt skriv- och publiceringsprojekt. Deras senaste skrift heter “Vem kommer att rädda oss från framtiden” och innehåller en samling artiklar rörande den pågående finanskrisen, mat- och oljepriser, den ekologiska krisen och dess potentiella betydelse för radikala rörelser. editors@turbulence.org.uk
Originally published in Swedish here. The English original can be found here, and a German translation here. A Serbian version of the text is online here, and a Greek version here (PDF).
Wie war das noch mit dem Ende der Geschichte?
von Turbulence
In den 1990er Jahren war es der letzte Schrei. Der neoliberale Kapitalismus war angeblich der krönende Endpunkt der Weltgeschichte. “There is no alternative” (”Es gibt keine Alternative”), lautete die von der britischen Premierministerin Margaret Thatcher oft gebrauchte Parole. Der Prozess, mit diesem totalitären Geseier aufzuräumen, begann schon vor langer Zeit. Die globalisierungskritische Bewegung, die um die Jahrtausendwende entstand und mit den Protesten in Seattle und Genua in Verbindung gebracht wird, weigerte sich, das vermeintliche Ende der Geschichte zu akzeptieren. Sie lancierte die Parole “Eine andere Welt ist möglich.” Wir waren Teil jener Bewegung und können nun, inmitten einer folgenschweren Weltwirtschaftskrise, ganz klar sagen, dass wir recht hatten, und die anderen unrecht.
Es geht uns hier nicht um Schadenfreude, sondern darum, was diese Krise eigentlich bedeutet. Erfolgreich war der Neoliberalismus vor allem bei der ideologischsten aller Unternehmungen: er schaffte es, die politische Mitte zu besetzen. Alan Greenspan – der ehemalige Vorsitzende der US-Zentralbank Federal Reserve, der bei einem Großteil der Deregulierungsmaßnahmen Pate stand, die zur jetzigen Krise beigetragen haben – hat zugegeben, dass er seine lebenslang gehegten Überzeugungen im Rahmen der Krise neu überdenken musste. Das zentrale Dogma des Neoliberalismus – dass Märkte das beste Mittel seien, um den gesellschaftlichen Reichtum und die vorhandenen Ressourcen zu verteilen, da sich das Eigeninteresse der Individuen nur dort auf magische Weise in gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt verwandle – ist gründlich widerlegt worden. Es ist nicht mehr einfach nur ‚gesunder Menschenverstand’, oder die einzig vernünftige Position: mittlerweile ist klar, dass es sich immer schon um eine parteiische Ideologie, und nicht um neutrale ‘Wissenschaft’, handelte. Wenn jemand wie Greenspan das anerkennt, ist das so, als würde der Papst sagen: “Vielleicht habe ich mit dieser ganzen Gott-Geschichte doch unrecht.” Für den Neoliberalismus ist diese Krise ebenso vernichtend, wie das der Fall der Berliner Mauer für den Ostblock war.
Wer aber sagt, dass sich die Welt ändern wird, sagt damit noch nicht, dass jetzt das Ende des Kapitalismus, oder auch nur der Anfang von etwas ‘besserem’ als dem Neoliberalismus bevor steht. Gemeint ist damit nur, dass wir gegenwärtig den Moment erleben, an dem ein bestimmtes wirtschaftliches und politisches Arrangement, dessen Ursprung in den späten 70er Jahren liegt, untragbar geworden ist.
Der Neoliberalismus war u. a. die Antwort auf eine politisch starke und anspruchsvolle ArbeiterInnenklasse, die sich an die Vorstellung, der Wohlfahrtsstaat sei für die Befriedigung ihrer Grundbedürfnisse zuständig, ebenso gewöhnt hatte wie an die Erwartung steigender Reallöhne, und die überzeugt war, dass ihr noch mehr zustehe. Seitdem stagnieren oder sinken die Reallöhne. Die wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Leistungen sind zurück gefahren und eingeschränkt worden. Unsicherheit und Furcht haben sich breit gemacht. Als Gegenleistung bekamen wir günstige Kredite, ermöglicht durch niedrige Zinssätze und deregulierte Finanzmärkte (denen wiederum steigende Häuserpreise zugrunde lagen, also eben die ‘Blase’, von der diese Krise ausging), private Kranken- und Altersversicherungen und – insbesondere in Großbritannien und den USA – einen überbordenden Konsum, der nicht auf steigende Löhne, sondern auf die ungezügelte Verschuldung der Privathaushalte zurück ging. Eine sehr kleine Anzahl von SpekulantInnen wurde sehr reich. Einige von uns bekamen Häuser und eine Altersrente. Die meisten von uns verschuldeten sich immer mehr.
Jetzt ist dieser ganze ‘Deal’ zusammen gekracht. Der Ausdruck ‘Kreditklemme’ spricht Bände: Die Zeiten, als günstige Kredite die Verluste in allen anderen Bereichen kompensierten, sind vorbei. Jetzt stehen wir vor der trostlosen Realität stagnierender Löhne, prekärer Arbeitsverhältnisse, steigender Preise und weiter schrumpfender Sozialleistungen. Kurzum, wir im globalen Norden blicken dem entgegen, was der Großteil der Weltbevölkerung in den 80er Jahren erlebte, als IWF und Weltbank über den Erdball zogen und ihre ‘Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen’ feilboten.
Die ersten Kämpfe gegen den Neoliberalismus in den 1990er Jahren richteten sich gegen genau diese Art der ‘Anpassung’, und das könnte sich jetzt wiederholen. Wir können nicht genau wissen, wo und in welcher Form die neuen sozialen Konflikte ausbrechen werden, ob sie sich als dauerhaft erweisen und verallgemeinern werden. Vielleicht wird es um die steigenden Preise von Nahrungsmitteln, Wasser, Transport oder Strom gehen, und die jahrhundertealte Tradition des eigenmächtigen Preisbestimmung auf Grundlage einer ‘moralischen Ökonomie’ des ‘gerechten Preises’ wird wiederbelebt werden, um sich gegen die ‘politische Ökonomie’ des Marktes zu wehren. Vielleicht werden Wohnfragen im Mittelpunkt stehen. Dann könnte auf Lehren aus der Bewegung gegen die britische poll tax (Kopfsteuer) zurück gegriffen werden, als Menschen sich organisierten, um Räumungen zu verhindern und materielle Räume für sich zurück zu erobern.
Das alles bedeutet aber auch, dass die Umstrukturierung, deren Aushandlung und Planung sich die G20 in den kommenden Monaten widmen werden, geprägt sein wird von den Reaktionen der Menschen auf die momentane Situation. Alle sprechen von einem ‘New Deal.’ Der Deal, der am Ende für uns heraus springt, wird von unserer Fähigkeit abhängen, das, was wir wollen, nicht nur zu fordern, sondern auch zurückzuerobern.
Die Geschichte wartet darauf, gemacht zu werden. Aber das wussten wir ja auch schon davor.
Turbulence ist ein unregelmäßig erscheinendes Zeitschriftenprojekt. Die letzte Ausgabe trug den Titel Who Will Save Us From the Future? und enthält verschiedene Artikel zur momentanen Überschneidung verschiedener Krisentendenzen - die Finanzkrise, Nahrungsmittel- und Ölpreiskrise, ökologische Krise - und deren mögliche Bedeutung für radikale Bewegungen.
English original. Swedish translation. Serbian version. Greek version (PDF).
Do You Remember the End of History?
By Turbulence
It was all the rage in the 1990s. Neoliberal capitalism, sometimes called Thatcherism or Reaganism, was supposed to represent the pinnacle of history. The slogan then, as the Iron Lady was fond of saying, was ‘There Is No Alternative’. The task of overturning this totalitarian cant started a long time ago. The Counter-Globalisation Movement that arose at the turn of the century and is associated with the protests in Seattle and Genoa, refused to accept that history was over. It put forward the slogan ‘Another World is Possible’. We were part of those movements and now amidst a momentous world economic crisis we can say quite clearly that we were right and they were wrong.
This is not about gloating – it goes right to the heart of what this crisis really means. Above all, neoliberalism was successful in that most ideological of manoeuvres: claiming the centre ground. Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve who oversaw much of the de-regulation that contributed to the present crisis, has admitted that he’s had to re-examine his entire life’s dearest beliefs. The essential dogma of neoliberalism – that markets are the best way to allocate social wealth and resources, because only there can individuals’ pursuit of their self-interest be magically transformed into social progress – has been thoroughly disproved. It is no longer common sense, or the only sensible position: it’s now clear that it was a partisan ideology (rather than neutral ‘science’) all along. To hear someone like Greenspan recognise that is like hearing the Pope say, ‘maybe I’ve been wrong about this whole God business’. This is neoliberalism’s ‘fall of the Berlin wall’ moment.
But to say that the world is going to change doesn’t mean that this will be the end of capitalism, or even necessarily the beginning of anything ‘better’ than neoliberalism. It means that now is the moment when a certain economic and political arrangement created in the late 1970s became unsustainable.
The rise of neoliberalism was partly a response to a politically strong and demanding working class, used to the idea that its basic needs should be met by the welfare state, that real wages would rise, and believing itself entitled to more. Since then, real wages have stagnated or declined, welfare provision has been rolled back and restricted, insecurity and fear have become widespread. In return we got cheap credit, thanks to low interest rates and deregulated financial markets – underwritten by rising house prices (the ‘bubble’ where this crisis began) –, private insurance and pensions, and (particularly in the UK and US) a feast of consumption fuelled not by rising wages, but by rampant personal debt. A very few speculators got very wealthy. Some of us got houses and a pension. Most of us got deep into debt.
Now this whole ‘deal’ has collapsed. The name ‘credit crunch’ says it all: the days when cheap credit compensated for losses in all other areas are over. We face the grim reality of those stagnant wages, precarity, rising prices and ever-shrinking social provision. In short, we in the global North face what most of the world’s population experienced in the 1980s, when the IMF and the World Bank roamed the globe selling ‘structural adjustment’.
It was around this ‘adjustment’ that the initial struggles against neoliberalism took place in the 1990s, and the same could happen now. We can’t know exactly where these new social conflicts will erupt, or in what form; whether they will take hold and become generalised. Perhaps around rising food and utility prices, as people reinvent a centuries-old tradition of price-setting, informed by a ‘moral economy’ of ‘fair prices’ that opposes the ‘political economy’ of the market. Perhaps around housing, remembering lessons from the anti-poll tax movement, as people organise to prevent evictions and reclaim physical space.
But this also means that the shape of the restructuring which will be being designed and debated by the G20 and others over the coming months will depend on how people will react to the situation. Everybody’s talking about a ‘New Deal’: well, the deal we get can only be as good as our capacity to demand – and reclaim – what we want.
History, then, is up for grabs. But we knew that all along.
December, 2008
This article was first published in Mule no. 5
The text above is also available as an A5 flyer, free to download. Feel free to print it out, photocopy it, and drop a few copies in your nearest bookshop.
A German translation is available here, a Swedish translation here, a Serbian here and a Greek version is here (PDF).
1968 et les portes ouvertes sur de nouveaux mondes
John Holloway
1968, pourquoi parler de 1968? Il y a tant d’urgences. Parlons plutôt de Oaxaca et du Chiapas, et de la menace d’une guerre civile au Mexique. Ou bien de la guerre en Irak ou encore de l’accélération de la destruction des conditions nécessaires à la vie humaine sur terre. Est-ce vraiment le moment, pour les vieillards, de se laisser aller aux réminiscences, confortablement installés dans leur fauteuil?
Mais peut-être avons-nous besoin de parler de 1968 parce que, quoique confrontés à cette urgence réelle, nous nous sentons perdus, à la recherche d’une direction à prendre. Et il ne s’agit pas de trouver la bonne route (car une telle route n’existe pas) mais de créer de nombreux sentiers. 1968 a peut-être quelque chose à voir avec le fait que nous nous sentions perdus, et peut-être est-il en mesure de nous aider à tracer de nouveaux sentiers. Parlons donc de 1968.
Explosion de la constellation sociale du travail abstrait
1968 a ouvert la porte d’un changement dans le monde, d’un changement dans les règles du conflit anti-capitaliste, d’un changement dans la signification d’une révolution anti-capitaliste, d’un changement donc dans la signification de l’espoir. C’est ce que nous essayons encore aujourd’hui de comprendre. Voilà pourquoi j’affirme que 1968 fait partie de ces choses qui contribuent à faire que nous nous sentions perdus et qu’il s’agit aussi d’un évènement qui peut nous aider à nous orienter.
1968 fut une explosion, et son écho résonne toujours, mêlé au bruit des explosions qui, par la suite, ont repris les thèmes de 1968, la plus importante datant peut-être de 1994, avec l’explosion en chaîne que constitue le mouvement zapatiste. Ainsi, il ne s’agit pas pour moi de refaire avec précision l’histoire de 1968 : ce qui m’intéresse c’est l’explosion que cela a constitué et comment nous pouvons penser, dans le sillage de celle-ci, des moyens qui nous permettraient de venir à bout de cette catastrophe qu’est le capitalisme.
1968 fut une explosion, l’explosion d’une certaine constellation de forces sociales, d’un certain mode du conflit social. Parfois, cette constellation est appelée fordisme. Ce vocable a le grand mérite d’attirer immédiatement notre attention sur cette question centrale de la manière dont est organisée notre activité quotidienne. Il fait référence à un monde où la production de masse dans les usines se combinait avec la promotion d’une consommation de masse par le biais de salaires relativement élevés et de l’action du soi-disant Etat-providence.
Les acteurs centraux de ce processus étaient d’une part les syndicats, dont la participation aux négociations salariales contractuelles faisait d’eux une force motrice, et d’autre part l’Etat, qui donnait l’impression d’être en mesure de réguler l’économie et d’assurer un niveau de vie convenable. Il n’est guère surprenant, dans une telle société, que les aspirations à un changement social aient été focalisées sur l’Etat et sur l’objectif d’en prendre la direction, par la voie des urnes ou non. Ainsi il serait probablement plus exact de qualifier cette forme de rapports sociaux non seulement de fordiste, mais aussi de keynésien et de léniniste.
Je veux suggérer qu’il y avait quelque chose d’encore plus profond à la clé. Le danger, dans le fait de nous restreindre, dans notre compréhension, à une crise du fordisme (ou plutôt du fordisme-keynesianisme-léninisme) tient dans le fait que ce terme nous invite à penser qu’il s’agit d’un mode de régulation parmi d’autres, et voué, comme les autres, à être remplacé par un nouveau (le post-fordisme, l’Empire ou quoi que ce soit d’autre). Le capitalisme est alors envisagé comme une succession de restructurations, de synthèses ou de fermetures, alors que notre problème n’est pas d’écrire une histoire du capitalisme mais plutôt de trouver un chemin qui pourrait nous mener hors de cette catastrophe. Il est nécessaire de dépasser le concept de fordisme. Le fordisme a été une forme extrêmement développée de travail aliéné, de travail abstrait, et ce qui a été remis en question durant ces années c’était le travail aliéné, c’est-à-dire le cœur même du capitalisme.
Le travail abstrait (j’utilise là l’expression que Marx utilisait dans Le Capital car il me semble que c’est un concept plus riche) est le travail qui produit de la valeur et de la plus-value, et donc du capital. Marx l’a opposé au travail utile ou concret, à l’activité qui est nécessaire à la reproduction de n’importe quelle société. Le travail abstrait est le travail dépouillé de ses caractéristiques particulières, c’est le travail équivalent à n’importe quel autre travail, et cette équivalence est établie soit par l’échange soit par des analogies administratives. L’abstraction n’est pas seulement «mentale» : c’est une abstraction réelle. Le fait que les produits soient fabriqués en vue de l’échange rejaillit sur le processus de production lui-même et convertit ce dernier en un processus dans lequel la seule chose qui compte est la performance du travail social nécessaire, l’efficacité de la production de biens qui se vendront. Le travail abstrait, c’est le travail dépourvu de toute particularité, dénué de tout sens. Le travail abstrait produit la société du capital, une société dont le seul sens, dont le seul but est l’accumulation de travail abstrait, la poursuite constante du profit.
Le travail abstrait trame la société dans laquelle nous vivons. Il tisse ensemble la multiplicité des activités humaines par la répétition du processus d’échange, par ce processus qui ne cesse de nous dire, toujours davantage, que ce que nous aimons faire importe peu, que peu importe l’amour et l’attention que nous y portions, que ce qui compte, c’est dans quelle mesure cela va se vendre et combien d’argent cela peut rapporter. C’est ainsi que nos activités sont tissées les unes aux autres, c’est là-dessus que la société capitaliste est bâtie.
Mais ce tissage va encore bien plus loin que cela. Car cette manière de se rapporter à l’autre, à travers l’échange d’objets, crée une chosification, une réification, une fétichisation générale des rapports sociaux. De la même façon que ce que nous créons se sépare de nous et se retourne contre nous en niant ses origines, tous les aspects de nos relations avec les autres acquièrent le caractère de choses. L’argent devient une chose, au lieu d’être une simple relation entre différents créateurs. L’Etat devient une chose, au lieu d’être la manière dont nous organisons nos affaires communes. Le sexe devient une chose, au lieu d’être la multiplicité des façons à travers lesquelles nos corps se touchent et se rapportent physiquement. La nature devient une chose à utiliser pour notre profit, au lieu d’être cette interrelation complexe des différentes formes de vie qui se partagent cette planète. Le temps devient une chose, le temps de l’horloge, un temps en dehors de nous qui nous dit que demain sera pareil à aujourd’hui, au lieu d’être juste le rythme de nos existences, les intensités et les relâchements de notre faire. Et ainsi de suite.
En participant au travail abstrait, nous ne cessons de tisser, encore et encore, ce monde qui nous détruit si rapidement. Et chaque partie de ce tissu donne de la force et de la solidité aux autres parties. Au centre se trouve notre activité, notre travail abstrait, mais le vide et l’absurdité de l’abstraction de notre travail est maintenu à sa place par l’ensemble de la structure d’abstraction ou d’aliénation que nous créons : l’Etat, l’idée et la pratique d’une sexualité uniquement dimorphe, l’objectification de la nature, le vécu du temps comme temps de l’horloge, la vision de l’espace comme un espace contenu à l’intérieur de limites, et ainsi de suite. Chacune de ces facettes de l’absurdité abstraite est créée par nous et renforce, par effet de retour, l’absurdité abstraite de la vie quotidienne qui en est le noyau. C’est ce tissage complexe qui va exploser en 1968.
Le «dessous» du travail abstrait, le faire
Comment? Quelle force était à l’origine de l’explosion? Ce n’était pas la classe ouvrière, tout du moins pas dans son acception traditionnelle. Les ouvriers d’usine eurent certes un rôle important, particulièrement en France, mais ils ne jouèrent pas de rôle central dans l’explosion de 1968. On ne peut pas non plus attribuer cela à l’action d’un groupe particulier. C’est plus une relation sociale, la relation qui se noue autour du travail abstrait, qui explose. La force qui se trouve derrière l’explosion n’est pas un groupe mais le «dessous» du travail abstrait, la contradiction du travail abstrait, ce que le travail abstrait contient mais ne parvient pas à contenir, ce que le travail abstrait réprime mais n’arrive pas à réprimer.
Quel est le «dessous» du travail abstrait? On a affaire là à un problème de vocabulaire, et ce n’est pas par hasard, parce que ce qui est réprimé tend à devenir invisible, sans voix, sans nom. On peut parler d’anti-aliénation, ou d’anti-abstraction. Dans ses manuscrits de 1844, Marx définit l’anti-aliénation comme une «activité vitale consciente» et, dans Le Capital, l’opposition se pose entre travail abstrait et «travail utile ou concret». Ce terme n’est pas totalement satisfaisant, en partie parce que la distinction entre travail et d’autres formes d’activités n’est pas partagée par toutes les sociétés. Pour cette raison, j’utiliserai le terme le faire pour nommer le «dessous» du travail abstrait : le faire, plutôt que juste l’anti-aliénation, parce que ce dont il s’agit est avant tout la manière dont l’activité humaine est organisée.
Le capitalisme est basé sur le travail abstrait, mais il y a toujours un dessous, un autre aspect de l’activité qui semble être totalement subordonné au travail abstrait mais ne l’est pas et ne peut pas l’être. Le travail abstrait est l’activité qui crée du capital et tisse la domination capitaliste, mais il y a toujours un autre aspect, un faire qui garde ou qui cherche à garder sa particularité, qui pousse vers une forme de sens, vers une forme d’autodétermination. Dès le début du Capital, Marx pointe la relation entre travail abstrait et travail utile comme étant le point autour duquel la compréhension de l’économie politique (et donc du capitalisme) pivote – une phrase presque totalement ignorée par l’ensemble de la tradition marxiste.
Au sein du capitalisme, le travail utile (le faire) existe sous la forme de travail abstrait, mais la relation entre forme et contenu ne peux pas être simplement comprise comme une relation contenu/contenant : inévitablement, il s’agit d’une relation de «à-l’intérieur-en-opposition-et-au-delà», le faire existe à l’intérieur, en opposition et au-delà du travail abstrait. C’est une question d’expérience quotidienne, puisque nous essayons tous de trouver un moyen de diriger notre activité vers ce que nous considérons comme désirable ou nécessaire. Et même à l’intérieur de notre travail abstrait, nous essayons de trouver le moyen de ne pas nous soumettre totalement au règne de l’argent. Professeurs, nous tentons de faire plus que de produire les fonctionnaires du Capital ; ouvriers sur une chaîne de production, dès que nous avons un instant de libre, nous caressons les cordes d’une guitare imaginaire ; infirmières, le soin que nous portons à nos patients n’est pas seulement motivé par le gain ; étudiants, nous rêvons d’une vie qui ne serait pas totalement déterminée par l’argent. Il y a une relation antagoniste entre ce que nous faisons et l’abstraction (ou l’aliénation) imposée par le Capital, une relation qui n’est pas seulement faite de subordination mais aussi de résistance, de révolte et de dépassement.
Ceci est toujours présent, mais en 1968, c’est l’explosion, au moment où toute une génération qui n’est plus domptée par l’expérience du fascisme et de la guerre se lève pour affirmer : «Non, nous ne vouerons pas nos vies au règne de l’argent, nous ne sacrifierons pas tous les jours de notre vie au travail abstrait, nous allons faire autre chose». La révolte contre le Capital s’exprime clairement comme celle qu’elle est et doit toujours être : une révolte contre le Travail. Il devient clair qu’on ne peut plus penser la lutte des classes comme celle du Travail contre le Capital parce que le Travail est du même côté que le Capital, le Travail produit le Capital. La lutte n’est pas celle du Travail contre le Capital mais celle du faire (ou du vivre) contre le Travail et ainsi, contre le Capital. C’est ce qui s’exprime dans les universités, c’est ce qui s’exprime dans les usines, c’est ce qui s’exprime dans les rues en 1968. C’est ce qui empêche le Capital d’accroître encore le taux d’exploitation pour garder son taux de profit et maintenir le Fordisme en place.
C’est là la force du faire, c’est-à-dire la force de dire «non, ce n’est pas ainsi que nous vivrons nos vies, nous ferons autrement», qui fait exploser la constellation de lutte basée sur l’extrême abstraction du Travail telle qu’exprimée dans le Fordisme. C’est une révolte qui est dirigée contre tous les aspects de l’abstraction du Travail, pas seulement contre l’aliénation au sens étroit du terme, mais aussi contre la fétichisation du sexe, de la nature, du temps, de l’espace, et encore contre les formes d’organisation obéissant à un cadre étatique, qui sont partie prenante de la fétichisation. On assiste à une libération, à une émancipation : il devient possible de penser et de faire des choses impossibles auparavant. La force de cette explosion, la force de cette lutte, éventre la catégorie du Travail (ouverte par Marx mais refermée par la pratique de la tradition marxiste) et avec elle, toutes les autres catégories de pensée.
L’explosion nous projette dans un monde nouveau. Elle nous projette dans un nouveau champ de bataille, caractérisé par une nouvelle constellation de luttes par distinction plus ouverte. Ceci est crucial : si nous nous empressons de parler d’un nouveau mode de domination (Empire ou post-Fordisme), nous refermons des dimensions que nous nous battons par ailleurs pour maintenir ouvertes. En d’autres termes, il y a un danger réel qu’en analysant le soi-disant nouveau paradigme de domination, nous lui accordions une solidité qu’il ne mérite pas, et dont nous ne voulons certainement pas. Le tissu relativement cohérent qui existait avant l’explosion a été mis en pièce. Il est dans l’intérêt du Capital de le remettre en état, d’établir un nouveau modèle. L’anti-capitalisme se dirige dans la direction opposée, déchirant, élargissant les failles aussi loin que possible.
L’ancienne constellation était basée sur l’antagonisme entre Travail et Capital, avec son cortège de syndicats, de corporatismes, de partis, d’Etats providences, etc. Si nous avons raison de dire que la nouvelle constellation doit être comprise comme ayant en son centre l’antagonisme entre le faire et le travail abstrait, cela signifie donc qu’il faut repenser radicalement ce que veut dire anticapitalisme, ce que veut dire révolution. Toutes les pratiques et les idées établies liées au travail abstrait deviennent questionnables : le travail, la sexualité, la nature, l’Etat, le temps, l’espace, toutes deviennent des champs potentiels de lutte.
La nouvelle constellation (en d’autres termes, la constellation qui est apparue clairement en 1968 et qui est encore aujourd’hui dans les affres de la naissance) est la constellation du faire contre le travail abstrait. Ce qui signifie qu’elle est fondamentalement négative. Le faire existe dans et contre le travail abstrait : dans la mesure où il fait irruption au sein du travail abstrait mais qu’il existe aussi au-delà (en tant que coopérative, que centre social, que Junta de Buen Gobierno), il est toujours en danger, toujours façonné par son antagonisme avec le travail abstrait et menacé par celui-ci. Dès que nous le positivons, en le considérant comme un espace autonome, ou comme du socialisme dans un seul pays ou dans un seul centre social, ou comme une coopérative qui n’est pas en mouvement contre le capitalisme, il se convertit rapidement en son contraire. Les luttes contre le Capital se déplacent rapidement et sont instables : leurs existences sont à la limite de l’évanescence et ne peuvent pas être jugées du point de vue de la positivité d’institutions.
Des luttes anti-identitaires et polyphoniques
Le mouvement du faire contre le Travail est anti-identitaire : par conséquent, c’est le mouvement de la non-identité contre l’identité. Ceci est important pour des raisons pratiques, simplement parce que la restructuration actuelle du capital correspond à une tentative d’enfermer, de canaliser les nouvelles luttes dans des identités. Les luttes des femmes, des noirs, des indigènes, pour autant qu’elles sont maintenues dans leurs identités respectives, ne posent aucun problème à la reproduction du système du travail abstrait. Au contraire, la reconsolidation du travail abstrait dépend probablement de la redistribution de ces identités en tant qu’identités, le recentrage des luttes autour de luttes limitées et identitaires. Le mouvement zapatiste ne lance aucun défi au capitalisme tant qu’il reste une lutte pour les droits des indigènes : c’est quand la lutte déborde les frontières de cette identité, quand les zapatistes affirment «nous sommes des indigènes mais nous sommes plus que ça», quand ils disent qu’ils luttent pour refaire le monde, pour créer un monde fondé sur la reconnaissance mutuelle de la dignité, c’est alors qu’ils constituent une menace pour le capitalisme. La lutte du faire est la lutte qui vise à déborder les catégories fétichisées de l’identité. Nous ne nous battons pas tant pour les droits des femmes que pour un monde dans lequel la division des gens entre deux sexes (et la génitalisation de la sexualité sur laquelle cette division est fondée) serait dépassée, pas tant pour la protection de la nature que pour une nouvelle réflexion radicale portant sur les relations entre les différentes formes de vie, pas tant pour les droits des migrants que pour l’abolition des frontières.
Pour toutes ces transformations, le temps est crucial. Le temps homogène a peut-être été le plus important ciment de la vieille constellation, la constellation du travail abstrait, profondément ancrée tant à gauche qu’à droite. Dans ce cadre, la révolution, à moins de ne pouvoir être pensée du tout, ne peut avoir lieu que dans le futur. Ceci est à présent terminé. Ce qui était autrefois considéré comme un binôme inséparable, la «révolution future», est maintenant vu comme un pur non-sens. Il est trop tard pour la révolution future. Et de toute façon, nous reproduisons le capitalisme que nous détestons chaque jour que nous passons à faire des plans sur la révolution future, de sorte que la notion de révolution future est contre-productive. La révolution est ici et maintenant ou elle n’est pas. C’était implicite en 1968 lorsque le mouvement refusait d’attendre que le Parti décide qu’il s’agissait du bon moment. C’est explicite dans le «Ya basta!» zapatiste du premier janvier 1994. Assez! Maintenant! Nous refusons d’«attendre que le cycle de Kondratiev arrive à son terme». Nous refusons d’«attendre que le Parti ait pris le pouvoir». Nous voulons à présent la révolution ici et maintenant!
Qu’est-ce que cela signifie? Tout simplement qu’il faut une multiplicité de luttes à partir du particulier, qu’il faut la création d’espaces ou de moments au travers desquels nous cherchons à vivre maintenant la société dans laquelle nous voulons vivre. Cela signifie qu’il faut créer des fissures dans les injonctions du système capitaliste, des moments et des espaces dans lesquels nous affirmons que «Non, nous ferons pas ce que le Capital exige de nous, nous ne ferons que ce nous considérons comme nécessaire ou désirable.»
Inévitablement, cela exige de comprendre la lutte anti-capitaliste comme une multiplicité de luttes différentes. Et il ne s’agit pas d’une multiplication des identités, mais du mouvement rapide de luttes anti-identitaires qui se frôlent et divergent, qui s’infectent les unes les autres et se repoussent, tel un chaos créatif de fissures qui se multiplient, s’étendent, parfois se rebouchent avant de réapparaître et de s’étendre de nouveau. Il s’agit de la révolte polyphonique du faire contre le travail abstrait. Il faut bien saisir que cette révolte ne peut être que polyphonique : nier cette polyphonie serait la subordonner à une nouvelle forme d’abstraction. Le monde que nous essayons de créer, ce monde du faire utile ou de l’activité vitale consciente doit être un monde fait de multiples mondes. Ce qui implique, bien sûr, des formes d’organisation qui cherchent à articuler et respecter cette polyphonie : c’est-à-dire des formes anti-étatiques.
Vue de l’extérieur et parfois même de l’intérieur, cette polyphonie ressemble à un bruit chaotique et dissonant n’ayant ni sens ni unité, tramé par nul grand récit. Mais il ne faut pas se méprendre : le grand récit n’est plus celui d’avant 1968, mais il y en a un, comportant deux faces. Sur la première face de ce grand récit, l’affirmation simple d’un refus, d’un Non, d’un «Ya basta!». Sur sa seconde face se trouve la Dignité : nous vivons d’ores et déjà dans le monde que nous voulons créer, en d’autres termes : nous faisons.
Nous pourrions conclure en disant que 1968 fut la crise de la classe ouvrière en tant que prose, mais aussi sa naissance en tant que poésie : la crise de la classe ouvrière en tant que travail abstrait mais aussi sa naissance en tant que faire utile et créatif. Les années qui viennent de s’écouler nous ont montré combien il est difficile d’écrire de la poésie, combien cela est difficile mais aussi à quel point c’est nécessaire.
Qui ne peut prendre que deux formes (en l’occurrence : mâle/femelle).
Les Juntes de Bon Gouvernement sont les conseils établis par les zapatistes dans leurs municipalités autonomes.
Un cycle de Kondratiev est un cycle économique (période d’une durée déterminée qui correspond plus ou moins exactement au retour d’un même phénomène) de l’ordre de 40 à 60 ans aussi appelé cycle de longue durée. Mis en évidence dès 1926 par l’économiste Nikolai Kondratiev dans son ouvrage Les vagues longues de la conjoncture, d’où son nom.
1968 dans le monde
«1968», ce n’est pas que Paris et le «Mai français». «1968» est un raccourci englobant des séries entières de soulèvements, d’insurrections et de révolutions qui eurent lieu sur toute la planète pendant une période explosive qui dura trois années, sans que l’on puisse en déterminer clairement ni le début ni la fin. Aux Etats-Unis, le «Summer of Love» de 1967 a ouvert la voie à des protestations militantes contre la guerre du Vietnam, à des soulèvements dans plus d’une centaine de villes et à une émeute ultra médiatisée lors de la convention du Parti Démocrate qui se déroulait à Chicago. A Mexico, des mois d’agitation politique ne purent être stoppés que par le massacre de Tlatelolcho, durant lequel l’armée et la police tuèrent entre 200 et 300 personnes quelques jours avant l’ouverture des Jeux Olympiques. Durant ces Jeux, deux athlètes, Tommie Smith et John Carlos firent le signe des Black Panthers sur le podium des vainqueurs.
En Tchécoslovaquie, le printemps de Prague ne prit fin que lorsque les chars russes eurent envahi le pays. Les habitants de la deuxième plus grande ville de l’Irlande du Nord repoussèrent les loyalistes et la police et déclarèrent l’autonomie du Derry Libre. Il y eut des révoltes, des grèves, des occupations et toutes sortes d’actions politiques dans d’innombrables autres pays, et notamment en Allemagne, au Pakistan, en Bolivie, en Espagne, au Japon, en Pologne, en Belgique, en Suède, au Royaume-Uni, au Brésil, au Nigeria, au Sénégal, en Serbie, en Autriche, en Turquie, à Hong-Kong, en Egypte, au Liban. «L’automne chaud» italien de 1969 marqua le début du mouvement autonome qui dura plus d’une décennie.
Sources
Ce texte est paru en anglais dans la revue Turbulence No4 (www.turbulence.org.uk) et en français dans Archipel N° 167, janvier 2009 et N° 168, février 2009.
John Holloway (1947) est un économiste et philosophe marxiste d’origine irlandaise dont le travail est associé au mouvement zapatiste. Il réside et enseigne à Puebla au Mexique depuis 1991. Des articles d’ Holloway sont disponibles en français sur <endehors.org> et en anglais sur <Libcom.org>.
Son livre «Changer le monde sans prendre le pouvoir: le sens de la révolution aujourd’hui», est paru en janvier 2008 aux Editions Syllepse, collection Utopies critiques.
Petite bibliographie:
Negativity and revolution: Adorno and political activism
John Holloway - Fernando Matamoros - Sergio Tischler, paru le 20 octobre 2008 chez Pluto Press
Zapatista: reinventing revolution in Mexico
John Holloway - Eloina Pelaez, paru le 1er janvier 1998 chez Pluto Press
Cambiar el mundi sin tomar el poder
John Holloway, paru le 1er janvier 2003 chez Montesinos
Translated by Infokiosques. PDF version article. English original.
Solidaire Economie
Euclides André Mance juicht in dit artikel een nieuwe manier van productie toe, die groeit als deel van een netwerkrevolutie, en stelt dat dit de basis zou kunnen vormen voor nieuwe postkapitalistische maatschappijen.
Een gedurfde hypothese: er is een mondiale revolutie gaande. Deze wordt niet geleid door enige politieke partij of voorhoede. Ze bezit geen militaire bases en haar strategie is allesbehalve oorlogszuchtig. Ze mobiliseert miljoenen mensen over de hele wereld. We weten er weinig over. Wat we wel weten is dat op basisniveau van haar mobilisatie, organisatie en onderwijs, er duizenden bewegingen en miljoenen mensen zijn die begonnen zijn met het verweven van samenwerkenden netwerken van economische solidariteit, waarbij kanalen opgebouwd worden en verbanden met het vermogen om lokale en mondiale strijden samen te brengen en te versterken. Ze werken collectief, van onderop en democratisch, consensus vormend terwijl bewust afwijkende meningen gerespecteerd worden. We zien deze bewegingen en hun resultaten overal en toch weten we weinig over de macht van dit fenomeen, aangezien ze vooralsnog niet in staat lijken om de wereld te veranderen. En toch, blijf ik stellen, is er een mondiale revolutie gaande.
De grote politieke ontdekking van de jaren 1990 was het idee van het verweven van samenwerkingsnetwerken tussen groepen, bewegingen en organisaties voor het coördineren en delen van niet alleen onze oplossingen en overwinningen, maar ook onze problemen en uitdagingen, onze strategieën en dagelijkse praktijken. We waren bezig om ‘assen van strijd’ op te bouwen die in staat zouden moeten zijn om het lokale en het mondiale bij elkaar te brengen, de korte termijn en de lange, evenals diversiteit en eenheid. Toch, terwijl deze samenwerkende netwerken cruciaal waren, hadden we niet goed begrepen wat daarvan de volledige potentie was.
Neem bijvoorbeeld de Wereld Sociale Forums; het WSF-proces is de top van een gigantische ijsberg waarachter zich een wirwar van samenwerkende netwerken en processen verschool. De beperking van het WSF–proces is dat het niet ver genoeg gegaan is in het ontwikkelen van wereldwijde sociale netwerken. De forums zijn belangrijke momenten waarbij duizenden acteurs met elkaar verbonden worden en waarbij een belangrijke stroom aan communicatie opengemaakt wordt van de verscheidenheid die inherent zijn aan deze netwerken. Na afloop keren, zelfs als de deelnemers op een of andere manier ingelicht zijn door de nieuwe, collectief verworven ervaring, de stromen van communicatie en acties feitelijk terug naar de eerder bestaande platformen.
Hoewel ze natuurlijk erg belangrijk zijn, zijn processen en ruimtes zoals de sociale fora niet voldoende. Door de mondiale opbouw van samenwerkende solidaire netwerken als onze strategische horizon te kiezen, kunnen we manieren vinden om zulke momenten te verbreden naar meer sferen van leven en strijd. Meer dan simpelweg informatie te verspreiden over voorstellen, en dus actief te zijn op het niveau van het ideologische debat, is het noodzakelijk om op politiek en economisch gebied actief te zijn en sommige voorstellen in praktijk om te zetten. Met andere woorden; onze dagelijkse economische praktijken moeten onderdeel zijn van het werk om de mondiale economische structuren te veranderen.
Naast sociale forums en top-mobilisaties, moet de verdediging van soevereine economieën zich voltrekken in de keuze van de producten die we consumeren en de ethische keuzes voor de manier waarop we ons inkomen verwerven om bepaalde economische sectoren te ondersteunen. Datzelfde geldt voor onze verdediging van ecosystemen en de keuze om de milieueffecten van onze consumptie te beperken. De ‘goede strijd’ moet bevochten worden op het economische gebied (niet alleen cultureel of politiek). Er is een revolutie gaande, maar om ‘te winnen’ betekent het uitbreiden en versterken van de samenwerkende processen die de basis zouden kunnen vormen van waaruit een postkapitalistische maatschappij kan ontstaan.
Solidaire economie als materieel fundament van postkapitalistische maatschappijen
Miljoenen mensen over de hele wereld praktiseren solidaire economie. Ze werken en consumeren niet in de eerste plaats voor het gewin, maar met het doel om te produceren voor hun eigen en andermens’ welzijn. Wat telt bij solidaire economie is het creëren van bevredigende economische omstandigheden voor alle mensen. Dat betekent het garanderen van individuele en collectieve vrijheden, het genereren van werk en inkomen, het uitsluiten van alle vormen van uitbuiting, overheersing en uitsluiting, en het beschermen van ecosystemen, evenals het bevorderen van duurzame ontwikkeling.
Dit netwerk kwam aanvankelijk voort uit succesvolle praktijken van het genereren van werk en inkomen, eerlijke handel, ethische consumptie, solidaire financiering en de verspreiding van duurzame productietechnologie. Deze inspanningen waren echter geïsoleerd. Het was nodig dat ze zich zouden ontwikkelen naar samenwerkende netwerken die al deze verschillende activiteiten zouden integreren met strategieën die het potentieel van economische stromen zouden vergroten en de wisselwerking tussen hen. Dit betekende dat solidaire financiering het ontstaan mogelijk maakte en het voortbestaan van door arbeiders bestuurde productieve bedrijven die technologie benutten die weinig beslag op het milieu legden en daarentegen een hoge sociale opbrengst hadden. De producten van deze bedrijven begonnen verkocht te worden in circuits van solidaire handel via winkels, markten, internationale eerlijke handelssystemen en zelfs via internet. Dit maakte op z’n beurt weer mogelijk dat consumenten de producten en diensten die ze normaal van kapitalistische bedrijven kochten, konden vervangen door producten en diensten uit de solidaire economie. Zodoende werd het systeem weer gevoed van stimulering van welzijn van arbeiders en consumenten, milieubescherming en duurzame ontwikkeling. Technologieën zoals vrije software en biologische landbouw begonnen benut, ontwikkeld en gedeeld te worden binnen deze netwerken. Overdadige rijkdom die in het circuit geproduceerd werd, werd geherinvesteerd, gedeeltelijk in de vorm van solidaire microkredieten.
Hoe snel de solidaire economie ook ontwikkelt, miljoenen mensen die voor een ‘andere wereld’ strijden nemen er geen deel aan. Ten eerste omdat ze niet weten dat die bestaan; ten tweede omdat het relatief moeilijk is om de producten en diensten te verkrijgen. Beide problemen kunnen snel worden overwonnen. Het grootste obstakel is cultureel: om een consumeristische cultuur te overstijgen die de nadruk legt op kwantiteit, overdaad, eigendom en afval boven het welzijn van mensen en samenlevingen, moeten we onduurzame vormen van productie, consumptie en levenswijzen vervangen door nieuwe manieren van produceren, consumeren en solidair leven.
Terwijl ze zich verder ontwikkelen op economische en cultureel gebied van deze revolutie, zullen solidaire netwerken ook vooruitgang boeken op politiek gebied - de staat zal veranderd worden en er zullen mechanismen van participatie van onderop groeien. Deze revolutie is niet lineair, elke werkelijke situatie verandert op z’n eigen manier. Maar dankzij het feit dat ze in het netwerk zitten, kunnen samenwerkende processen communiceren en leren van elke historische ervaring, succesvol of niet. De informatietechnologie die hun samenhang faciliteren lijken steeds meer in het middelpunt te komen staan bij Staat en publieke sfeer. Dit opent mogelijkheden voor nieuwe processen en mechanismen van bestuur en gedeeld management die voort kunnen komen uit de gecombineerde effecten van democratische revoluties in de culturele sfeer met processen van samenwerkende solidaire economie als materiele basis.
Uitdagingen en horizons
Het is natuurlijk niet allemaal even eenvoudig en er blijven grote uitdagingen en vragen bestaan, zowel praktisch als theoretisch. Om te beginnen met vragen die steeds weer gesteld worden:
- Hoe verhouden netwerken van solidaire economie zich met de hen omringende kapitalistische economie. Zij die externe relaties gebaseerd op competitie? Als dat zo is, hoe kan solidaire economie dan ‘winnen’?
- Hoe kunnen we garanderen dat de uitbreiding van netwerken van solidaire economie niet betekent dat de aanvankelijke principes verdwijnen? In het algemeen, hoe kunnen de netwerken zelf hun principes afdwingen? En is het niet belangrijker dat er banen en inkomen geproduceerd worden?
- Wat is het verschil tussen het verdedigen van solidaire economie en de verdediging van lokale vormen van kapitalisme? Betekent het meer dan een simpele aanbeveling van lokale welzijn en in hoeverre kan het dan niet samengaan met een lokaal, kapitalisme van de ‘kleine schaal’?
- Hoe verhoudt solidaire economie zich binnen de huidige politiek ontwikkeling in Latijns Amerika?
Hoe meer de solidaire economie uitbreidt en diversifieert en z’n stromen en verbindingen verbeteren, des te kleiner de noodzaak om zich te verhouden met niet-solidaire actoren. Het achterliggende idee is dat de banden met niet-solidaire toeleveranciers en distributeurs in toenemende mate verbroken worden en worden vervangen door solidaire actoren, die daarmee opgenomen worden in het netwerk. Hoewel ze wel banden hebben met niet-solidaire actoren, streven initiatieven uit de solidaire economie ernaar om te kiezen voor de sociaal en ecologisch ‘minst slechte’ leveranciers en distributeurs.
Terwijl sommigen bang zijn dat een groei van samenwerkende netwerken en solidaire economie al snel een herhaling zou vertonen van de op competitie gebaseerde mechanismen van de niet-solidaire economie, geloof ik dat het de beste strategie is om de ‘overwinning’ te behalen. Want de groei bevestigt het vertrouwen in een andere economie, gebaseerd op samenwerking en niet op competitie. De nadruk zou niet moeten liggen op het ontwikkelen van strategieën die niet-solidaire initiatieven uit de markt dringen, maar op het verveelvuldigen van het aantal en de diversiteit van solidaire actoren tot z’n hoogte dat ze een hervorming van de productieve ketens zou mogelijk maken. Daarmee zou een ecologisch duurzame en sociaal rechtvaardige economie kunnen ontwikkelen.
Solidaire economie mag dus niet verward worden met de kapitalistische manier van produceren. Sommige mensen verwarren die met ‘lokale ontwikkeling,’ en aangezien kapitalisme goed in staat is om lokale ontwikkeling aan te bevelen, denken ze dat solidaire economie gereduceerd kan worden tot dat perspectief van ‘lokaliseren’. Kapitalistische initiatieven van dit type zijn in sommige gevallen succesvol geweest, met aanzienlijke steun van de staat, maar op den duur betekent de logica van concentratie van rijkdom altijd dat de lokale economische dynamiek verzwakt wordt.
Omgekeerd, zelfs als het waar is dat solidaire economie territoriale ontwikkeling bevordert, mag niet vergeten worden dat de manier waarop ze dat doet onder het paradigma is van herverdeling van rijkdom eerder dan kapitaalsaccumulatie. Hoe meer rijkdom verdeeld is, via de praktijk van eerlijke prijzen (bij de commercialisering van goederen en diensten en bij de vergoeding van zelfbeheerd werk), des te groter is het lokale welzijn in het algemeen. De eerlijke prijzen worden vastgesteld door de economische actoren zelf - bedrijven, producenten, consumenten die direct met elkaar handelen op een manier die is gecoördineerd via netwerken. Solidaire economie is gebaseerd op een stel waarden die tegelijk ethisch en economisch zijn en die tot werkelijkheid komen in concrete praktijken zoals zelfbestuur, democratische beslissingen over economische activiteiten en de ecologische hervorming van productieve ketens. Als alle belangrijke besluiten op vergaderingen genomen worden, zal het zeer onwaarschijnlijk zijn dat dit zelfbeheer uit zou kunnen lopen in de ontkenning van juist de democratie die haar heeft doen ontstaan.
Twee van de grootste risico’s die solidaire economie hedentendage loopt, zijn: het gebrek aan begrip dat progressieve sociale krachten ervoor opbrengen: en de invasies die kapitalistische krachten hebben zitten doen op het begrip solidariteit, waarbij ze dat dan in een lijn stelden met ‘maatschappelijk verantwoord’. Velen denken daardoor dat solidaire economie slechts een vorm van kapitalisme is die maatschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid serieus neemt. Dit vooroordeel, met name binnen links, maar ook in delen van rechts, draait de bewijslast om tegen solidaire economie en dwingt deze om argumenten naar voren te brengen op het gebied van de historische mogelijkheid, in plaats van het debat in de richting te brengen van de effectiviteit van de huidige historische realiteit - een waarin arbeiders eigenaar geworden zijn van zelfbeheerde bedrijven en democratisch beslissen wat er met ze gebeurt, daarbij samenwerkend met andere bedrijven op manieren die allen voordeel verstrekken. Aan de andere zijn er actoren uit de solidaire economie die proberen om financiering uit publieke middelen (met name overheid) te krijgen, die het antagonistische en revolutionaire karakter van deze nieuwe economie omlaag schroeven. Dat geeft ruimte aan tweeslachtige lezingen die het mogelijk maakt om ze op een hoop te gooien met kletspraat over sociale en ecologische verantwoordelijkheid. Daar komt bij dat terwijl het debat woedt over de vraag of de waarden van solidaire economie niet onderweg verloren zullen raken, grote delen van de progressieve sociale sectoren nog steeds niet-solidaire producten consumeren zonder stil te staan bij de gevolgen van hun consumptie, die terugvloeit naar lokale en mondiale kapitalistische kringen.
Ondanks dit alles groeit de solidaire economie in Latijns Amerika snel, lessen trekkend van zowel haar fouten als haar successen. In Argentinië bijvoorbeeld, vielen de netwerken aanvankelijk weer terug nadat het aantal ruilhandelgroepen aanvankelijk explodeerde met eigen lokaal geld - op een gegeven moment waren er meer dan twee miljoen deelnemers en sommige onderzoeken wijzen zelfs op tussen de drie en vijf miljoen. De ernst van de impasse leidde vervolgens tot de opkomst van een nieuwe nationaal netwerk van solidaire ruilhandel, met een betere organisatie en methode. In Brazilië leidden de lessen van Argentinië en andere plekken tot de oprichting van gemeenschappelijke banken die werken met sociaal geld dat lokaal wordt uitgegeven en in circulatie gebracht. Anders dan het Argentijnse geval zijn deze lokale gelden verzekerd tegen oppotten met solidaire microcredietfondsen. In Venezuela heeft het Braziliaanse voorbeeld aangezet tot een voortdurende organisatie van een netwerk van gemeenschapsbanken die lokale munten uitgeven. In Mexico is een systeem van ruil ontwikkeld waarbij sociaal geld niet meer op papier wordt verstrekt, maar geregistreerd wordt als elektronisch krediet op smart aards die via datacommunicatienetwerken transacties laten maken. In Brazilië voorziet het elektronische systeem dat ontwikkeld is, zowel in transacties met niet-gegarandeerde munten, die alleen circuleren binnen een groep van uitgevers, als gegarandeerde, als een vorm van betaling tussen gebruikers van het systeem, zonder noodzaak tot gebruik van smart cards.
We zien dus dat deze ervaringen, zowel door hun successen als hun mislukkingen, een belangrijke bron van kennis zijn: dankzij de communicatiestroom tussen samenwerkende netwerken, heeft de solidaire economie in Latijns Amerika kunnen groeien.
Conclusie
In Brazilië zijn 1,2 miljoen arbeiders, geheel of gedeeltelijk betrokken bij de solidaire economie en zijn er 1250 bedrijven ontstaan in de laatste vijf jaar. Dat mag weinig lijken, maar het gaat om een fenomeen dat de laatste tien jaar ontstaan is, en toont een groeiend bewustzijn aan van de deelnemers zelf die onder meer zichtbaar wordt in de uitzaaiing van forums van solidaire economie die overal in Brazilië en elders op de wereld zijn ontstaan. Ook zien je tegelijkertijd een intensifiëren van de transacties binnen de sector en een groei van diens politieke uitdrukking.
Misschien is het voor velen alleen een utopie, een steeds terugwijkende horizon van hoop, maar voor miljoenen anderen is solidaire economie een manier van werken, produceren, verhandelen, consumeren en uitwisselen van waarden. Het is een manier om individuele en persoonlijke behoeftes te bevredigen, bij de belangen van welzijn van allen. Het is de materiele basis van de netwerk revolutie.
Solidaire economie is het fundament van een nieuwe manier van produceren die zichzelf aanprijst via de netwerk revolutie. In deze zin zijn we ‘aan het winnen’, omdat solidaire economie zich uitbreidt, netwerken overal groeien en hun vermogen tot politieke actie sterker wordt. Men kan dat zien aan de golf van volksregeringen die de verkiezingen gewonnen hebben overal in Latijns Amerika. Maar deze revolutie hangt af van ons vermogen om te blijven verbinden en uit te breiden in ‘netwerken van netwerken’, ‘bewegingen van bewegingen’, waarbij het lokale en mondiale aan elkaar geknoopt wordt. Daarvoor moeten we de circuits van solidaire economie versterken.
Noot: Euclides Andre Mance is filosoof en is sinds de jaren 1990 als volksonderwijzer werkzaam geweest. Hij is lid van het Volks Solidariteits Economie Netwerk in Brazilië en drijvende kracht achter de website solidarius.com.br. Hij is schrijver van verschillende teksten en boeken, zoals De Netwerk Revolutie (A Revolucao das Redes) dat ook in het Italiaans vertaald is. Zijn werk kan hier gevonden worden.
Toelichting van Turbulence
De term ’solidaire economie’ is de vertaling van het Portugese economia solidária, of economía solidaria (Spaans), en économie solidaire(Frans). Grof gezegd beschrijft het een vorm van ‘grassroots’ coöperatieve economie die in de hele wereld bezig is om duizenden lokale alternatieven aan elkaar te verbinden met het doel om bij te dragen aan het ontstaan van grootschalige, levensvatbare en creatieve netwerken van verzet tegen de winst-over-alles-economie…
Zoals alle begrippen uit de politieke strijd is de definiëring van ’solidaire economie’ zeer omstreden. Voor sommigen slaat het op een serie strategieën die gericht zijn op de uitfasering van het kapitalisme en de onderdrukkende sociale verhoudingen die deze ondersteunt en aanmoedigt. Anderen zien er strategieën in voor het ‘humaniseren’ van de kapitalistische economie - waarbij ze proberen de kapitalistische globalisering aan te vullen met op gemeenschappen gebaseerde ’sociale vangnetten’ (Ethan Miller)
“Huurdersverenigingen, groepen werkelozen, coöperatieve crèches, consumentengroepen, solidaire credietassociates, locale geldsoorten en meer; al deze activiteiten delen dat ze bewust ingaan tegen het heersende economische model; ze leggen de nadruk op lokale oplossingen, ze verbinden economische structuur met het milieu. Ze zijn nieuw, zijn gebaseerd op vrijwilligheid en zijn democratisch aangestuurde vormen van herverdeling die gericht zijn op de noden van mannen en vrouwen” (Inter Reseaux de L’Economie Solidaire, Frankrijk)
Dutch translation by globalinfo.nl
English version here.
Hulluus uuden edellä
kompleksisuus, kriittinen epävakaus ja kapitalismin loppu
Kay Summer ja Harry Halpin
“Jopa kosmisesta tai geologisesta aikaperspektiivistä tarkasteltuna meidän vuosisatamme on jollain tapaa ainutlaatuinen”
- Martin Rees, 2006. Brittiläinen kosmologian ja astrofysiikan professori.
Kapitalismi: monimutkainen systeemi
Kapitalismin vääjäämättömyyteen vankimmin uskovat ihmiset ovat usein anti-kapitalisteja. Tämä ei ole niin ristiriitaista kuin miltä se kuulostaa. Moni uskoo, että kapitalismi pystyy rekuperoimaan [1] kaikki kohtaamansa vastarinnan muodot tai kriisit. Täten kapitalismi on voittamaton, ja niinpä on parasta tyytyä kirjoittamaan tuskaantuneena kapitalismikriittisiä tekstejä - mitä monet antikapitalistit näyttävät tekevän. Tässä kirjoituksessa haluamme tarkastella kysymystä “onko elämää kapitalismin ulkopuolella” uuden ja yllättävänkin optimismin lähteen valossa: kompleksisuusteorian synty on 1900-luvun lopun tieteen radikaalein muutos. Kompleksisuusteoria ja laajemmin epälineaarinen maailmankatsomus saattavat tarjota syvällisiä näköaloja, joista on hyötyä erityisesti meille, jotka mietimme miten parhaiten edistää uudenlaisen yhteiskunnan syntymistä.
Kompleksisuusteorian avulla voi tutkia mitä tahansa järjestelmää, jossa monta eri osaa ovat yhdistyneinä dynaamisessa (ajan myötä muuttuvassa) verkostossa. Olennaista näille järjestelmille on, että ne kehittyvät epälineaarisesti. Epälineaarisuus tarkoittaa, että joskus pieni tapahtuma aiheuttaa pienen muutoksen järjestelmässä, mutta toisinaan vastaava tapahtuma voi panna alulle mullistavan tapahtumaketjun. On helppoa osoittaa, että kapitalismi on monimutkainen dynaaminen systeemi, joka muuntuu epälineaarisesti. Näin ollen kompleksisuusteoria voi olla hyvä väline sosiaalisen maailmamme ymmärtämisessä.
Kapitalismi on monimutkainen asia, onhan se kuuden miljardin ihmisen välisen vuorovaikutuksen tulos. Kapitalismi on myös dynaaminen, mistä todistavat työnteossa tapahtuneet nopeat muutokset ja tuotteiden määrän hämmentävä kasvu. Kapitalismi on “systeemi”, siis verkosto jossa kukaan ei ole “vastuussa” (muistathan miten historialliset yritykset kapitalismin ohjaamiseksi ovat epäonnistuneet). Lopuksi, kapitalismi on erittäin epälineaarinen. Esimerkkinä vaikka Argentiinan ennakoimaton talouskriisi, joka muutti miljoonien ihmisten elämän vuonna 2001. Kriisi sai alkunsa vain muutaman sijoittajan päätettyä siirtää rahansa pois maasta. Kuitenkin sijoittajat liikuttavat päivittäin rahojaan ulkomaille, yleensä mitättömin seurauksin.
Kompleksisuus yksinkertaistettuna
Kompleksiset, uudistuvat dynaamiset systeemit pyrkivät säilyttämään oman rakenteensa silloinkin, kun järjestelmän osat kokevat suuria muutoksia. Ihmisruumis on hyvä esimerkki uudistuvasta systeemistä. Ihmisruumiin rakennuspalikat, solut, uudistuvat jatkuvasti, mutta olennaiset piirteemme kuten sisäelimet, ihonväri jne. säilyvät. Näin ollen ihmissysteemiä kuvaa sekä muutos että jatkuvuus. Tällaiset monimutkaiset uudistuvat systeemit tarvitsevat toimiakseen kaksi tärkeää tekijää. Ensinnäkin, systeemin täytyy muodostua monista erilaisista, keskenään vuorovaikuttavista elementeistä. Toiseksi, systeemin täytyy voittaa entropian laki eli termodynamiikan toinen pääsääntö. Entropian lain mukaan systeemit hajoavat ajan myötä: niiden järjestelmä rappeutuu ja muuttuu yksinkertaisemmaksi. Systeemin on siis pidettävä itsensä kasassa säännöllisen materiaali- tai energiasyötön avulla. Ihmisruumis käy tässäkin esimerkiksi: tarvitsemme ruokaa, vettä ja happea, muutoin ruumiimme menettävät nopeasti monimutkaisuutensa, kuolevat ja lopulta hajoavat yksinkertaisiksi molekyyleiksi.
Uudistuvat monimutkaiset systeemit ovat siis materiaalin ja energian suhteen avoimia, olivatpa ne sitten itseorganisoituneita tai ihmisen luomia (kuten internet) – ja tämän vuoksi ne vaativat säännöllisesti rakennusaineita tai energiaa. Näin ollen nämä systeemit eivät koskaan ole aivan tasapainossa. Tai paremminkin, ne eivät ole staattisessa tasapainossa. Yksinkertainen esimerkki on keinussa istuva lapsi. Tälläkin dynaamisella systeemillä on staattinen tasapainopiste, mutta tasapainopisteessä istuminen ei ole erityisen kiinnostavaa, saati sitten hauskaa! Vasta kun lapsi alkaa keinua edestakaisin, järjestelmään syntyy dynaamisuutta. Aikaansaatua dynaamisen tasapainon tilaa voidaan ylläpitää suhteellisen säännöllisellä energian syötöllä. Biologiset organismit, ekosysteemit, kapitalismi ja internet ovat paljon monimutkaisempia dynaamisia systeemejä: niin kauan kuin ne saavat tarpeeksi energiaa ja materiaalia, nekään eivät ikinä vakiinnu staattiseen tasapainoon ympäristönsä kanssa. Energia- ja materiaalivirrat työntävät ne jatkuvasti pois tasapainopisteestään. Internetin ylläpitämiseksi hajonneita tietokoneita on korvattava uusilla - materiaalien ja energian on virrattava - muutoin internet lakkaa olemasta monimutkainen systeemi.
Monimutkaiset systeemit ovat enemmän kuin osiensa summa: ne synnyttävät uusia ilmiöitä. Tätä kutsutaan emergenssiksi eli ilmaantumiseksi. Ihminen on enemmän kuin kasa vettä, hiiltä, typpeä ja muita molekyylejä. Ihminen on enemmän kuin makromolekyyliensä, solujensa ja elintensä yhdistelmä. Internet on enemmän kuin iso joukko tietokoneita. Yhteyksien kokoonpano on tässä oleellista. Monimutkaisen systeemin osien väliset yhteydet muodostavat vuorovaikutteisia piirejä. Hierarkkisissa systeemeissä vuorovaikutus eri osien välillä on tarkoituksella rajoitettu minimiin. Systeemin yhteyksien muodostamat palautekehät voivat muuttaa koko systeemin. Ns. negatiiviset palautekehät pyrkivät pitämään systeemin ennallaan, kun taas positiiviset palautekehät saattavat sysäistä systeemin uuteen tilaan, tai luoda uuden systeemin.
Tästä pääsemme seuraavaan tärkeään asiaan: uudistuvilla monimutkaisilla systeemeillä on usein lukuisia vakaita tiloja. Kuvittele, että monimutkainen systeemimme on topografinen kartta täynnä vuoria ja laaksoja, joiden lomassa vierii pallo jatkuvassa liikkeessä. Enimmäkseen pallo pysyy yhdessä ja samassa laaksossa. Useat eri voimat voivat työntää pallon hetkeksi pois laakson pohjalta, mutta yleensä se valuu sinne takaisin. Laakson pohjaa (eli systeemin vakaata tilaa) ympäröivää laaksoa kokonaisuudessaan kutsutaan vetovoima-altaaksi. Palloon pitäisi kohdistaa joko valtavasti voimaa, tai vain hiukan mutta juuri oikeanlaista voimaa, jotta syntyisi myönteinen palautekehä, jonka seurauksena pallo kierisi pois tuosta laaksosta ja päätyisikin toiseen laaksoon eli vetovoima-altaaseen. Tällaisia suuria muutoksia (eli vaihesiirtymiä) kyllä tapahtuu, mutta vain harvoin ja ne edellyttävät yleensä useita samanaikaisia muutoksia. Niitä edeltävien kriittisen epävakauden ajanjaksojen aikana koko järjestelmä on kovan rasituksen alaisena. Järjestelmä saattaa vavista ja käyttäytyä kaoottisesti ennen kuin se jälleen asettuu uuteen vakaampaan tilaan. Kompleksisuusteoria kutsuu näitä ajanjaksoja bifurkaatiopisteiksi tai haarautumiskohdiksi, koska tuolloin näyttää siltä että järjestelmä voi kääntyä arvaamattomiin suuntiin. Pallo tasapainottelee harjanteen päällä, ja sen alapuolella aukeaa useita mahdollisia laaksoja, joihin se voi päätyä.
Yksi esimerkki vaihesiirtymästä on jääkausien ja lämpimämpien kausien vaihtelu maapallolla. Toinen esimerkki on sosio-ekonomiset siirtymät metsästäjä-keräilijäyhteisöistä maanviljelykseen ja karjanhoitoon, ja feodaali- tai maalaisyhteisöistä kapitalistiseen tuotantomalliin. Usein vallankumoukselliset hakevat juuri tällaista vaihesiirtymää.
Kukaan ei voi tietää, kuinka monta vetovoima-allasta eli attraktoria erittäin monimutkaisilla systeemeillä on. Ne ovat vetovoima-altaita juuri siksi, että riippumatta systeemin tämänhetkisestä paikasta, jokin näistä muista paikoista vetää sitä puoleensa. Jotkin systeemit yhdistyvät lopulta yhteen tilaan, mutta monet monimutkaiset systeemit, niin kutsutut kaoottiset tai periodiset systeemit, käyvät läpi eri attraktoreita. Niiden polku näyttää mahdottomalta ennustaa, sillä näennäisen mitättömätkin muutokset voivat siirtää systeemin yhdestä attraktorista toiseen. Näitä attraktoreita kutsutaan oudoiksi attraktoreiksi. Lienee sanomattakin selvää, että systeemiä, jonka suuntaa on mahdotonta ennustaa, ei voi myöskään ohjailla tai hallita. Joidenkin tapahtumien voidaan arvioida pystyvän muita paremmin liikuttamaan systeemiä kohti uutta attraktoria, vaikkakaan uuden attraktorin olemusta ei voida silti ennalta tietää. Yleensä näissä tapahtumissa on kyse systeemin energia- ja materiaalivirtojen tai järjestelmän osien välisten yhteyksien muuttamisesta radikaalisti. Yhteyksiä tulee uusia tai niitä kokonaan menetetään.
Mitä hyötyä tästä teoriasta on? Ajattele ihmiskunnan kokemia radikaaleja ja maailmanlaajuisia muutoksia: energiankulutuksen ja materiaalin tuotannon nopea lisääntyminen; viestinnän räjähdysmäinen kasvu kännyköiden, internetin ja kaukomatkustuksen ansiosta. Lisääntyneet energia- ja materiaalivirrat ja ihmisten kytkeytyneisyys, yhdistettynä maapalloa uhkaavaan ekologiseen kriisiin, saattavat luoda suotuisat olosuhteet uudelle vaihesiirtymälle, joka tarkoittaisi määritelmällisesti kapitalismin loppua.
Sosiaalinen järjestäytyminen – aina monimutkaista
Ihmisten sosiaalinen järjestäytyminen on aina ollut ja tulee aina olemaan monimutkaista ja dynaamista. Onhan kyse suuresta joukosta ihmisiä, jotka vuorovaikuttavat keskenään. Ihmiskunnan historiassa on ollut kaksi, kenties kolme vakaata sosiaalisen järjestäytymisen muotoa, jotka ovat esiintyneet koko maapallon laajuisesti: metsästäjä-keräilijäyhteisöt, omavaraismaanviljely, ja - mikäli se tulee kestämään - kapitalismi. Emme laske mukaan monia suuria ja erittäin hierarkkisia sivilisaatioita, kuten keskiajan Japanin feodaalijärjestelmää, maya-sivilisaatiota tai muinaisen Rooman kaltaisia klassisia imperiumeja, sillä vaikka niiden kaltaisia yhteiskuntajärjestelmiä on syntynyt ja kadonnut säännöllisesti ympäri maapalloa, yksikään niistä ei ole saavuttanut globaalia dominanssia. Tämä viittaisi siihen, että nämä sivilisaatiot eivät olleet vakaita tiloja. Kenties autoritäärisyys selviytymisstrategiana ei toimi, koska se pyrkii aina kontrolloimaan ihmisiä ja ylläpitämään jotain jäykkää sosiaalista järjestystä, sen sijaan että sallisi järjestelmän jatkuvan uudistumisen ja kehityksen sitä mukaa kun järjestelmän osaset (ihmiset) ja ympäristö muuttuvat.
Vaihesiirtymät metsästäjä-keräilijöistä maanviljelykseen ja maanviljelyksestä kapitalismiin ovat sikäli kiinnostavia, että kummassakin siirtymässä systeemiin virtaava energia ja materiaali lisääntyivät voimakkaasti, ja ihmiset olivat aiempaa useammin ja tiiviimmin tekemisissä toistensa kanssa. Metsästäjä-keräilijäyhteisöt olivat ihmiskunnan ensimmäinen vakaa tila, joka vallitsi kaikissa maanosissa ainakin kahden miljoonan vuoden ajan. Maanviljelykseen siirryttiin kahdeksan tai yhdeksän kertaa, näennäisen itsenäisesti, noin 8000 - 12 000 vuotta sitten. Viljelysadot ja väestönkasvu muodostivat positiivisen palautekehän: viljely lisäsi saatavilla olevia siemeniä, jotka voitiin säästää pahan päivän varalle, mikä taas mahdollisti suuremman ihmispopulaation ruokkimisen, jolloin taas useampi ihminen saattoi istuttaa enemmän viljelyskasveja. Tämän palautekehän jatkuessa maailman ihmisten määrä kohosi neljännesmiljoonasta (8000 vuotta sitten) 600 miljoonaan, ennen eurooppalaisten maailmanvalloituksen alkua 1500-luvulla. Eikä pelkästään väestö lisääntynyt: suhteessa väkimäärään maanviljelijäyhteisöillä oli paljon enemmän yhteyksiä kuin suhteellisen vähälukuisilla ja löyhästi verkottuneilla metsästäjä-keräilijäyhteisöillä. Siirtymää kapitalismiin puolestaan vauhditti tuotannosta saadun voiton uudelleensijoittaminen, mikä jälleen lisäsi materiaalin ja energian syöttöä systeemiin. Kulutushyödykkeiden keksiminen, mikä ennakoi pääoman syntyä, sai aikaan kehyksen jossa tuotteet ja palvelut saattoivat kiertää laajuudessa, jota kukaan ei olisi osannut ennakoida. Ja jälleen syntyi uusia yhteyksiä ihmisten ja eri ympäristöjen välille.
Nyt ihmiskunta on joutunut tekemisiin kahden uuden ilmiön kanssa: internetin ja muun viestintäteknologian aikaansaama ällistyttävä yhteyksien lisääntyminen sekä maailmanlaajuinen, erittäin nopeasti paheneva ympäristökriisi. Nämä muutokset ovat mielestämme niin suuria, että ne voivat osaltaan tuoda ihmiskuntamme historian kolmannen vaihesiirtymän partaalle. Artikkelin viimeisessä osassa siirrymme niiden tarkasteluun.
Globaali ympäristökriisi
Kapitalismissa tavaroita sekä palveluja tuotetaan ja myydään kilpailevilla markkinoilla, saatavat voitot sijoitetaan lisätuotantoon ja sama toistetaan loputtomasti. Tähän malliin sisältyy kuitenkin keskeinen virhe. Laajentuva tuotanto edellyttää laajenevia resursseja, mikä johtaa krooniseen ja ratkaisemattomaan kriisiin, maailmanlaajuiseen ympäristökriisiin. Kapitalismi on aina edellyttänyt loputonta laajenemista, mutta rajallisella planeetalla se ei ole mahdollista. 500 vuoden iässä kapitalismi ei enää ole hyvä selviytymisstrategia.
Kapitalismin houkutus on perustunut sen kykyyn tarjota ihmisille hyvät puitteet säilyä hengissä (tosin monille samainen järjestelmä on erittäin luotaantyöntävä) Kun vain pysyt hiljaa, teet työtä ja pelaat mukana, saat palkinnoksi tarpeeksi ruokaa, katon pään päälle ja todennäköisesti avioliiton ja lapsia. Mutta kun järjestelmän materiaalinen pohja romahtaa, tämä selviytymisstrategia houkuttelee yhä vähemmän. Yhä useampi ihminen tulee toteamaan sen hinta-hyötysuhteen riittämättömäksi. Ihmisten on pakko kehittää vaihtoehtoja kapitalismille, mikäli haluamme selviytyä.
Tätä argumenttia on kritisoitu kahdelta suunnalta. Ensimmäinen vastalause tulee kapitalisteilta, varsinkin niiltä jotka kannattavat “vihreää kapitalismia” (mikä luova, harhaanjohtava nimi!) Parhaimmillaan vihreä kapitalismi voisi hidastaa kapitalismin rappeutumista ja pidentää sen ikää parilla vuosikymmenellä. Mutta perusongelma säilyy samana: myös “vihreä” kapitalismi edellyttää työn, materiaalin ja energian loputonta lisäämistä. Toinen vasta-argumentti tulee niiltä radikaaleilta, joiden mukaan ilmastonmuutoksen kaltaiset uhkakuvat ovat vain kuvitteellisia kriisejä, joiden avulla voidaan perustella työntekijöiden hyväksikäyttö ja vastarinnan kukistaminen. On totta, että jotkin kriisit ovat kuvitteellisia - mutta toiset eivät ole. Tästä palaamme artikkelin aloituslauseeseen: juuri anti-kapitalistit uskovat usein vankimmin kapitalismiin. Mutta ei kapitalismi ole mitkään moderni jumala, joka voi muuttaa fysiikan lakeja. Me elämme edelleenkin rajallisella planeetalla.
Globaali kytkeytyneisyys
Yhteydet ihmisten välillä ovat muuttumassa radikaalisti. Viestintäteknologiat ja ihmisten ja tavaroiden kuljetus muokkaavat yhteyksiämme – systeemin osien fyysistä kykyä luoda yhteyksiä toisiinsa. Kun yhteydet lisääntyvät, systeemi muuttuu yhä monimutkaisemmaksi, ja niin tulee myös todennäköisemmäksi, että pienet muutokset moninkertaistuvat. Internet on arkkityyppinen verkostojen verkosto, joka on lisännyt yhteyksiä enemmän kuin mikään muu teknologinen infrastruktuuri. Yhteydet lisääntyvät nopeasti internetin yhdistyessä mobiiliteknologiaan ja niiden levitessä laajalti jopa kolmannen maailman maaseutualueille. Vakaina aikoina ihmiset käyttävät tällaisia teknologioita arkisesti, esimerkiksi flirttailevat tekstiviesteillä. Mutta kun koko olemassaolomme on uhattuna, tai kun alamme uskoa että parempi tulevaisuus onkin mahdollista saavuttaa, ihmiset voivat innostua käyttämään samoja teknologioita erikoislaatuisempiin tavoitteisiin. Näiden teknologioiden avulla on mahdollista mobilisoida ihmisiä maailmanlaajuisesti, ennennäkemättömän hienostuneella tavalla.
Antiglobalisaatioliikkeen ensimmäinen kierros oli seurausta globaalin Etelän ja Pohjoisen kansalaisliikkeiden välille syntyneistä uusista yhteyksistä, jotka internet mahdollisti. Tämän teknologian yleistyessä ihmiset, joilla ei nykyjärjestelmässä ole paljoa menetettävää, tulevat käyttämään uutta viestintäkykyään omiin tarkoituksiinsa. Ihmiset voivat reagoida yhdessä tapahtumiin paljon nopeammin kuin ennen; uusi sosiaalinen järjestelmä voi ilmaantua spontaanisti ihmisten itse itselleen luomien yhteyksien kautta, johtajien asettaman järjestyksen sijaan.
Mitä seuraavaksi?
Mainitsimme kytkeytyneisyyden valtavan lisääntymisen. Väitimme, että materiaalin ja energian lisääntynyt syöttö systeemiin on pakottanut kapitalismin kohtamaan ulkoiset, luonnonympäristönsä rajat. Näiden tekijöiden lisäksi maailmamme osoittamat täyden skitsofrenian merkit viittaavat siihen, että elämme kriittisen epävakauden aikoja. Kriittisellä epävakaudella kuvataan villisti ja näennäisen kaoottisesti käyttäytyvää monimutkaista systeemiä. Kriittinen epävakaus on yleensä haarautumiskohdan ensimmäinen näkyvä vaihe ja tässä pisteessä massiiviset, systemaattiset muutokset alkavat. Horjahtelemme kohti uutta ja tuntematonta systeemiä tai systeemejä. Vain ehkä yhdellä neljästä- tai viidestäkymmenestä sukupolvesta on tilaisuus kokea ihmisyhteiskunnan vaihesiirtymä ja, vielä tärkeämpää, osallistua uuden yhteiskunnan luomiseen. Romahduksen aave sekä kauhistuttaa että innostaa.
Kun ilmassa on epävarmuutta tulevasta, esiin loihditaan usein unelmia menneistä, vakaista sosiaalisista järjestelmistä. Lähi-idässä moni haaveilee paluusta feodaaliseen teokratiaan. “Primitivistit” taas haluavat ihmisten alkavan jälleen metsästäjä-keräilijöiksi. Meidän pitäisikin muistaa, että vaikka toisenlaiset maailmat ovat mahdollisia (ja myös todennäköisiä), jotkin niistä ovat huonompia kuin nykyinen. Kaikeksi onneksi sekä feodaalinen teokratia (koska se on erittäin autoritäärinen) että metsästäjä-keräilijäyhteiskunta (koska 90 % ihmiskunnasta pitäisi kuolla) ovat erittäin epätodennäköisiä. Maailmassa on yksinkertaisesti liikaa yhteyksiä ja liikaa materiaalia (mukaan lukien 6,6 miljardia ihmisaivoa) ja energiaa (ne kaikki ihmiset) että moiset skenaariot voisivat toteutua. Lähestymämme vaihesiirtymä tulee olemaan jotain uutta ja ennen näkemätöntä.
Yksi mahdollinen vetovoima-allas on ekofasismi. Siinä eliitti käyttäisi modernia kontrolliteknologiaa luodakseen sosiaalisesti autoritäärisen globaalin talouden, joka olisi eliitin ulkopuolisen väestön osalta materiaalisessa tasapainotilassa. Kun resurssien määrä on rajallinen, ihmiset pelkäävät jäävänsä ilman ja siksi luotaisiin linjanvetoja siitä, ketkä saavat ja ketkä eivät. Jako köyhiin ja rikkaisiin olisi brutaalimpi kuin nykypäivänä. Voimme nähdä vilauksen tästä mahdollisesta attraktorista nykyisissä maahanmuuttokamppailuissa, jotka tulevat pahenemaan ympäristökriisin aiheuttamien suurten väestömuuttoliikkeiden myötä. Ekofasismi olisi erityisen petollinen vihollinen, sillä monet sen kannattajat käyttävät antikapitalistista retoriikkaa. Ekofasismista ei voisi tulla vakaata attraktroria - se on tuomittu epäonnistumaan, sillä se on suljettu systeemi ja tuhoaa yhteyksiä. Mutta olemassaolonsa aikana se ehtisi aiheuttaa vakavaa haittaa ihmiskunnalle ja planeetalle.
Toinen mahdollinen attraktori muodostuisi hajautetuista, yhdessä toimivista yhteisöistä, joiden suhteet perustuisivat yhteenkuuluvuudentunteeseen: ajatukseen, että jaamme maapallon biosfäärin. Yhteisöt olisivat vahvasti kytkeytyneitä. Toisin kuin fasismi, ja outoa kyllä hieman kapitalismin tapaan, tämän attraktorin vahvuus ja palautumiskyky perustuu sen yhteyksien vahvuuteen. Tämä sosiaalisen järjestäytymisen muoto on aina avoin, ja hakee aina uusia yhteyksiä; ja kompleksisuusteorian hengen mukaisesti, toisin kuin mitkään aiemmat vallankumoukselliset liikkeet, se ei ole lainkaan deterministinen. Autonomian logiikka mahdollistaa, että systeemin osat optimoivat omat yhteytensä ja linkittyvät siten ihmisiin, materiaaleihin, intohimoihin ja paikkoihin tavoilla, jotka ottavat maksimihyödyn materiaali- ja energiavirroista. Tuotanto ei seuraa kasvun logiikkaa vaan pyrkii täyttämään yhteiset tarpeet yhteisön jakamaa rikkautta käyttäen. Tuotanto ja sitä koskevat päätökset tehtäisiin suoran demokratian kautta, mikä maksimoi kytkeytyneisyyden. Lisäksi tämä autonomiaan, yhteisöllisyyteen ja yhteisvaurauteen perustuva erittäin joustava systeemi voi tarjota meille työkalut ympäristökriisiä vastaan.
Meillä on syytä optimismiin. Vastaus kysymykseen “Onko kapitalismi tämän vuosisadan lopulla yhä tärkein tuotantotapa?” on lähes aina kielteinen. Kapitalismin nykyinen suunta ei voi jatkua pitkään. Monimutkaisten systeemien on mahdollista muuttua silmänräpäyksessä. Maailmanlaajuinen ympäristökriisi herättää yleensä pessimismiä, mutta, ristiriitaista kyllä, se myös luo toivoa. Olosuhteet, joissa ihmisten sosiaalinen järjestäytyminen voi muuttua nopeasti, eivät ole olleet näin suotuisat kahteen- tai edes viiteensataan vuoteen. Emme voi tietenkään ennustaa, minkä muodon uusi sosiaalinen järjestelmä ottaa. Mutta pitäkäämme mielessä salatut muuttujat: vapaa tahto ja ihmismielen kekseliäisyys. Pieniltä vaikuttavat teot saattavat, näinä hyper-kytkeytyneinä, epävakaina aikoina, saada aikaan muutoksia jotka ylittävät mielikuvituksemme.
Kay Summer ja Harry Halpin ovat olleet pitkään mukana “liikkeiden liikkeessä” ja sitä edeltävissä liikkeissä. He tekevät työkseen tutkimusta, josta osa käsittelee epälineaarisia systeemejä ja ideoita. Heidän edellinen yhteinen kirjoituksensa epälineaarisuudesta ja kansalaisliikkeistä julkaistiin kirjassa “Shut them Down!: The G8, Gleneagles 2005 and the Movement of Movements” (2005, www.shutthemdown.org). Heidät tavoittaa osoitteista kaysmmr[at]yahoo.co.uk ja harry[at]j12.org
Tämä artikkeli on suora käännös Turbulence-lehden artikkelista “The crazy before the new - Complexity, critical instability and the end of capitalism” http://turbulence.org.uk/turbulence-1/the-crazy-before-the-new/
[1] = toim. huom. rekuperaatiolla tarkoitetaan prosessia, jossa radikaaleja ideoita käytetään hyväksi niiden alkuperäistä päämäärää vesittäen. Vastarinnan muodot voidaan jopa sulauttaa osaksi hallitsevaa valtaa ja käyttää niitä sen pönkittämiseen. Esimerkiksi käyvät kapitalististen kauppaketjujen myymät Che Guevara –paidat, joissa ei liene enää mitään vallankumouksellista.
This translation was published in Väärinajattelija # 3. Käännös/translation: Soile Koskinen.
The English original of this article is here.
Das Maß eines Monsters: Kapital, Klasse, Konkurrenz und die Finanzmärkte
Experten sprechen von der weltweiten ‘Kreditklemme’ als der potentiell schlimmsten Krise, die den Kapitalismus seit dem New Yorker Börsencrash von 1929 und der dann einsetzenden Weltwirtschaftskrise befallen habe. Solche Vergleiche scheinen uns von zweifelhaftem Wert zu sein. Sicherlich müssen wir aber die Ursprünge, das Wesen und die Bedeutung der gegenwärtigen Finanzkrise zu verstehen versuchen. Vor allem müssen wir sowohl das Potential als auch die Gefahren, die sie für uns birgt, verstehen. Dazu im Folgenden zwei Analysen. In der ersten vertritt Christian Frings die Position, dass die neoliberale ‚Finanzialisierung’ eine Antwort auf soziale Kämpfe war und die jetzige Krise antikapitalistischen Bewegungen neue Möglichkeiten eröffnet. Im zweiten Text (unten) argumentiert David Harvie, der Finanzsektor sei von zentraler Bedeutung für die wettbewerbsmäßige Berechnung, die Akkumulation und den Klassenkampf, was die gegenwärtige Krise zu einer Krise sowohl des Maßes als auch des Kapitals mache.
- Turbulence
“Die internationalen Finanzmärkte haben sich zu einem Monster entwickelt, das in die Schranken gewiesen werden muss.”
– Horst Köhler, Bundespräsident der BRD und ehemaliger Geschäftsführender Direktor des IWF
Die Zahlen, die im Zusammenhang mit den Finanzmärkten genannt werden, sind kaum zu fassen. Eine Wertgröße, die dem jährlichen Gesamtprodukt der Weltwirtschaft entspricht, wechselt auf den Finanzmärkten innerhalb von sechs Tagen die Hände! Manchmal – zum Beispiel jetzt, inmitten der ‘internationalen Kreditkrise’ – scheint der Finanzsektor außer Kontrolle zu geraten. Ein Chor von Stimmen erhebt sich, um – wie Horst Köhler, aber auch, um ein Beispiel aus der Linken zu nennen, Walden Bello – die Finanzmärkte zu verurteilen und seine Regulierung zu fordern.
Handelt es sich bei der regen Tätigkeit auf den Finanzmärkten nur um ‘Spekulation’? Oder um ein Indiz für die Flucht des Kapitals aus einer ’stagnierenden Realwirtschaft’, d. h. aus einer ‘Produktion’, in der das Kapital mit der lebendigen Arbeit zu kämpfen hat, wenn es Mehrwert abpressen will? Sicherlich ist ein Großteil der Aktivitäten auf den Finanzmärkten in dem Sinne spekulativ, dass WertpapierhändlerInnen in der Hoffnung, einen Profit zu machen, Risiken eingehen. Aber so gesehen ist alles, was KapitalistInnen tun, spekulativ. Nichts ist spekulativer als Geld in die Produktion zu werfen, also Produktionsmittel einschließlich Arbeitskraft zu erwerben, um dann die lebenden, kämpfenden, hoffenden TrägerInnen dieser Arbeitskraft hart genug arbeiten zu lassen, um dem Investoren einen Profit zu bescheren.
Es geht aber nicht nur um Spekulation. Tatsächlich führen Diskussion darüber, inwiefern es auf den Finanzmärkten in erster Linie um ‘Spekulation’ geht, oder auch darüber, ob die Finanzmärkte eine ’stabilisierende’ oder ‘destabilisierende’ Wirkung haben, leicht in eine Falle. Schnell entsteht der Eindruck, Investitionen in die ‘Realwirtschaft’ – also in die Akkumulation entfremdeter Arbeit in Fabriken, auf Feldern, in Call Centern und Schulen – seien irgendwie ‘ethischer’. Diese Sorte Kritik am Finanzsektor verfehlt noch dazu dessen wichtigste Funktion, die uns direkt zum Kern der Kapitalakkumulation, der Konkurrenz, der Klassenfrage und des Klassenkampfes bringt.
Auf den Finanzmärkten – und insbesondere bei jenen geheimnisvollen ‘Derivaten’ – geht es immer um Fragen des Maßes, also um die Messung von Wertschöpfung und Kapitalakkumulation. Derivate erlauben es, die verschiedenen (in der Zeit, im Raum und über verschiedene Sektoren verteilten) ‘Bestandteile’ des Kapitals wertmäßig zu einander in Beziehung zu setzen oder kommensurabel zu machen. Derivate machen sogar aus dem sehr ungewissen Wesen des Werts, also aus seiner Anzweifelbarkeit, eine handelbare Ware.
Die ‘Leistung’ eines Vermögenswertes (also die ‘Leistung’ des ihm entsprechenden ‘Bestandteils’ des Kapitals, einschließlich der von ihm ausgebeuteten ArbeiterInnen) kann über seine Ertragsrate gemessen werden. Das bedeutet, dass jeder Vermögenswert, wenn er nicht verfallen soll, eine wettbewerbsfähige Ertragsrate aufweisen muss. Mit anderen Worten, er muss den auf dem Markt etablierten durchschnittlichen Ansprüchen entweder entsprechen oder sogar noch besser sein. FinanzinvestorInnen, SpekulantInnen – wie wir sie nennen, ist egal – interessiert es nicht, ob sie mit Kakao-futures, dem argentinischen Peso oder einem mit dem DAX verbundenen Index handeln. Sie streben einfach nach der höchst möglichen Ertragsrate (unter Berücksichtigung der Risiken). Und so wird, durch ihr Marktverhalten, die ‘Leistung’ der ‘führenden’ hundert Konzerne mit der ‘Leistung’ der gesamten argentinischen Wirtschaft und der Kakaobauern in aller Welt verglichen (ist die argentinische Wirtschaft ’stark’, wird der Wert des Peso steigen). Die Folgen für die ArbeiterInnen der Welt sind klar. Gemessen wird unsere ‘Leistung’. Die Leistung der Arbeiterin in einer Detroiter Autofabrik kann nicht nur mit der ihres Nebenmannes am Fließband (oder auch mit der einer entsprechenden Arbeiterin in Alabama oder Südkorea), sondern auch mit der von TextilarbeiterInnen in Marokko, ProgrammiererInnen in Bangalore oder Putzkräften in der Londoner U-Bahn verglichen werden. Die Konkurrenz wird verstärkt, ebenso der Klassenkampf.
Und somit kommen wir zur gegenwärtigen Krise. Der Ursprung der Krise waren die KreditnehmerInnen mit geringer Bonität (so genannte subprime Kreditnehmer) und die als collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) bekannten Kreditforderungen, die eine an die Hypotheken der Kreditnehmenden gekoppelte Form von Derivaten sind. Nicht nur ist unser Zugang zu Wohnmöglichkeiten von den Transaktionen der KapitalistInnen abhängig. Nicht nur ist unser Kampf um ein Dach über dem Kopf für InvestorInnen zu einer Gelegenheit geworden, Profit zu machen. Sogar unsere ‘Leistung’ als KreditnehmerInnen wird vom internationalen Finanzmarkt gemessen. Sie wird an diesen Markt gekoppelt – und damit auch an die Leistung aller übrigen Vermögenswerte, von den ProgrammiererInnen und Putzkräften bis zu den BäuerInnen und TexilarbeiterInnen. Kurz, wir werden – sowohl in unserer Reproduktionstätigkeit als auch bei der Lohnarbeit – zu Subjekten wettbewerbsmäßiger Berechnung.
Wer in die an Hypotheken angebundenen CDOs investiert hatte, glaubte offenbar, dass die KreditnehmerInnen, ob subprime oder nicht, ebenso wie die US-Wirtschaft als Ganzes, ‘Leistung erbringen’ würden – dass also US-amerikanische HausbesitzerInnen und ArbeiterInnen der Rolle, die ihnen in der wettbewerbsmäßigen Berechnung zugedacht worden war, gerecht werden würden. Natürlich würde ein kleiner Teil der KreditnehmerInnen die erwartete ‘Leistung’ nicht ‘erbringen’, aber solche Risiken waren bereits sämtlich in den ‘Risiko-und-Ertrags-Profilen’ (risk-and-return-profiles) der CDOs zur Kenntnis genommen, waren berechnet und bewertet worden. Tatsächlich versagten dann aber viel mehr KreditnehmerInnen als vorhergesehen die erwartete Leistung. Als es zu immer mehr Zahlungseinstellungen kam, war das gesamte Finanzsystem bedroht.
Einerseits geht es in dieser Krise um den Konflikt zwischen Bedürfnissen und Profiten: zwischen unserem Bedürfnis nach einer Wohnmöglichkeit und dem Bedürfnis der InvestorInnen – oder des Kapitals – nach einer Ertragsrate. Wie alle Krisen zeigt auch diese, dass unser Zugang zum gesellschaftlichen Reichtum, beispielsweise zu Wohnmöglichkeiten, durch Geld rationiert wird. Um das zu verstehen, genügt es, sich anzusehen, wie sich die als tent cities (Zeltstädte) bekannten amerikanischen Elendssiedlungen ausbreiten, während Häuser aus Holz, Ziegelstein und Mörtel aufgrund von Zahlungsunfähigkeit leer stehen.
Andererseits ist die gegenwärtige Krise aber auch eine Krise des Maßes. InvestorInnen haben Risiken falsch eingeschätzt. Sie haben sich verrechnet. Jetzt sprechen die Banken über am Markt vorzunehmende ‘Korrekturen’. Interessant ist an dieser Krise weniger, dass Finanzinstitutionen eine Menge Geld verloren haben (bis jetzt sind 300 Milliarden US-Dollar ‘abgeschrieben’ worden), sondern dass sie fast ein Jahr später immer noch nicht genau wissen, wie viel. Die gesamte Krise hindurch sind die Finanzmärkte nicht im Stande gewesen, Wert zu messen und Kapital wertmäßig vergleichbar (kommensurabel) zu machen. Kapital muss, um Kapital sein zu können, kommensurabel gemacht werden. Wenn ‘Bestandteile’ des Kapitals nicht gemessen und als so und so viele Dollar oder Euro in Bilanzrechnungen eingetragen werden können, dann sind es eben nur so und so viele Barrel Rohöl oder so und so viele Tonnen Kaffee: Ihr Stellenwert als Kapital ist bedroht. Daher ist jede Krise des Wertmaßes eine Krise des Kapitals, und damit des Kapitals selbst.
Der Widerstand gegen die wettbewerbsmäßige Berechnung muss Teil unserer Politik sein. Die subprime KreditnehmerInnen haben dieses Potenzial auf negative Weise aufgezeigt: In den USA hat eine (überwiegend schwarze) ArbeiterInnenklasse eine Krise ausgelöst, indem sie die für sie vorgesehene Rolle und die darin implizite Berechnung verweigert hat. Die Herausforderung besteht darin, einen positiven Rahmen für diese Macht zu entwickeln.
Subprime KreditnehmerInnen sind solche mit ’schlechter Bonität’, also Personen ohne gesichertes Einkommen oder Kapitalbesitz, die womöglich bereits frühere Darlehen nicht haben zurück zahlen können – kurz, die Prekären!
Derivate sind Finanzinstrumente, deren Wert – jedenfalls im Prinzip – vom Preis eines ihnen zugrunde liegenden Gutes, Vermögenswertes oder mehrerer Vermögenswerte abgeleitet ist. Futures sind beispielsweise Verträge, in denen der Tausch eines bestimmten Gutes oder Vermögenswertes zu einem zukünftigen Termin und zu einem vorher fest gelegten Preis vereinbart wird. Optionen funktionieren ähnlich wie futures, mit dem Unterschied, dass sie ihrem Besitzer das Recht geben, entweder zu kaufen oder zu verkaufen, ihn aber nicht dazu verpflichten. Swaps sind bilaterale Vereinbarungen über den Tausch von Zahlungsströmen oder Forderungen. Zum Beispiel kann ein in japanischen Yen bewertetes Darlehen mit Gleitzins gegen ein in US-Dollar zurück zu zahlendes Darlehen ohne Gleitzins getauscht werden. In der Praxis werden Preise meist auf den Derivatenmärkten bestimmt und die Preise der zugrunde liegenden Aktivposten oder Waren dann von diesen Derivatenpreisen abgeleitet. Damit wird der Preis, den eine guatemaltekische Kaffeeanbauerin für ihre Ernte erhält, faktisch von der London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) bestimmt – die übrigens 1999 während des Carnival Against Capital besetzt wurde. Derivate können an Waren wie Kaffee, Kakao, Saumägen, Öl usw. gekoppelt sein, aber auch an Aktien oder Aktienindexe (z. B. den FTSE100), Zinsraten, Devisen… Es gibt mittlerweile sogar Derivate, die auf dem Wetter basieren. Einige Monate lang existierte ein ‘Politikanalysenmarkt’ (policy analysis market), der es erlaubte, mit Putschen, politischen Morden und terroristischen Anschlägen zu wirtschaften.
In den 1970er Jahren (ebenfalls einem Jahrzehnt steigender Ölpreise), betrieben westliche Banken das so genannte petrodollar-recycling und boten Regierungen in der ‘Dritten Welt’ Darlehen mit Gleitzins an, wodurch ganze Ökonomien den Bemessungsverfahren und der Disziplin der internationalen Finanzmärkte ausgesetzt wurden. Die wirkliche Bedeutung dieser Disziplin wurde in der internationalen Schuldenkrise der 1980er Jahre sowie in den verschiedenen Finanzkrisen seit den 1990er Jahren deutlich.
Kredit kommt vom lateinischen credere, glauben.
David Harvie ist Mitglied der Free Association und Redaktionsmitglied der Zeitschrift Turbulence.
English original here.
Liike on kuollut, eläköön liike!
Yhteiskunta
Kapitalismi ja sitä vastustavat liikkeet ovat tottuneet hitaisiin muutoksiin: jos vallankumous ei synny nyt, ehkä sitten ensi vuosisadalla. Ilmastonmuutos muuttaa kaiken. Nyt muutoksella on kiire. Berliiniläinen aktivisti ja tutkija Tadzio Müller pohtii, miten antikapitalistien tulisi taistella ilmastonmuutosta vastaan maailmassa, jossa valtioiden ja pääoman puolestapuhujat ovat omineet vihreän puheenparren.
Liike on kuollut! Tarkemmin sanottuna: vaihtoehtoista globalisaatiota ajava liike on kuollut sellaisena kokonaisuutena, jossa eri liikkeet ja “aktivistit” kohtaavat, muuttuvat ja yhdistävät kamppailunsa uusliberalistisen globalisaation yhteistä kohdetta vastaan. Eivät yksittäiset kamppailut ole kuolleet pois. Eivätkä huippukokousten vastaiset mobilisoinnit ole myöskään loppuneet.
Tätä kirjoittaessani valmistelut Japanin G8-kokousta varten ovat täydessä vauhdissa. Jokaisessa radikaalin ja ei-niin-radikaalin vasemmiston kokouksessa suunnitellaan yhden jos toisenkin huippukokouksen pysäyttämistä. G8 Italiassa 2009, Naton 60-vuotisjuhlat Ranskassa ja niin edelleen: Countersummits-R-Us?
Jostain syystä mobilisoinneilla ei ole enää samaa iskuvoimaa kuin ennen. Kuinka monta kertaa ollaankaan lähdetty liikkeelle ja ajateltu, että jos nyt epäonnistutaan, lopetetaan koko touhu? Edes laaja liikehdintä G8-kokouksessa Heilingendammissa ei saavuttanut juuri mitään. Kyllä kymmeniä tuhansia ihmisiä saa kaduille, mutta on toinen kysymys, onko toiminnalla mitään vaikutusta muihin kuin itse osallistujiin.
Älkää ymmärtäkö väärin. Liike ei kuollut häviäjän nöyryyttävää kuolemaa. Monella tapaa se on myös voittanut. Selvitäkseen liikkeiden on pysyttävä liikkeellä. Siksi voitot merkitsevät usein myös liikkeiden kuolemaa. Koska ne elävät ja hengittävät vastakkainasettelusta, ne tarvitsevat vihollista. Mitenkäs oma vihollisemme? Kysytään Martin Wolfilta, Financial Timesin pääideologilta, uusliberaalin hyökkäyksen huomattavalta puhemieheltä. Eräässä puheessaan hän käsitteli päivää, jolloin Yhdysvaltain keskuspankki pelasti suuren pankin estääkseen finanssikriisiä leviämästä: “Muistakaa perjantai 14. maaliskuuta 2008. Silloin kuoli unelma globaalista vapaiden markkinoiden kapitalismista”.
Uusliberalismi on siis – osittain – kuollut, kuten kuollut on – myös osittain – sitä vastaan kamppaillut liike. Kuollut on myös liikkeeseen kuulunut kapitalismin vastainen suuntaus, josta tämäkin teksti kumpuaa. Liike näyttää kadottaneen elementin, joka voisi sulauttaa taistelujen moninaisuudesta yhteen uuden liikkeen tai joka voisi vastustaa vastarinnan hajaannusta, johon pääoma ja valtio yrittävät meitä jatkuvasti ajaa. Tarvitsemme kertomuksen, toivoa, tarvitsemme “koukun”, joka vetäisi meidät liikkeelle. Tällä hetkellä vaihtoehtoisen globalisaation liike on selvästi liike, jolla ei ole koukkua, vihollista tai päämäärää.
Samalla kun on olemassa liike ilman kertomusta, on kuitenkin olemassa myös kertomus ilman liikettä: ilmastonmuutos. Yhä useammat poliittiset päätökset (myös monet sellaiset, joilla on tuskin mitään tekemistä aiheen kanssa) oikeutetaan sillä, että niillä on joku suhde “ilmastoon”. Euroopan hallitukset joutuivat G8:n ja erityisesti liittokansleri Merkelin päihittämiksi Heilingendammissa. Silloin nämä hallitukset ymmärsivät, että niiden on kehitettävä omaa näkökantaansa ja käytäntöään ilmastonmuutokseen, tai muuten ne ovat vaarassa menettää merkityksensä vihreiden kysymysten uudessa uljaassa maailmassa.
Pääoman ja hallituskoneistojen edistyneimmät toimijat ovat keksineet loistavan tavan saada poliittista kannatusta uudelle “vihreälle ratkaisulle”. Sen on määrä ratkaista ylikasaantumisen kriisi, tilanne jossa on ollut liian paljon rahaa jahtaamassa liian harvoja tuottoisia sijoitusmahdollisuuksia. Se on myös ratkaisu nykyiseen finanssikaaokseen ja legitimaatiokriisiin, joista globaali auktoriteetti on kärsinyt siitä lähtien, kun “globaalin terrorismin” kertomusten voima alkoi hiipua.
Se, että kaikki puhuvat nyt ilmastokysymyksestä, on suuri voitto vihreälle liikkeelle. Samalla se on myös viimeinen naula vihreän liikkeen arkkuun: jokainen vihreä kansalaisjärjestö on korviaan myöten sidoksissa neuvotteluihin Kioton sopimuksen jatkosopimuksesta. Siksi on epätodennäköistä, että ne omaksuisivat poliittisia kantoja, jotka eroavat merkittävästi hallitsevista päämääristä.
On liike ilman kertomusta ja kertomus ilman liikettä. Tästä seuraa nykytilanne, jossa ilmastonmuutosta käsitellään pääosin tavoilla, jotka edistävät valtioiden tai pääoman määräävien osien päämääriä.
Kapitalismin vastaisesta näkökulmasta pääoman jatkuvan kasaantumisen eli talouskasvun ja ilmastonmuutoksen hoitamisen välillä on perustava ristiriita. Se kiteyttää samalla entistä energisemmän kapitalismin vastaisen politiikan, joka voi onnistua yhdistämään ihmisten laajalle levinneen huolen ilmastonmuutoksesta sekä vaikutelman siitä, että tämänhetkiset toimenpiteet (Kioto, Bali, päästökauppa jne.) ovat aivan liian vähän, aivan liian myöhään.
Radikaalit yhteiskunnalliset liikkeet ovat kykenevimpiä toimimaan ja “tekemään historiaa” juuri silloin, kun nykypäivän tavanomaiset lähestymistavat ongelmanratkaisuun – joko luodaan markkinat ratkaisemaan ongelma tai sitten vaietaan siitä – eivät tarjoa uskottavaa tapaa käsitellä ilmiötä. Juuri silloin, kun ratkaisujen löytäminen näyttää mahdottomalta, on yhteiskunnallisilla liikkeilla tilaisuus laajentaa mahdollisuuksiaan. Nyt näyttää, että luvassa olisi “täydellinen myrsky”…
Useimmat pyrkimykset rakentaa vaikutuskykyistä kapitalismin vastaista liikettä ilmastonmuutoskysymyksen ympärille kohtaavat kuitenkin suuria käytännön vaikeuksia. Globaalin Pohjoisen perspektiivistä katsottuna näyttää siltä, että meillä on kyllä pyrkimyksiä kehittää kapitalismin vastaista ilmastonmuutospolitiikkaa, mutta ne törmäävät yhä useisiin vaikeuksiin.
Britanniassa kaikki alkoi vuonna 2006. “Ilmastotoimintaleiri” pyrki sulkemaan pohjoisenglantilaisen hiilivoimalan yhdeksi päiväksi. Mikä tärkeämpää, se pyrki tuottamaan tilan pohtia uusia ideoita ja käytäntöjä kapitalismin vastaiselle ilmastonmuutospolitiikalle. Ajatus “ilmastotoimintaleireistä” on sittemmin inspiroinut ihmisiä Saksassa, Ruotsissa, Yhdysvalloissa, Chilessä, Australiassa, Uudessa Seelannissa ja muualla. Tällä hetkellä tämä näyttää olevan esiin marssivan ilmastoliikkeen toiminnan keskeisin “ase”. On jokseenkin ironista, että alun perin ajatus leiristä syntyi huippukokousprotestien puutteista.
En todellakaan halua vähätellä leirien tärkeyttä. Ne ovat inspiroineet paljon ihmisiä eri maissa. Se ei ole mitätön saavutus, mutta yksi niitä koskeva kritiikki nousee muiden ylle. Saavatko leirit todellisuudessa mitään muuta aikaa kuin sen, että ne tyydyttävät ihmisten halun tehdä jotain? On kivaa hengata leireillä kavereiden ja tovereiden kanssa, mutta kysymys kalvaa: mitä me haluamme? Mitä voimme saavuttaa? Ovatko leiritouhuilu ja pyrkimykset sulkea voimalaitoksia yksi kerrallaan missään suhteessa ilmastonmuutoksen haasteen suuruuteen? Tämä kysymys turhauttaa samalla, kun taistellaan jatkuvasti siitä, etteivät poliittisen kentän voimakkaammat äänet hukuta meidän ääniämme.
En edelleenkään väitä, ettei ilmastoleirejä tulisi järjestää. Leirien tulisi kuitenkin olla osa laajempaa projektia, joka antaa niille jotain poliittista merkitystä hyvin paikallisen intervention tuolla puolen. Voimme tietenkin toivoa, että poliittinen globaalisuus nousisi tämänvuotisten ilmastoleirien välillä muodostuvista yhteyksistä, mutta yhteinen koordinaatio on ollut aivan olematonta.
Ei ole yhteisiä vaatimuksia (muita kuin “ilmastonmuutoksen vastustaminen”, mikä on poliittisesti suunnilleen yhtä hyödyllistä ja omintakeista kuin vastustaa hylkeenpoikasten kuoliaaksi hakkaamista). Ei ole yhteistä kertomusta, ei slogania kuten “suljetaan WTO”, ei edes ympäripyöreää kompromissia kuten “fix it or nix it“. Ei ole omaa vastinetta iskulauseelle “toisenlainen maailma on mahdollinen”!
Jos brittiläisen liikkeen tapa kohdata ilmastonmuutoksen haaste vaikuttaa poliittisesti rajoittuneelta, skaalan toisessa päässä on Saksa. Yrityksiä käynnistää ilmastoleiriprosessia ei ole häirinnyt ainoastaan tavanomainen vasemmistolainen keskinäinen nahistelu ja riitely – ryhmä on jo jakautunut – vaan se on kohdannut myös toisen poliittisen ongelman. Täällä Saksassa radikaalivasemmisto on niin akateemista ja niin kiinni “kriittisen teorian” ja “dekonstruktion” traditioissa, että sen päävastaus ilmastonmuutoksen uhkaan on harjoittaa “kritiikkiä” “hallitsevaa ilmastonmuutosdiskurssia” kohtaan ja kritisoida “tieteellisen tiedon hegemonista roolia” ilmastonmuutoksen konstituoinnissa kriisiksi.
On kyllä varmasti tärkeää muistaa että hallitustenvälinen ilmastopaneelin (IPCC) julkaisemat raportit tulevat erittäin konservatiiviselta instituutiolta. On myös tärkeää pohtia kriittisesti, kuinka turvautumista “tieteelliseen tietoon” käytetään usein sulkemaan “ei-asiantuntijoita” ulos poliittisista keskusteluista, mutta Diskurskritik ei voi olla ainoa vastaus ilmastonmuutoskysymykseen. Se on hieman sama kuin heittäisi kopioita Adornon ja Foucault’n teksteistä tulvavesiin ja toivoisi ongelman menevän pois.
Mutta ollaan rehellisiä. Täällä Pohjoisessa kapitalismin vastaisen vasemmiston luulisi jo tottuneen poliittiseen tehottomuuteen ja marginaalisuuteen, lukuunottamatta kohtuuttomuuden hetkiä, jolloin pienet voimanpurkaukset tuottavat yllättäen muutoksia. Missä määrin yksi sosiaalikeskus Hackneyssä, Kreuzbergissa tai Las Ramblasissa todella edistää taistelua gentrifikaatiota vastaan?
Pystyykö sodanvastainen mielenosoitus San Franciscossa todella “pysäyttämään imperiumin”, kuten siitä tehty video (Interrupt This Empire) väittää? Pystyvätkö myymälävarkaudet, edes massatoimintana toteutettuna, merkittävästi häiritsemään kapitalistisen tavarakierron prosesseja?
En tiedä. En myöskään usko, että toiminnassa mukana olevista kovinkaan moni tietää. On tärkeää muistaa, että puhuttaessa “kapitalismista” kapitalismin vastustajat myöntävät, ettei heillä ole vastausta tähän kysymykseen. Yksi tapa käsitellä kysymystä on viitata muutoksen epälineaariseen dynamiikkaan kompleksisissa (sosiaalisissa) järjestelmissä.
Emme voi tietää, mitä vaikutuksia tämän päivän toiminnallamme tulee olemaan huomenna: ajattele perhosta Balilla ja hurrikaania Haitissa. Ja sitten on argumentti, joka on saavuttanut lähes dogmaattisen statuksen kapitalismin vastaisissa keskusteluissa: “kuule, kapitalismi ei ole ollut olemassa ikuisesti, se alkoi jossain paikassa jossain vaiheessa, ja se tulee myös päättymään jossain vaiheessa” – pitkälti sama voidaan sanoa maailmankaikkeudesta!
Voisin jatkaa luetteloa olemassa olevista älyllisistä kikoista, joilla voi puolustella poliittisen merkityksemme vähäpätöisyyttä. Toivon kuitenkin, että ajatukseni on selvä: että kapitalismin vastainen politiikka globaalissa pohjoisessa elää eräänlaisessa ajattomuudessa, koska me emme kykene ajattelemaan tekojen vaikutuksia tulevaisuudessa. Tai emme uskalla ajatella. Mieleen tulevat strutsit ja myös yksi seinäkirjoitus, joka maalattiin Göteborgissa koulun seinään sen jälkeen, kun paikka oli ollut poliisin hyökkäyksen kohteena: “But in the end we will win!”
Nyt palaamme siihen, miksi kapitalismin vastaiselle liikkeelle näyttää olevan niin vaikeaa kehittää politiiikkaa ilmastonmuutoksen ympärille. Taistelussa pääomaa vastaan jokin on antanut meidän aina ajatella, että lopulta kuitenkin voitamme. On kuitenkin melko mahdotonta luottaa tähän, kun kyse on ilmastonmuutoksesta. Kapitalismin vastaisen politiikka on tavanomaista ajatonta, sen sijaan ilmastonmuutospolitiikassa keskeistä on asian kiireellisyys. Silloin meidän on löydettävä keinoja vastata tuohon kiireeseen.
Molemmat yllä kuvaillut suhtautumistavat (”yliaktivistinen” ja “ylikriittinen”) ovat yrityksiä vastata kiireeseen. Ne molemmat ovat myös melko epätyydyttäviä vastauksia. Ensimmäinen ottaa kiireen aivan liian vakavasti ja ryntää pää kolmantena jalkana poliittiselle kentälle, joka on paljon voimakkaampien pelaajien dominoima. Toinen suhtautumistapa taas kertoo, että kiireellisyys on pelkkä konstruktio ja siitä seurauksena oleva pelon politiikka ovat vallan strategioita. Käytännössä akateeminen suhtautumistapa tyytyy vain kritisoimaan konstruktioita eikä tartu lainkaan kysymykseen.
Kiireellisyys syntyy nimenomaan siitä, että erilaiset aikakäsitykset törmäävät toisiinsa. Se syntyy pääoman eksponentiaalisen aikakäsityksen (missä pääoma alati kiihdyttää sosiaalista elämää ja tuotantoa) ja kompleksisten ekosysteemien ajallisuuden välille. Ekosysteemit eivät tietenkään ole staattisia. Ne voivat kyllä mukautua uusiin olosuhteisiin, mutta yleensä eivät pääoman vaatimalla vauhdilla. Jos muutos on liian nopea, silloin saavutetaan pahamaineinen leimahduspiste, joissa ekosysteemien kokemat muutokset käyvät peruuttamattomiksi ja katastrofaalisiksi. Yksi esimerkki on Golf-virran pelätty kääntyminen, toinen on napaseudun mannerjäiden sulaminen.
Miten siis käsitellä tätä kiireellisyyden ongelmaa? Ensiksikin on myönnettävä, että on epätodennäköistä – itse asiassa mahdotonta – että poliittisesti marginaalinen radikaalivasemmisto kykenisi tehokkaasti hidastamaan kasvihuonekaasujen tuotantoa maailmassa, jossa pääoman kasaantuminen on erottamaton osa fossiilisten polttoaineiden polttamisesta. Joku on kutsunut tätä “fossilistiseksi kapitalismiksi”. Emme myöskään kykene pakottamaan ekologisia systeemejä mukautumaan nopeammin pääoman vauhtiin.
Me kuitenkin voimme puuttua politiikan aikakäsitykseen ja hallitusten “ilmastonmuutospolitiikkaan”. Politiikan rooli on eristää pääoman tuottama sosiaalisen elämän ja tuotannon kiihdyttäminen kaikesta yhteiskuntakritiikistä ja luoda illuusio, että jatkuva pääoman kasautuminen olisi sovitettavissa yhteen sosioekologisen vakauden kanssa. Tämän politiikan mukaan riittäisi, jos teemme muutamia (mieluiten markkinapohjaisia) hienosäätöjä. Muuten voisimme jatkaa enemmän tai vähemmän samalla tavalla kuin ennenkin.
Tämä eristäminen pitää kurissa ja jopa ottaa haltuun sen räjähdysmäisen voiman, joka piilee ihmiskunnan ja pääoman välisen ristiriidan ymmärtämisessä – ristiriidan, joka elää kiistämättömänä osana kompleksisia ekologisia systeemejä. Kun tämä voima otetaan haltuun, se saadaan antamaan tukea uudelle kasautumisen kierrokselle (ajattele “vihreää kapitalismia”) ja poliittisen sääntelyn ulottamiselle entistäkin syvemmälle meidän elämiimme.
Globaalissa Pohjoisessa kapitalismin vastainen liike ei voi “pysäyttää” tai edes merkittävästi hillitä ilmastonmuutosta. Jos olettaisimme kykenevämme tähän, jäisimme väistämättä ajattomuutemme vangeiksi, koska voisimme ainoastaan toivoa saavuttavamme päämäärämme joskus kaukaisessa tulevaisuudessa, todellisen ajan ulkopuolella. Mutta vaikka voimamme ja resurssimme ovat rajalliset, voimme puuttua pääoman ajan eristämiseen todellisen demokratian “hitaudesta”.
Jos me jälleen kerran jätämme omien voimiemme hajaannuksen ja ajattomuutemme apean varmuuden, jos muistamme, että liikkeinä meillä on kyky olla valtiota nopeampia, silloin voimme paeta niiden harjoittamaa ristiriitaista energioiden haltuunottoa ja sisällyttämistä, ja puuttua siihen.
Miten teemme tämän? Miten pidämme avoinna sen poliittisen tilan, jonka on luonut yhä laajempi huolestuminen ilmastonmuutoksesta ja jolla on potentiaali tuottaa uusia ideoita ja ratkaisuja, uusia mahdollisuuksia, jotka saattavat puolestaan yltää kapitalismin tuolle puolen? Kuinka voidaan puuttua paineisiin, jotka suuntautuvat uuden “vihreän kapitalismin” muodostamiseen, kohti “eko-imperiumia”, globaalia autoritaarista eko-keynesiläisyyttä?
Jos kysymyksen kiireellisyys pakottaa meitä ajattelemaan vaikutuksen ja vieläpä tehokkuuden termein, kuinka meidän pieni, resurssiköyhä liikkeen siipemme voisi laittaa peliin rajalliset voimamme tehokkaalla tavalla? Kuinka voisimme saavuttaa maksimituloksen suhteessa päämäärään, joka on luoda ja/tai ylläpitää tilaa, jossa kehitetään moninaisia, alhaalta ylöspäin rakentuvia, ei-kapitalistisia ratkaisuja ilmastokriisiin?
Vastaus tähän kysymykseen alkaa kahdella lisäkysymyksellä ja vie sitten meidät koko argumentin alkuun. Ensimmäinen kysymys: Mikä on luultavasti tärkein yksittäinen prosessi, jolla maailman hallitukset pyrkivät eristämään pääoman julkiselta kritiikiltä suhteessa ilmastonmuutokseen?
Vastaus: Lähes varmasti Kioto/Bali-prosessit, joissa maailmalle tarjotaan kansainvälisen politiikan draamaa, mutta jotka lopulta eivät tuota juuri mitään sellaista, mikä oikeasti suojaisi ilmastoa. Kioto-sopimusten allekirjoittamisesta lähtien, hiilidioksidipäästöt ovat ylittäneet jopa IPCC:n projisoimat synkimmät skenaariot.
Näissä prosesseissa pienenpieni päästövähennys legitimoi suuren kasan jatkettua kasvihuonekaasujen tuotantoa – puhumattakaan kokonaisen uusien päästöluottomarkkinoiden luomisesta (joiden odotetaan olevan arvoltaan kaksi biljoonaa Yhdysvaltain dollaria vuoteen 2020 mennessä), paljolti globaalin pääoman iloksi. Kioton jatkoprosessi, joka alkoi Balissa joulukuussa 2007, on tarkoitus allekirjoittaa kansainvälisessä huippukokouksessa Kööpenhaminassa joulukuussa 2009.
Toinen kysymys: mitkä ovat radikaalien globaalien liikkeiden vahvuudet verrattuina sekä vihollisiimme että maltillisempiin liittolaisiimme?
Vastaus: Suuren mittakaavan huippukokousmobilisaatioden organisoinnissa. Juuri huippukokousmobilisaatioissa olemme kehittäneet jotain sellaista, jota voitaisiin kutsua “best practiceksi”. Siellä olemme aiemmin tuottaneet tuntuvan poliittisen vaikutuksen. Seattlessa me emme ainoastaan onnistuneet pysäyttämään konferenssia olemalla kaduilla, vaan myös kärjistämällä niitä moninaisia konflikteja, jotka olivat “sisäpuolella”, neuvottelevien hallitusten välillä.
Pystymmekö siis tekemään saman uudestaan ja rakentamaan poliittisen liiton, jota yhdistää vaatimus “Unohtakaa Kioto”? Silloin voitaisiin keskustella ilmastomuutoksen ongelmien mahdollisista “ratkaisuista”, jotka menevät hallitsevan, markkinavetoisen agendan tuolle puolen. Toiseksi kykenisimme tarjoamaan nousevalle globaalille ilmastoliikkeelle yhteisen fokuksen ja yhteisen vaatimuksen, jonka ympärille koota voimia. Unohtakaa Kioto – pysäyttäkää Kööpenhamina 2009!
Mutta miksi ehdottaa jälleen yhtä suurta huippukokousprotestia, kun on juuri esitetty, että vastahuippukokoukset ovat menettäneet suuren osan tehostaan? Siksi, että ilmastonmuutoksen politiikka vuonna 2008 näyttää hyvin erilaiselta kuin uusliberaalin globalisaation politiikka vuonna 2008. Itse asiassa ilmastonmuutoksen politiikka tänään näyttää enemmän globalisaation politiikalta aikana ennen WTO-kokouksen sulkemista Seattlessa. Siihen aikaan, “historian lopun” vuosikymmenen aikana, monet tiesivät, ettei uusliberaali kapitalismi ollut virheetön, mutta ei ollut ajatusta – ei edes “vasemmalla” – liikkeestä, tai ehkä jopa “liikkeiden liikkeestä”, joka voisi asettua sitä vastaan.
Seattle osoitti, että kamppailuilla on yhteinen vihollinen. Ennen kaikkea Seattle teki mahdolliseksi “liikkeen” syntymän. Nyt ollaan palaamassa takaisin alkuun. Kamppailujen alterglobalistinen vaihe on ehkä ohi, mutta opetukset eivät ole menneet hukkaan. Yksi opetuksista on se, että liikkeelle ei riitä “yksi toimintaviikko vuodessa”, jolloin keskitytään vain suuriin yksittäisiin tapahtumiiin. Syntyvän ilmastoliikkeen perustana on oltava jokapäiväisen vastarinnan ja muutoksen käytännöt kaikilla tasoilla, ei vain globaalilla, vaan myös alueellisella, kansallisella ja paikallisella tasolla.
Ennen kuin “ilmastoliike” voi nähdä itsensä “liikkeenä” tarvitaan jotain, joka todistaisi, että on olemassa huomattavasti radikaalimpi kanta ilmastonmuutokseen kuin se, että pyritään parempaan päästökauppaan. On todistettava, että löytyy ihmisiä, jotka eivät eivät ainoastaan keskity ilmastonmuutokseen vaan myös sen syyhyn: kapitalismiin.
Tähän saatamme tarvita sitä, mitä jotkut kutsuvat kohtuuttomuuden hetkeksi. Silloin aika nopeutuu ja aiemmin mahdottomista muutoksista tulee mahdollisia. Vastahuippukokous pystyy siihen. Liike on kuollut – eläköön liike!
Kirjoittaja asuu Berliinissä, jossa hän toimii ilmastotoimintaliikkeessä ja opettaa valtio-oppia Kasselin yliopistossa. Hän on yksi Turbulence-lehden toimittajista. Suomennos: Miika Saukkonen.
English original here. Danish translation here. Spanish here.
The Finnish version of this article was originally published here.
Et tu Bertinotti?
La antes fuerte izquierda radical parlamentaria italiana, sufrió una fractura con los movimentos sociales y posteriormente fue barrida en las recientes elecciones. Sandro Mezzadra examina la caída, mientras más abajo Keir Milburn y Ben Trott la contextualizan.
CONTEXTO
28 de abril de 2008. Seguidores del recién elegido alcalde de Roma, Gianni Alemanno, se agolpan en el exterior del ayuntamiento. El nuevo alcalde de derechas aparece en el balcón y enarbola la bandera tricolor italiana. Empiezan los gritos, ‘Duce, Duce’ mientras los seguidores levantan el brazo en el ‘saludo romano’. La estética es inconfundiblemente fascista.
Estos ecos del pasado de Italia han sido acompañados por una oleada de violencia contra los inmigrantes. Ambas cosas han traído consigo el retorno de Silvio Berlusconi al poder, a la cabeza de una coalición de derechas que incluye a la posfascista Alianza Nacional y la xénofoba Liga Norte.
Este deslizamiento a la derecha ha implicado lo que, en el breve texto que sigue, Sandro Mezzadra describe como la ‘abolición’ de la izquierda parlamentaria en las últimas elecciones. Coincide además con un momento particularmente tenso en las complejas relaciones entre los movimientos y las instituciones de la izquierda italiana.
Todo ello en evidente contraste con el periodo anterior del gobierno Berlusconi, entre 2001 y 2006, que estuvo caracterizado por una explosión de luchas, que algunos llamaron ‘la primavera de los movimientos’. Fue también un periodo de cooperación intensa y largamente productiva entre los movimientos sociales y las instituciones, incluidos los partidos políticos. Las 300.000 manifestaciones contra el G8, las huelgas generales del 2002 contra un paquete de reformas laborales y cortes presupuestarios, la proliferación de foros sociales locales por toda Italia, así como las protestas contra las guerras en Afghanistán e Iraq, estuvieron todos caracterizados por la colaboración entre movimentos autónomos y no-autónomos. De particular importancia fueron el Sindicato de Comisiones de Base, COBAS; el sindicato de trabajadores del metal, FIOM; los Tute Bianche/Disobbedienti; y las juventudes de Rifondazione, Giovani Comuniste e Comunisti.
Sin embargo, la decisión de Rifondazione de buscar su participación en el gobierno post-Berlusconi tras las elecciones del 2006, llevaron a una ruptura en sus relaciones con los movimientos sociales. El ‘área de la autonomía’ en Italia, de repente, se volvió más fácil de definir. Con la convocatoria de elecciones anticipadas, sólo dos años después de que algunos partidos de izquierda radical, incluida Rifondazione, entraran en el gobierno de coalición de Romano Prodi, los esfuerzos para llevar el cambio a través de la vía parlamentaria (o, para los más cínicos, ‘el camino del oportunismo’) fracasaron estrepitosamente. Parece que es en este ‘área de la autonomía’ en la que la izquierda italiana tendrá que concentrar progresivamente sus esfuerzos en los años venideros.
- Keir Milburn & Ben Trott
Tres partidos de la izquierda radical, Federazione dei Verdi, Rifondazione comunista, y Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, tomaron parte en el gobierno de coalición post-Berlusconi. En las elecciones provocadas por la caída de dicho gobierno, formaron la coalición Sinistra Arcobaleno (Izquierda Arcoiris), dirigida por el antiguo líder de Rifondazione comunista, Fausto Bertinotti. La coalición sufrió una derrota aplastante. Por primera vez desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, no hay participación comunista en el parlamento italiano, e Italia es ahora uno de los pocos países europeos sin representación de los Verdes en el parlamento.
Los resultados de las recientes elecciones en Italia fueron un shock. Se había abolido la ‘izquierda’ parlamentaria. Fue una derrota particularmente aplastante para Rifondazione comunista y Fausto Bertinotti, iniciador del proyecto Sinistra Arcobaleno.
Pertenezco a aquellos que criticaron este proyecto incluso antes de las elecciones. Arcobaleno era desde el principio una pura ‘política de la coalición’.
Dentro de Rifondazione, entre 1998 y 2003, hubo –paralelamente al desarrollo de poderosas luchas y movimientos sociales- al menos un intento para tomar en serio la crisis de la democracia representativa; para concibir una nueva relación entre las luchas sociales y las instituciones; para desarrollar esta relación en los nuevos espacios transnacionales de Europa; y para sacar pleno rendimiento a la investigación militante en la transformación de la composición de clase como un medio de participación en las luchas sociales. sus energías en la participación en el gobierno y de este modo resolver la crisis del comunismo histórico a través de una especie de un proyecto de ‘izquierda-social democrática’. Las elecciones han emitido un duro juicio a dicho proyecto.
Son muchos los compañeros en Italia que han celebrado este varapalo, pues algunos creen que la derrota de Bertinotti muestra la necesidad de una identidad comunista tradicional, mientras que otros apuntan a la necesaria autonomía de las luchas y movimientos sociales. Personalmente, encuentro que la primera postura hace referencia a una ‘política identitaria’, y me siento más cercano a la segunda. Creo sin embargo que es urgente plantear de nuevo el problema de la política dentro de las luchas y movimientos sociales, que no han desaparecido en Italia, sino más bien al contrario. Sin embargo, las elecciones no sólo llevaron a la derrota de Bertinotti y Arcobaleno, sino que la victoria de Berlusconi y Bossi (líder de la Liga Norte) está además caracterizada por rasgos singulares que no se han enfatizado suficientemente. En particular, la Lega llevó a cabo una agresiva campaña electoral, típica de la crisis de la globalización neoliberal. Actualmente nos enfrentamos a una ocupación del derecho a criticar la globalización. Como consecuencia de las indicios de una crisis económica internacional, se está redescubriendo la comunidad territorial y/o nacional en sentido defensivo como el punto de referencia exclusivo para la política. La ubicuidad de la retórica sobre la ‘seguridad’ tiene que interpretarse en este contexto.
Las luchas sociales y los movimientos, bajo estas condiciones, corren el peligro de ser reducidas al estatus de resistencia. El problema que deben abordar los políticos de izquierdas, en mi opinión, consiste precisamente en abrir nuevos horizontes que vayan más allá de eso. Las protestas de Seattle (1999) y Génova (2001) sacaron a la luz esta cuestión con energía, anticipando la crisis de la globalización neoliberal.
No hay una respuesta ‘nacional’ a esta problemática, la tarea a la que nos enfrentamos en Italia es similar a la que tiene que tener lugar en todos lados. Intentamos interpretar la situación aquí en el contexto europeo y global.
Más allá de la izquierda tradicional hay nuevos espacios y posibilidades por descubir y construir para la política radical.
La situación en la que nos ponemos esta tarea es muy diferente de la que que emergió el ‘movimento global’. El mundo está cambiando, ni el Imperio (la forma global e interconectada de gobierno descrita por primera vez por Hardt y Negri) ni el imperialismo parecen poder/ser capaces de establecer –en el sentido capitalista- el ‘orden mundial’. El debate de esta tarea es algo que, estoy seguro, seguirimos ejerciendo juntos en un futuro próximo.
Traducción: Bárbara Iniesta
Sandro Mezzadra es editor de la revista italiana Posse www.posseweb.net y enseña Teoría Política en la Universidad de Bologna.
Keir Milburn y Ben Trott son editores de Turbulence. editors@turbulence.org.uk
e-Newsletter 6
CONTENTS
1) 2008 ESF in Malmoe, Sweden - Some Reflections and Documentation
2) Turbulence @ The Frankfurt Book Fair
3) Turbulence @ The Serpentine Gallery Manifesto Marathon, London
4) ‘Move into the Light?’ on Amazon
5) ‘1968 and Doors to New Worlds’ Spanish Translation
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1) 2008 ESF in Malmoe, Sweden - Some Reflections and Documentation
Between 17 and 21 September, 2008, the Fifth European Social Forum (ESF) was held in Malmoe, Sweden. Turbulence were present, and thousands of copies of the new magazine were distributed. Many thanks to everyone who helped handing out copies, and to those of you who filled up your backpacks carrying bundles back to various corners of the world!
As with other events that we’ve tried to intervene into, like last year’s G8 Summit protests and this year’s climate camps in the UK and Germany, we’ve tried to gather together some scraps of analysis and texts, photos, videos and more which we think might help document and increase our understanding of these events and the roles they fulfil.
You can find an initial collection of pieces about this year’s Social Forum, along with some background information on our website here.
If you’ve written something about the Forum, or have videos or photos you think it would be useful to share, send them to us at editors@turbulence.org.uk and we’ll consider posting them online.
2) Turbulence @ The Frankfurt Book Fair
This weekend (Oct 15-19, 2008), the world’s largest annual book fair will be taking place in Frankfurt, Germany. Copies of Turbulence 4 will be available for free, so if you’re in town and don’t yet have a copy, that’s the place to get your hands on one!
More info about the Fair: here.
3) Turbulence @ The Serpentine Gallery Manifesto Marathon, London
Turbulence have been invited to contribute new and old(er) issues of the magazine to the Serpantine Gallery’s ‘Manifesto Marathon’ this weekend (18-19 October, 2008). The Marathon is an attempt to showcase new artists’ work, alongside practitioners from the worlds of literature, design, science, philosophy, music and film returning to the historical notion of the manifesto.
Tickets for the event are available from Ticket Web: 08700 600 100 www.ticketweb.co.uk or from the Gallery lobby desk.
For more information and directions to the event which will take place in London, visit the Gallery’s website.
4) ‘Move into the Light?’ on Amazon
The PM Press edition of ‘Move into the Light? Postscript to a turbulent 2007’ (Turb_03) is now available via Amazon in the USA, Canada, Germany, Austria, France, the UK and Japan.
Alternatively, of course, copies can also be ordered directly from PM Press or read online here.
For more information, click here.
5) ‘1968 and Doors to New Worlds’ Spanish Translation
John Holloway’s article from Turbulence 4, ‘1968 and Doors to New Worlds’ has been republished in Spanish by the journal Herramienta under the title ‘Mayo 1968 y la crisis del trabajo abstracto’
It can be read in full here.
Translations of other articles from Turbulence are, as ever, available online here.
Get in touch with us at editors@turbulence.org.uk if you can help out with other translations.
(October 17, 2008)
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www.turbulence.org.uk // www.myspace.com/turbulence_ideas4movement // editors@turbulence.org.uk
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The ESF in Malmö, Sweden
In 2001, the first World Social Forum (WSF) was held in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, coinciding with the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Since then, social fora have played an important role in enabling discussion, the exchange of ideas, and coordination and collaboration amongst the various elements of the global ‘movement of movements’.
In the wake of the original event in 2001, social fora have sprung up around the world on the continental, national and city level. A number of thematic fora have also been held, most recently the second World Social Forum on Migration, in Madrid earlier this month.
The fifth European Social Forum (ESF) was held in Malmö, Sweden, between 17 and 21 September, 2008. Along with the climate camps held in the UK and Germany earlier this year and the protests around the Republican National Convention in Minneapolis, we chose Malmö as a good moment to try and intervene in movement discussions, distributing a few thousand copies of the most recent issue of Turbulence framed around the question of futures and the meaning for the left of the current intersecting and ever-deepening crises.
The Social Forum, this year, appeared to experience something of a quantitative and qualitative decline. The numbers were the lowest they’ve ever been, and the organisers appeared to be preparing to cater for larger numbers. Qualitatively speaking, both the Forum itself and the events surrounding it appeared to relatively lack innovation, having less movement and cross-pollination in them than previous years. This almost certainly says much more about the current state of the European area of the global movement than it does about the concrete organisation of this year’s event.
As we’ve attempted to do with other events we’ve intervened at, we’d like to try and compile some background information about and critical reflection on the events in Malmö. Please do send any reports, videos, audio interviews or photos you come across or have produced yourself. Our email address, as always, is editors@turbulence.org.uk
The following is only a very tentative list of reflections, some of which we think might be of interest.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A brief history of the World Social Forum and the International Youth Camp can be found in the following article by Turbulence editor Rodrigo Nunes here.
The special issue of the journal ephemera: theory and politics in organisation from which that article is taken focuses on the WSF and the global social forum process. It is well worth taking a look at.
Also of note is the new edition of Challenging Empires, edited by Jai Sen and Peter Waterman. The contents of the first edition are online here.
A history of the European Social Forum is online here, written by Tord Björk from Friends of the Earth Sweden ahead of the Forum in Malmö.
Here’s the invitation to this year’s ESF, a list of those involved with the Organising Committee, and a copy of the World Social Forum Charter of Principles to which the ESF also subscribes.
As has been the case at every ESF, an ‘autonomous space’ independent from but coinciding with the Social Forum was held in Malmö. The space was held at Utkanten social centre, organised by the ESF 2008 Action Network. Within the Action Network, a number of Swedish radical publications also worked together to publish a free newspaper, From Thoughts to Action. An edited version of Tadzio Mueller’s article in the most recent issue of Turbulence was included, with a new post-script.
THURSDAY AT THE SOCIAL FORUM
After the grand opening event the night before, Thursday was the day where workshops started in earnest. Turbulence was present at a seminar about the past, present and future of the global justice movement. A Call to act around and against the global climate change summit in December 2009 in Copenhagen, having been written by an international gathering of radical climate activists a week before in Denmark, was discussed and received a positive response.
FRIDAY AT THE SOCIAL FORUM
On Friday morning, a workshop was organised, amongst others, by people from the Interventionist Left in Germany, around the question of whether mass blockades and civil disobedience a la Heiligendamm could be a new way forward for the movements in Europe.
On Friday evening, a Reclaim the Streets (RTS) part was held in central Malmoe. The Call for the party is here. There’s a report from the action (and a few photos) here.
SATURDAY AT THE SOCIAL FORUM
Perhaps the largest single event at the Forum was a planned presentation by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri of their new book, Common Wealth (the final volume in the trilogy following the bestsellers Empire and Multitude). Negri was unwell and unable to attend the event, but Hardt’s presentation can be watched on YouTube in eight parts: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. (Also available via GoogleVideo).
In the afternoon, around 15,000 people participated in the ESF demonstration, the slogan of which was, ‘Power to the people – against capitalism and environmental destruction. Another world is possible!’ The Call for the Anti-Capitalist Action Bloc is here.
SUNDAY AT THE SOCIAL FORUM
Sunday was dominated by the Assembly of Social Movements, a body officially separate from the ESF. This was the meeting which, in 2002, issued the call for the global day of protest against the planned war in Iraq which saw some of the world’s biggest protests take place on February 15 the following year. Around 1,000 people participated in this year’s Assembly, which issued the following statement.
Statement from the Assembly of Social Movements (Sunday 21 September 2008)
2009: To Change Europe. On the European level, we are witnessing a liberal and anti-social front on all domains: economic financial crisis, price increases, food borne illness crisis, privatization and disassembly of public services, movements against work reform, decisions of the European Court of Justice, dismantling of the Common Agricultural Policy, reinforcement of Fortress Europe against migrants, weakening of democratic and civil rights and growing repression, economic cooperation agreements, military intervention in external conflicts, military bases, all this in a world where inequalities, poverty and global and permanent war are increasing day by day.
In this context of global crisis, we want to reaffirm that alternatives do exist for global justice, peace, democracy and environment.?We, the European social movements gathering in Malmö, have committed on a common agenda in the way to lead the fight for ‘Another Europe’ and Europe based on the people’s rights.
1. On the social issue: We launch immediately a COMMON EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN against EU social and labour policies, first to oppose specifically the EU directive on working time and EU decision on migrant labour. This campaign will have different steps (e.g.: December the 6th in Paris) and includes the objective of a massive joint mobilization at European level as soon as possible. As a second step, we build up a large, inclusive and strategic conference/counter-summit of all the European social movement, in Brussels in March.
2. Against NATO and war: we call a large demonstration in April the 4th in Strasbourg/Kiel, centre of celebration of the 60th anniversary of NATO, to say ‘Stop NATO!’ and dissolving this terrifying tool of war. In the same day we call demonstrations in all countries in Europe. We propose the WSF in Belem to declare the 4th of April a day of international mobilisation against NATO.
3. Against the climate crisis: we call for a global day of action on climate on December 6th during the Poznan summit in Poznan itself and al other the world. We are calling for a massive international mobilisation next year to make the critical Copenhagen talks in December 2009.
4. Against the G8: In July 2009, the Sardinian and Italian social movement will invite all movements to come to Sardinia where the G8 summit will be held in la Maddalena island to protest against G8 and its policies and to present our alternatives for global justice, peace, democracy and environment.
DOCUMENTATION
There is an initiative this year to document the ‘outcomes’ of the Social Forum via the official ESF website. You can do so here.
There’s a photo gallery with pictures from this year’s Social Forum here.
e-Newsletter 5
CONTENTS
1) Turbulence @ ESF In Malmoe
2) Climate Camps 08: Some Early Analysis
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1) TURBULENCE @ ESF IN MALMOE
Thousands of copies of Turbulence 4, ‘Who will save us from the future?’ will be being distributed at next week’s European Social Forum (ESF) in Malmoe, Sweden (18-21 September 2008).
Grab your copy there, if you don’t already have one. Or better still, grab a bundle of 10, 20, 50, 100,… to take back to your local independent bookshop, social centre, university, or group of mates.
We’re not yet exactly sure where copies will be being stored (although we imagine they’ll be pretty easy to find!) To be sure, though, check the ‘News’ section on our website from Thursday 18 September when there should be more precise information available.
For details about events at and around the Forum, check out one or more of the following links:
European Social Forum (see also here)
Actions and Demos ‘News-ticker’ feed
2) CLIMATE CAMPS 08: SOME EARLY ANALYSIS
Photo: Guy Smallman
This summer (2008) Camps for Climate Action have been held in several countries. While we didn’t make it to some of them, such as the quite significant Australian event, the latest issue of Turbulence was distributed in some numbers at both the British and German camps, while members of the Turbulence collective also participated in the talks and workshops that were held there.
As part of this intervention we have both gathered together some record of our contributions as well as some analysis of the events that we have come across. You can find it all here.
We hope to be updating the article links on this page regularly, so keep checking back. Also, if you come across (or write) anything you think might be helpful, send it along to us at editors@turbulence.org.uk
(September 13, 2008)
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www.turbulence.org.uk // www.myspace.com/turbulence_ideas4movement // editors@turbulence.org.uk
To stay informed about future ‘Turbulence’ publications and projects, subscribe to our (very!) low-traffic e-newsletter here: https://lists.riseup.net/www/info/turbulenceannouncementslist
Climate Camps 2008
Photo: Guy Smallman
This summer (2008) Camps for Climate Action have been held in several countries. While we didn’t make it to some of them, such as the quite significant Australian event, the latest issue of Turbulence was distributed in some numbers at both the British and German camps, while members of the Turbulence collective also participated in the talks and workshops that were held there.
As part of this intervention we have both gathered together some record of our contributions as well as some analysis of the events that we have come across. We have done the same with other events we have intervened in such as the anti-G8 protests in Heilegendamn. The aim of this is to aid the analytic process by acting as a catalytic space to carefully consider our interventions and actions. This, we think, should be facing both inwards, towards our movements, and outwards towards the world and how our movements are theorised and represented, and the impacts they can be seen as having.
This process has brought to the fore a couple of potential problems or tensions that it seems helpful to discuss. In fact both problems, in their different ways, stem from concerns about the ways that the high profile of some individuals or groups can distort or interrupt the process of movements analysing and transforming themselves.
When we began to gather analysis of the climate camps (primarily the UK camp) we found a trend towards poles of attention gathering around two relatively well-known individuals. The first was the president of the National Union of Miners (and class-struggle icon) Arthur Scargill, who visited the camp to defend the coal industry. His visit was prompted by the critical attitude taken towards the camp by anarchist and ex-miner Dave Douglass, who, while he attended the camp and ran workshops, at one point even went so far as to suggest a counter demonstration against the camp and in support of the coal industry. This approach has provoked some debate around climate activism and class. However, in the mainstream media this was reduced to a debate on the various merits of Coal versus Nuclear power, between Arthur Scargill and the second ‘well-known figure’, political commentator George Monbiot. Indeed, the second pole of attention has been around Monbiot, who was at the UK camp advocating a strong state to tackle climate change. This sparked much debate within the camp on the role(s) ‘the state’ might play around the issue of climate change.
Discussions around both class and state have become linked with these well-known figures. These dynamics of how a movement is represented both to its outside and to itself, can distort the analytical process, moving the centre of discussion away from how it was experienced at the camp. This distorting dynamic arises from the increased attention given to those who are able and confident enough to speak at large meetings or have better access to the mainstream media because, for instance, their views fit better with the dominant narrative of the world. The dilemma here is that by collecting this analysis together we are completing a positive feedback loop and solidifying these distorting effects.
Nevertheless, we can’t deal with those dynamics by just ignoring them. As a starting point, our analysis must begin from where we are, not from where we wish to be. We can however try to be aware of such dynamics, bring them into our understanding of our movements, and experiment with tools and techniques to undermine them.
One dynamic we have seen play out before is the tendency towards the polarisation of debates which often occurs when they take place through mediatised polemics, with poles becoming associated with particular individuals. When this happens there can be a tendency to identify with one individual or another causing a slide into factionalism. In fact at the core of most of these debates are genuine, concrete dilemmas that can run straight through the middle of the people involved. Accompanying this personalisation of politics, is the danger of the erection of experts, where the much more general process of analysis and transformation that took place at the camps becomes reduced to the personality characteristics of particular individuals.
Of course we’re aware that our own activities could be the spark to this dynamic. Turbulence had a relatively high profile at the UK camp; one of our number even took part in a plenary debate with, amongst others, George Monbiot. We think, however, that this debate had a different tone to some of the other polemics, partly because, true to our latest issue, we have tried to avoid abstract polemics based on futurology. We’d rather focus on the concrete and specific situations that we find ourselves in. What needs to be analysed is whether the different currents of thought can work together in the near-future, and if not, can we at least manage their relationship? Planning further ahead becomes less and less useful the further you go. After all we know that ideas and subjectivities change in movement and that events can occur that change the whole basis on which we discuss and struggle.
Here is our round-up of useful and maybe-less-useful analysis from the climate camp. Check back again soon, as we’re hoping to update this page regularly.
Climate Change, The State and Class
‘The Road to 90% Cuts in CO2 Emissions and the Role of the State’ – Plenary debate at the Climate Camp With George Monbiot, Almuth Ernsting, Keir Milburn and Janusz from Copenhagen - mp3 50M.webloc
There was some debate on a similar topic at the Guardian website:
Ewa Jasiewicz: Time for a revolution
George Mobiot: Climate change is not anarchy’s football
Ewa Jasiewicz: Sunday in the camp with George
This sparked some debate on the Autopsy email list, including a reply from Mombiot. The discussioin starts here.
Another pole of debate was the attitude of some connected to the NUM
Dave Douglass reports on the camp to the NUM website.
Rachel analyses his position here.
The debate is also continued online here.
Other Analysis
Different members of the Free Association reflect here and here. The slides used in their presentation during the workshop, Who Can Save Us From the Future? Capitalist, Crisis, Austerity and Freedom, are available here.
Juliette Beck: Social change not climate change
Red Pepper: Climate Camp Blog
Last Hours magazine: Modern ecologism and its prospects
Adam Ford: Climate camp and class
Jack Ray: What was the point?
Uri Gordon and Lucy Michaels: Lessons from Climate Camp
Documentation
Photos galleries from the Camp are available via the Camp for Climate Action website here and the Guardian newspaper here.
And finally, the following amusing video about police confiscations at the climate camp has been put together by Undercurrents.
Please let us know of any other analysis or reflections on the camp: editors@turbulence.org.uk
The best place for analysis might be the post climate camp gathering 26th-28th Spetember in Manchester. For details, click here.
e-Newsletter 4
CONTENTS
1. ‘Move into the Light?’ Republished by ‘Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil’
2. Turbulence 4 Launch Event at the European Social Forum in Malmoe
3. Turbulence 4 Published in North America - Copies Available at RNC Protests
4. Turbulence 4 Arrives in German (At Last!)
5. ‘The Movement is Dead,…’ Turb_04 Article Republished By Modkraft.dk
6. ‘Et tu Bertinotti?’ Turb_04 Article Translated into Greek
7. Looking For Somewhere to Publish ‘Move into the Light?’ in Spanish and Italian
8. Appeal for Translators
9. Donations Needed!
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1. ‘MOVE INTO THE LIGHT?’ REPUBLISHED BY ‘LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE BRASIL’
Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil have republished ‘Move into the Light? Postscript to a turbulent 2007’. The text was published on July 16 2008, and it can be found online here and here.
The translation was carried out by Caia Fittipaldi.
The original text is here and, as we mentioned in the last e-Newsletter, is now available from PM Press.
2. TURBULENCE 4 LAUNCH EVENT AT THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FORUM IN MALMOE
Copies of Turbulence 4 will be available at the European Social Forum (ESF) in Malmoe, Sweden, taking place from 17-21 September. We’re considering a launch event, or some kind of a bash. We’ll keep you informed. If you’re coming, though, we’d love it if you could grab a bundle to take back with you and distribute in your area or networks.
More information about the forum is here.
There’s information about the autonomous spaces here.
3. TURBULENCE 4 PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA – COPIES AVAILABLE AT RNC PROTESTS
Turbulence 4 asks, ‘Who will save us from the future?’ Well, probably not the ‘Grand Old Party’. Nor, most likely, any of the decisions being taken on the fringes of the Republican National Convention taking place in Minneapolis next week.
Nevertheless, we think the space opened by the protests around the convention could provide a bit of room for engaging with the problem of ‘the future’; and we want to get in on the discussion!
We’ve now printed thousands of copies of Turbulence 4 in the US, many of which will be distributed at the protests. If you want to grab a copy for yourself, or better, a bundle to take back to your corner of the world; the RNC protests are your opportunity!
Copies will be available at the Convergence Space: 627 Smith Ave S St. Paul, Mn 55107. The phone number is: (651) 293 3968.
Copies will soon also be available in North America via PM Press.
4. TURBULENCE 4 ARRIVES IN GERMANY (AT LAST!)
A bunch were distributed at the Klimacamp and, finally(!), a load have now also arrived in Berlin. Sometime over the next couple of weeks, they’ll be appearing in bookshops and infoshops across Berlin and – we hope – the rest of the country. Copies will also soon be able to be ordered from Red Stuff.
5. ‘THE MOVEMENT IS DEAD,…’ TURB_04 ARTICLE REPUBLISHED BY MODKRAFT.DK
A Danish translation of Tadzio Mueller’s article, ‘The Movement is Dead, Long Live the Movement’ (published in Turbulence 4) is now available here.
The article was translated by David Balleby Roenbach, an activist involved with KlimaX, and has been published by modkraft.dk here.
6. ‘ET TU BERTINOTTI?’ TURB_4 ARTICLE TRANSLATED INTO GREEK
Sandro Mezzadra’s article (with an Introduction by Keir Milburn and Ben Trott), ‘Et tu Bertinotti?’, from Turbulence 4, is now available online in Greek here.
7. LOOKING FOR SOMEWHERE TO PUBLISH ‘MOVE INTO THE LIGHT?’ IN SPANISH AND ITALIAN
We now have a Spanish and an Italian translation of ‘Move into the Light? Postscript to a turbulent 2007’. If you edit a newspaper, journal, magazine or website and would be interested in publishing the text – or else know of somewhere which might – please get in touch.
Email: editors[at]turbulence.org.uk
8. APPEAL FOR TRANSLATORS
We’re currently looking for people willing to help translate articles published in the latest issue of Turbulence into languages other than English. Let us know if you can help out.
Email: editors[at]turbulence.org.uk
9) DONATIONS NEEDED!
We’re still desperately short of cash! Help us out if you can with a donation, no matter how small. Donations can be made via the PayPal button on our website, or get in touch if you’d like our bank details for a direct transfer.
Email: editors[at]turbulence.org.uk
(August 27 2008)
Bevægelsen er død, længe leve bevægelsen!
Den radikale venstrefløj bør kanalisere sin energi over i kampen for en antikapitalistisk klimapolitik. Man kan passende starte med at lukke Københavnertopmødet i 2009 på samme måde som man lukkede Seattle i 1999. (Af Tadzio Müller)
Bevægelsen er død! Mere præcist: alterglobaliseringsbevægelsen som et sted hvor bevægelser og aktivister kunne mødes og blive-anden sammen og forbinde deres kampe imod den nyliberale verdensorden er død. Ikke at de forskellige kampe er døde. Ej heller at vi har set det sidste til topmødemobiliseringer: I skrivende stund er forberedelserne til G8 i Japan i fuld sving og ved enhver samling af den radikale og ikke-så-radikale venstrefløj planlægger man på livet løs at nedlukke det ene eller det andet topmøde: G8 i Italien 2009; NATOs 60 års fødselsdagsbrag i Frankrig i 2009 osv. Countersummits-r-us?
Men på en eller anden måde har disse mobiliseringer ikke den samme slagkraft som tidligere; hvor mange sidste gange har der ikke været, hvor mange gange har folk ikke mobiliseret og tænkt »hvis det fejler denne gang, så stopper vi med det her«? Selv den relativt stærke tyske bevægelse kunne ikke gøre meget andet ved G8 i Heiligendamm end at indse, at det er én ting at samle titusinder i gaderne, men noget ganske andet at få disses aktioner til at give genlyd udover deltagernes egne kredse.
Misforstå mig ikke: bevægelsen døde ikke de besejredes nyttesløse død. På mange måder vandt den. Og for bevægelser som må bevæge sig for at overleve er deres sejre ofte kimen til deres bortgang, for de lever og ånder antagonisme, de har brug for en fjende. Men hvordan står det så til med vores fjende? Lad os spørge Martin Wolf, chefidéolog for Financiel times, en velformuleret og anset talsmand for den neoliberale offensiv. Da han omtalte den dag hvor Den amerikanske centralbank reddede en stor bank for at forhindre den finansielle krise i at sprede sig, skrev han: »Husk fredag den 14. marts 2008: det var dagen hvor drømmen om frimarkedskapitalismen døde«. Så neoliberalismen er død (på nogen måder). Det samme er altså (igen: på nogen måder) bevægelsen imod den, af hvilken den eksplicit antikapitalistiske strømning, fra hvis indre denne tekst er skrevet, aldrig har udgjort andet end en del. Den syntes at have mistet netop den smeltediglefunktion som kan støbe en hel bevægelse ud af en ureducerbar mangfoldighed af kampe, netop det som kan modstå den de-komposition af modstanden som stat og kapital konstant forsøger at presse nedover os. Vi har brug for en fortælling, et håb, en dynamik: på nuværende tidspunkt er alterglobaiseringsbevægelsen klart en bevægelse uden en dynamik, uden en fjende, uden et mål.
Det store nye?
Men lige så meget som der er en bevægelse uden fortælling, er der også en fortælling uden en bevægelse: klimaforandringer. Et tiltagende antal politikker (endda mange som nærmest ingen tilhørsforhold har til emnet) retfærdiggøres via deres relation til klimaet. Siden den europæiske del af bevægelsen blev udmanøvreret af G8 og specielt forbundskansler Angela Merkel i Heiligendamm i juni 2007, har den måttet indse at den må udvikle en position og en politisk praksis i henhold til klimaforandringer. Ellers risikerer den irrelevansen i denne fagre nye verden af »grønne« problemstillinger og tematiker. De mest avancerede afdelinger af kapital og statsapparat har spottet en favorable indgangsvinkel til at skabe politisk opbakning bag et nyt ‘grønt fix’ til både overakkumulationskrisen (det at for mange penge jagter for få profitable investeringer) som har forårsaget det aktuelle finansielle kaos, og til den legitimationskrise som den globale autoritet har lidt under siden kraften fra fortællingen om ‘global terrorisme’ begyndte at aftage. På en måde er det faktum at alle nu taler om klimaet en stor sejr for den grønne bevægelse. Men samtidig har det også betydet det sidste søm i bevægelsens kiste: Alle større grønne NGO’er er involveret op til halsen i forhandlingerne om opfølgeren til Kyoto-traktaten og derfor er det usandsynligt, at de vil artikulere en politisk position som vil divergere afgørende fra den dominerende dagsorden.
Så der er en bevægelse uden en fortælling og en fortælling uden en bevægelse, hvilket betyder at der ikke er meget håb for at klimaforandringerne vil blive håndteret på andre måder end dem som fremmer statslige og hvad end der nu er i den dominerende kapitals interesser. Og eftersom den antikapitalistiske standardposition angående klimaforandringer er at der er grundlæggene modsætninger mellem behovet for fortsat akkumulation af kapital (økonomisk vækst) på den ene side og behovet for at gøre noget ved klimaforandringerne på den anden, synes situationen at være ideel for en revitalisering af den antikapitalistiske politik, en politik som kan bygge bro mellem folks udbredte bekymringer for klimaet og den opfattelse at der gøres alt for lidt og alt for sent. Det er i præcis disse situationer, hvor de sædvanlige redskaber (skab et marked eller undertryk det eksisterende) ikke synes at kunne levere troværdige løsninger på problemer der samtidig af store grupper opfattes som alvorlige, at radikale bevægelser har den største mulighed for at handle og skabe historie. Det er netop når det synes umuligt at finde løsningsmodeller at der åbnes for at sociale bevægelser kan udvide det muliges grænser.
Pointeløshedens politik
I den virkelige verden er det meget sværre. I det globale norden er der bestemt forsøg på at skabe en antikapitalistisk klimapolitik, men for alle af dem gælder at problemerne tårner sig op. Set fra nordens perspektiv begyndte det hele i Storbritannien i 2006 med en klimalejr, som havde som projekt at nedlukke et kulkraftværk i Nordengland i en dag og, mere vigtigt, skabe rum for en udvikling af nye idéer og handlemåder i forhold til en antikapitalistisk klimapolitik. Lignende lejrer er blevet organiseret i Tyskland, Sverige, USA, Chile, Australien, New Zealand og andre steder og i øjeblikket virker det til at være hovedvåbnet i den fremspirende klimabevægelses aktionsrepetoire (en anelse ironisk er det, at lejrideen oprindeligt opstod ud af de dårlige erfaringer med topmødeprotestens endagsform).
Jeg vil ikke nedvurdere vigtigheden af disse lejrer, det er trods alt ikke en lille bedrift at have inspireret så mange mennesker i så mange lande, men lytter man til de mange kritikker af lejrerne, er der en ting der går igen: Bidrog de med noget udover at tilfredsstille ønsket om at gøre noget? Det føles godt at hænge ud i en lejr med sine venner og kammerater, men flere nagende spørgsmål melder sig: Hvad vil vi have? Hvad kan vi opnå? Og står hele det her campinglejrhalløj, hvor man forsøger at lukke kraftværker ned ét af gangen mens man kæmper for ikke at blive helt overdøvet af de mere magtfulde stemmer, i bare nogen grad i mål med den gigantiske udfordring, som klimaforandringer er? Det er den slags spørgsmål, som højst sandsynligt vil frustrere folk.
For at klargøre: Det betyder ikke at folk ikke skal organisere klimalejre. Bare at disse skal være en del af et større projekt, der giver dem en politisk betydning der rækker udover deres meget lokale indgriben. Vi kunne selvfølgelig håbe at denne bredere globale betydning ville vokse frem fra de bånd, som bliver skabt i mellem de forskellige klimalejre i år, men koordinationen imellem lejrerne har været begrænset eller nærmest ikke-eksisterende. Ingen fælles krav og paroler (udover det at være imod klimaforandringer, hvilket er cirka lige så politisk definerende som at være imod slå babysæler ihjel med køller), ingen samstemmig fortælling, ingen »shut down WTO«, intet »another world is possible«.
Hvis den måde, som den engelske del af bevægelsen har håndteret klimaudfordringen på, virker noget begrænset i sin politiske rækkevidde, så har vi i den anden ende af spektraet tyskernes tilgang. Forsøg på at kick-starte en klimalejrproces er her ikke alene løbet ind i de sædvanlige interne rivaliseringer og stridigheder på venstrefløjen. Den radikale venstrefløj er så akademisk og begravet i traditionen fra den kritiske teori og dekonstruktionen, at hovedsvaret på klimaudfordringen har været en kasten sig over kritikken af den dominerende klimaforandringsdiskurs samt den videnskabelige videns hegemoniale rolle i arbejdet med at konstruere klimaforandringerne som en krise. Selvfølgelig er det vigtigt at være opmærksom på, at rapporterne fra IPCC (The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) kommer fra en dybt konservativ institution samt krititisk reflektere over hvordan brugen af en videnskabelig diskurs tjener til at ekskludere ikke-eksperter fra den politiske debat, men Diskurskritik kan ikke være det eneste svar på klimaproblematikken. Det svarer lidt til at kaste bøger af Adorno og Foucault efter en stormflod og håbe på at det vil få den til at gå væk.
Fra tidsløshed til effektivitet
Men lad os være ærlige: på trods af erfaringen med små udbrud af transformationsmagt i særlige overskridelsesøjeblikke burde den antikapitalistiske venstrefløj i det globale nord være vant til at være politisk ineffektiv og marginaliseret. Hvad betyder et enkelt socialt fristed i London, Kreuzberg eller Barcelona egentlig i forhold til kampen mod gentrificeringen? Passer det virkelig at en antikrigsdemonstration i San Fransisco »forstyrrer Imperiet«, som en film lavet ved lejligheden påstod? Kortslutter butikstyveri, selv udført i massemålestok, den kapitalistiske varecirkulation? For at være helt ærlig ved jeg det ikke og det tror jeg heller ikke ret mange af dem, der deltager, gør. Men, og dette er den vigtige pointe, når antikapitalister taler om kapitalismen, så føler de ikke, at de behøver at have et svar. Det er tilstrækkeligt at henvise til den non-linære dynamik, som forandringsprocesser i komplekse sociale systemer har. Underforstået: Vi kan ikke vide hvilken effekt vores handlinger udført i dag vil have i morgen (tænk sommerfugl på Bali og orkan på Haiti). Eller man refererer til et argument, der har fået en nærmest dogmatisk status i antikapitalistiske diskussioner: »Hør engang, kapitalismen har ikke eksisteret altid, den opsted et bestemt sted på et bestemt tidspunkt, så den vil også forsvinde igen på et tidspunkt.« - det samme kan siges om universet! Jeg kunne blive ved med at opremse de intellektuelle tricks der bruges for at rationalisere vores relative politiske irrelevans, men håber at pointen er slået fast: At den antikapitalistiske politik i det globale nord befinder sig i en fom for tidsløshed, fordi vi enten ikke kan eller tør tænke dens effekter i fremtiden. Man kommer til at tænke på strudser. Eller den graffiti, der var sprayet på væggene i en skole i Gøteborg der blev stormet af politiet: »But in the end, we will win!«
Og det er her vi kommer tilbage til hvorfor det er så svært for den antikapitalistiske bevægelse at udvikle en politik på klimaområdet: mens diverse rationaliseringer måske kan gøre det muligt at tænke, at til slut vinder vi i kampen mod kapitalen, så er det ret umuligt at tænke sådan i forhold til klimaforandringerne. I modsætning til den antikapitalistiske kamps tidsløshed haster kampen mod det sidste. Og spørgsmålet er hvordan man håndtere tidsknapheden. De to førbeskrevne positioner (den ‘overaktivistiske’ og den ‘overkritiske’) er begge forsøg på at løse dette problem, dog begge med ret utilfredsstillende resulater. Den første overreagerer på hastværket og springer over stok og sten ind i et politisk felt domineret af meget stærkere spillere. Den anden forstår at konstruktionen af uopsættelighed og den resulterende frygtpolitik ofte er dominansstrategier, men stiller sig så tilfreds med at kritisere denne konstruktion i stedet for at enagere sig i det alvorlige problem, der ligger bag diskursen. Og hastværket er præcis et resultat af en tidskonflikt, en konflikt mellem temporaliteter. Mellem kapitalens temporalitet (kapitalen forøger konstant produktionen og det sociale livs tempo) på den ene side og de komplekse øko-samfundssystemer (der selvom de ikke er statiske og godt kan tilpasse sig nye betingelser ikke kan tilpasse sig i det tempo, kapitalen kræver) på den anden. Hvis forandringen er for hurtig, nås det berømte springende punkt, hvor processen slår over og bliver irreversibel og katastrofal (Golfstrømmens ophør er et eksempel, de polare iskappers bortsmeltning et andet).
Så hvordan håndterer vi hastværket? For det første ved at indse at det er usandsynligt, fatisk umuligt, at den politisk marginale radikale venstrefløj vil kunne nedsætte produktionen af drivhusgasser i en verden hvor akkumulationen af kapital er uadskillelig fra afbrændingen af fossile brændstoffer (»fossilitisk kapitalisme« har nogen kaldt det). Vi er heller ikke på en eller anden måde i stand til bringe økosystemernes tilpasningsevne på højde med kapitalens tempo. Men vi kan intervenere i politikkens temporalitet, i den regeringsmæssige klimapolitik, hvis funktion er at immunisere den af kapitalen skabte tempoforøgelse fra kritik ved at skabe den illusion at fortsat kapitalakkumulation er forenelig med socio-økologisk stabilitet. Sagt med andre ord at vi blot behøver at foretage et par (helst markedsbaserede) småændringer og derefter fortsætte mere eller mindre som om intet var hændt. Immuniseringens resultat er, at den potentielt eksplosive kraft i den voksende erkendelse af en antagonisme mellem kapital og menneskehed kan inddæmmes, måske endda koopteres således at det er muligt at skabe støtte til en ny omgang kapitalakkumulation (tænk på snakken om en grøn kapitalisme) samt endnu mere omfattende og dybdegående politisk regulering af vores liv.
Glem Kyoto!
Så igen: den antikapitalistiske venstrefløj i det globale nord kan ikke stoppe endsige i nogen væsentlig grad formildne klimaforandringerne. At antage det ville være at fastholde os selv i vores tidsløshed, fordi vi tidligst ville kunne håbe på at nå vores mål i en fjern og måske ikke-eksisterende fremtid. Med vores begrænsede styrke og ressourcer kan vi imidlertid intervenere i afskærmningen af kapitalens tid fra det ægte demokratis langsommelighed. Hvis vi igen formår at forlade den depressive tilstand skabt af vores dekomposition og tidsløshed, hvis vi husker på at vi som bevægelse har evnen til at være hurtigere end staten, så kan vi slippe de antagonistiske energier løs.
Hvordan bærer vi os så ad med det? Hvordan bevarer vi åbenheden i det politiske rum, som er skabt af den voksende bekymring for konsekvenserne af klimaforandringerne, en bekymring som har potentialet til at skabe nye idéer og løsninger, nye muligheder som måske endda peger udover kapitalismen? Hvordan intervenerer vi i forhold til de magtfulde kræfter, der presser på for at få en ny grøn kapitalisme, et øko-imperium, en global, autoritær øko-keynesianisme? Hvis tidsknapheden tvinger os til at være effektive, hvordan kan vores lille, ressourcesvage del af bevægelsen bedst udnytte sine begrænsede kræfter til at skabe og/eller opretholde rum, der muliggør en mangfoldighed af nedefra-og-op, ikke-kapitalistiske løsninger på klimakrisen?
Svaret på dette spørgsmål begynder med to yderligere spørgsmål og tager os tilbage til argumentationens begyndelse. Første spørgsmål: Hvad er den væsentligste proces hvormed verdens regeringer forsøger at immunisere kapitalen fra offentlige kritik på klimaområdet? Svar: det er næsten helt sikkert Kyoto/Bali-processerne, hvor hele verden trakteres med et internationalt toppolitisk drama, men som i sidste ende kun udretter meget lidt eller slet ikke noget, der beskytter klimaet (bare en lille sidebemærkning: siden underskrivelsen af Kyoto-aftalen er det globale Co2-udslip oversteget selv IPCC’s værste senarier), og hvor en lillebitte reduktion i udslippet legitimere fortsat masseproduktion af drivhusgasser. For ikke at tale om skabelsen af et helt nyt marked for handel med Co2-udslipskvoter (der anslås at ville repræsentere en værdi på 2 trilliarder dollars i 2020) – til den globale kapitals store glæde. Det er planen, at opfølgningsprocessen på Kyoto, der begyndte på Bali i 2007, skal kulminere i en aftaleunderskrivelse ved det internationale topmøde i København i 2009.
Andet spørgsmål: Set både i forhold til vores fjender og vores mere moderate allierede, hvori ligger da den radikale bevægelses største styrke? Svar: I organiseringen af omfattende topmødeafbrydende mobiliseringer. Det er netop i forbindelse med topmødemobiliseringer at vi tidligere har været i stand til at skabe en mærkbar politisk effekt. I Seattle i 1999 formåede vi ikke alene lukke at konferencen ved at være på gaden. Vi bidrag også til skærpelsen af de mange konflikter, der eksisterede mellem de forhandlende regeringer indenfor. Hvis vi kunne gøre det samme igen, og hvis vi kunne skabe en politisk koalition omkring kravet om at »glemme Kyoto«, så ville vi ikke alene være i stand at holde det politiske rum åbent, der er nødvendigt for diskussionen af løsningsforslag der rækker udover den herskende markedsstyrede agenda. Vi ville også kunne levere et fokuspunkt omkring hvilket en fremspirerende global klimabevægelse kunne samle sig. Glem Kyoto – luk ned København 2009!
Men hvorfor foreslå endnu en stor topmødeprotest efter at have argumenteret for at modtopmøder har mistet den effektivitet de engang havde? Fordi klimapolitikken i 2008 ser meget anderledes ud end den neoliberale globaliseringspolitik i 2008. Faktisk ligner klimapolitikken anno 2008 mere globaliseringspolitikken før nedlukningen af WTO-topmødet i Seattle. Dengang, i »historien er slut-årtiet«, vidste mange godt at den neoliberal kapitalisme ikke var fejlfri, men der var ingen anerkendelse, ikke engang på venstrefløjen, af en bevægelse, eller måske endda en bevægelse af bevægelser som kunne modsætte sig den. Seattle gjorde det muligt at se lighederne i mange forskelligartede kampe, for at se dem som værende rettet imod den samme fjende. Seattle muliggjorde, at en bevægelse overhovedet kunne opstå, og det er her, vi kommer tilbage til udgangspunktet: Kampcyklussen omkring globaliseringen er måske afsluttet, men dens lære, så som læren om undgå en »en-uge-om-året-bevægelse« fokuseret på de store topmødebegivenheder, har ikke mistet sin gyldighed. Den fremvoksende klimabevægelse må være rodfæstet i en daglig praksis af modstand og transformation på alle niveauer, ikke bare globale, men regionale, nationale eller lokale. Men før den overhovedet kan se sig selv som en bevægelse, skal den først markere sig og vise, at der findes en langt mere radikal holdning end den der siger, at vi bare skal have mere og bedre handel med Co2-kvoter. Vise at der findes nogen, som ikke bare fokusere på klimaforandringer, men også på dens årsager: kapitalismen. Og for at det skal kunne ske, kan vi meget vel have brug for det, som nogle engang kaldte et overskridelsesøjeblik, hvor tiden speeder op og forandringer, der før var umulige, bliver mulige. Et modtopmøde kan gøre det. Bevægelsen er død, længe leve bevægelsen!
Tadzio Müller er aktivist og teoretiker. Han er bosat i Berlin og underviser på universitetet i Kassel.
Teksten er oversat af David Balleby Rønbach, der er aktivist og bl.a. aktiv i den danske gren af KlimaX.
Artiklen har tidligere været bragt på hjemmesiden turbulence.org.uk under titlen The Movement is dead, long live the movement!
Danish translation originally published in modkraft.dk
Original English version here. Finnish translation here. Spanish version here.
e-Newsletter 3
CONTENTS
1. Urgent appeal for donations!
2. Turbulence @ Climate Camp
3. First translation of Turb_04 article now online
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1. Urgent appeal for donations!
Printing Turbulence 4: ‘Who Can Save Us From the Future?’ set us back several thousand pounds, and distribution costs have so far stretched into the many hundreds. We’re thrilled to be receiving so many orders and requests for copies, but we have now well and truly run out of cash.
If you’ve already received a copy in the post, picked up the latest issue at a bookstore near you, or hope to be able to get your hands on one in the near future, please consider making a donation no matter how small!
Donations can be made via the PayPal button on our website: www.turbulence.org.uk
If you’d rather pay directly into our bank account or write us a cheque, get in touch with us at editors@turbulence.org.uk
2. TURBULENCE @ CLIMATE CAMP
Many of the Turbulence collective will be taking part in the Camp for Climate Action which has just begun in Kent in the UK.
We will, of course, be distributing copies of the new magazine at the camp (remember to grab a bundle to take back to your local independent bookshop, social centre, or wherever else you can think of to distribute copies!)
We’re also going to be participating in a number of workshops, discussing some of the issues brought up in our latest publication and more.
On Thursday 7 August, The Free Association (many of whom are also involved with Turbulence) will be running a workshop entitled ‘Who Can Save Us From the Future? Capitalism, Crisis, Austerity and Freedom’. It will be taking place in Space B at 4:30pm.
In an unfortunate clash, Turbulence editor Tadzio Mueller will be taking part in a discussion entitled, ‘Copenhagen 2009 – What Will Be the Camp’s Response?’ at the same time. Mona Bricke and John Jordan will also be participating in the event which takes place in Space G.
Tadzio Mueller will also be discussing ‘Which Way Forward for the Climate Movement’ with Simon Lewis and Mona Bricke from 2pm on Thursday 7 August, also in Space G.
One of the Turbulence Collective, Keir Milburn, will also be taking part in the discussion, ‘The Road to 90% and the Role of the State’ alongside George Monbiot, Almuth Ernsting and others. The event takes place on Tuesday 5 August in Space A from 7:30pm.
The full programme for the Camp is available here
And information about the location is here
And don’t forget the Klimakamp in Germany from 15-24 August in Hamburg!
3. FIRST TRANSLATION OF TURB_04 ARTICLE NOW ONLINE
Christian Frings’ article, ‘Global Capitalism: Futures and Options’, published in the latest issue of Turbulence is now available in German on our website.
(August 5, 2008)
Klassenkampf und Krise: Futures and Options
Experten sprechen von der weltweiten ‘Kreditklemme’ als der potentiell schlimmsten Krise, die den Kapitalismus seit dem New Yorker Börsencrash von 1929 und der dann einsetzenden Weltwirtschaftskrise befallen habe. Solche Vergleiche scheinen uns von zweifelhaftem Wert zu sein. Sicherlich müssen wir aber die Ursprünge, das Wesen und die Bedeutung der gegenwärtigen Finanzkrise zu verstehen versuchen. Vor allem müssen wir sowohl das Potential als auch die Gefahren, die sie für uns birgt, verstehen. Dazu im Folgenden zwei Analysen. In der ersten (unten) vertritt Christian Frings die Position, dass die neoliberale ‚Finanzialisierung’ eine Antwort auf soziale Kämpfe war und die jetzige Krise antikapitalistischen Bewegungen neue Möglichkeiten eröffnet. Im zweiten Text argumentiert David Harvie, der Finanzsektor sei von zentraler Bedeutung für die wettbewerbsmäßige Berechnung, die Akkumulation und den Klassenkampf, was die gegenwärtige Krise zu einer Krise sowohl des Maßes als auch des Kapitals mache.
- Turbulence
Seit August 2007 steht es schlecht um die futures des Kapitalismus. Blitzartig, innerhalb von Tagen und Wochen, breitete sich die Krise der Finanzmärkte über den ganzen Globus aus. Was als lokal begrenztes Ereignis begonnen hatte, erschütterte Börsen und Banken auf allen Kontinenten. Und es ist längst nicht vorbei. Die Krise hat sich in mehreren Wellen entwickelt. Nach jeder erneuten dramatischen Zuspitzung und ebenso hektischer Intervention von Staat und Zentralbanken wurde das baldige Ende der Krise verkündet. Aber trotz aller Staatseingriffe lässt sich die Talfahrt nicht bremsen. Wenn der deutsche Bundespräsident die Finanzmärkte als „Monster“ bezeichnet, erinnert er an den Mythos von Frankenstein, den schon Marx zitierte, um die rätselhafte Verdinglichung des Kapitals zu beschreiben: „by incorporating living labour with their dead substance, the capitalist at the same time converts value, i.e., past, materialised, and dead labour into capital, into value big with value, a live monster that is fruitful and multiplies.“ Die Herrschenden werden selbst beherrscht, von einer anonymen Macht, die sie zwar verteidigen, deren Logik sie aber nicht verstehen.
Jede Krise ist ein Hinweis auf die historische Endlichkeit des Kapitalismus. Wenn sich die ‚Futures’ der Kapitalisten und Herrschenden nicht erfüllen, entstehen Optionen der Bewegungen von unten. Darin liegt keine Zwangsläufigkeit, aber die Optionen der Bewegungen sind heute ungleich größer als vor hundert oder zweihundert Jahren. Was heute auf der Tagesordnung steht, ist nicht eine institutionelle Bereinigung wie die Rückkehr zu einer strengeren Regulierung von Märkten. Danach rufen heute viele, selbst große Teile der Linken, die in der Krise nur einen Ausdruck neoliberaler Übertreibungen sehen. Die Finanzialisierung ist jedoch selbst nur Ausdruck einer fundamentalen Krise, die das kapitalistische System als globales Ganzes betrifft, wie es sich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg entwickelt hat.
Ende der 60er Jahre war dieses System in die Krise geraten. Nicht einfach durch innere Gesetzmäßigkeiten des Kapitals und der Konkurrenz, sondern vor allem durch den gleichzeitigen Druck von ArbeiterInnen überall auf der Welt. Das veränderte den Verlauf der Krise deutlich. Die Herrschenden scheuten davor zurück, die Last der Krise auf die ArbeiterInnen abzuwälzen, um die Profitraten zu sanieren. Auch wenn es heute vergessen ist, damals war es Tagesgespräch. Nach dem Pariser Mai 1968 und dem Massenstreik gab De Gaulle jeden Versuch auf, zum Goldstandard zurückzukehren, sondern erlaubte inflationäre Lohnsteigerungen. In Italien war der Slogan „Arbeiter produzieren die Krise“ verbreitet. Linke Ökonomen entwickelten die Theorie der „profit squeeze“, in der die Lohnsteigerungen, die von militanten Streikbewegungen durchgesetzt wurden, einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf den Verfall der Profitrate hatten. Wieder andere zeigten, dass die sinkenden Produktivitätssteigerungen auf die zunehmende Ablehnung der eintönigen Fließbandarbeit und Unwirksamkeit bürokratischer Kontrolle der Arbeitskräfte zurückzuführen war.
Die Entdeckung des „subjektiven Faktors“ in der marxistischen Krisentheorie in den 70er Jahren war also kein Zufall, sondern theoretischer Ausdruck einer praktischen Bewegung und einer tatsächlichen Veränderung von historischer Tragweite. In früheren kapitalistischen Krisen, im 19. und zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, waren die sozialen Bewegungen der ArbeiterInnen meistens eine Reaktion auf die Krisen des Kapitals gewesen. Es schien allein seinen eigenen inneren Gesetzen zu folgen. Sein Fetischcharakter schien ungebrochen, und daran orientierte sich auch die theoretische Beschäftigung mit der Krise. Die Welle von Klassenkämpfen der 60er und 70er Jahre hat die Infragestellung dieses Fetischcharakters wieder aktuell gemacht. Wir produzieren Geschichte und unsere Kämpfe haben einen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung des Kapitals.
Durch den Gegenangriff des Neoliberalismus und der staatlichen Repression gegen die Bewegungen, durch Arbeitslosigkeit und Austerität, wurde diese subversive Subjektivität der Weltgeschichte wieder verdrängt. Die Macht des Geldes und der Fetisch des Kapitals erhielt mit dem Boom der 90er Jahre neue Legitimität. Aber es war keine Lösung. Die Finanzialisierung war die Flucht des Kapitals aus der Produktion und die Illusion einer rein monetären Kapitalverwertung. Diese Flucht war von immer häufiger auftretenden Krisen begleitet: Börsencrash 1987, 1995 Tequilakrise von Mexiko aus, 1997 Asienkrise, 1998 LTCM- und Russlandkrise, 2000 das Ende des New-Economy-Hypes. Geradezu verwundert zeigen sich die Herrschenden, dass keine dieser Krisen das gesamte globale System in den Abgrund zog wie 1929. Das hat sich jetzt geändert und in den USA macht bereits das Wort vom „global slump of 2008-09“ die Runde. Ausschlaggebend dafür ist die massive Explosion des Derivatehandels in den letzten zehn Jahren und seine internationale Verzahnung. Das bedeutet nichts anderes, als dass die Suche nach profitablen Anlagen immer verzweifelter, immer spekulativer und immer waghalsiger geworden ist. Die Simulation der Kapitalverwertung durch Finanzialisierung lässt sich nicht ins Unendliche fortsetzen. Das ist es, was heute sichtbar wird. Auch darin drückt sich, in versteckter Form, der nach wie vor anhaltende Druck der globalen Arbeiterklassen aus, der einer neuen Intensivierung der Ausbeutung im Wege steht.
Historisch ist die Flucht des Kapitals aus der Überakkumulation in die Finanzialisierung nicht neu. Schon in früheren Zyklen der Entwicklung des kapitalistischen Weltsystems konnten die das System beherrschenden und organisierenden Mächte, wie die Niederlande im 18. und das britische Empire im 19. Jahrhundert, ihren Niedergang nach dem Akut-Werden der Überakkumulation für 30 oder 40 Jahre durch den Wechsel in die Finanzgeschäfte hinauszögern und die Ernte ihrer Vormachtstellung einfahren. Giovanni Arrighi und Beverly Silver haben in ihren Analysen die Entdeckung des „subjektiven Faktors“ in der Krisentheorie mit der welthistorischen Dynamik des Kapitalismus verbunden. Das führt nicht zu einer tristen Wiederholung der immer selben Scheiße vom Auf- und Abstieg der Imperien des Kapitals, sondern zu der Entdeckung, dass die Macht der Ausgebeuteten im Weltsystem tendenziell zugenommen hat. Mit jedem Wechsel ist ihr Einfluss auf die Gestalt und den sozialen Charakter des System größer geworden. Was wir zur Zeit erleben, ist der definitive Beginn des Endes eines kapitalistischen Zyklus, der sich trotz der Barbareien in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts unter US-amerikanischer Ägide noch ein mal entwickeln konnte. Niemand kann voraussagen, wie sich die sozialen Bewegungen von unten in den nächsten Monaten und Jahren in diese Krise einbringen und der Welt ein neues Gesicht geben werden. Wir können aber feststellen, dass unsere Optionen und unsere Macht, in die Geschichte einzugreifen deutlich größer geworden sind. Ein erstes Anzeichen dafür sind die Arbeiterkämpfe von China über Osteuropa bis Ägypten und die Hungerkrawalle auf allen drei Kontinenten, die sich schon jetzt in überraschender Schnelligkeit und Gleichzeitigkeit gegen die Krise entwickeln.
Christian Frings
Die Tendenz zur Überakkumulation, also zu einer Situation, in der zu viel Kapital zu wenigen profitablen Investitionsmöglichkeiten gegenüber steht, ist eine der Hauptkrisentendenzen kapitalistischer Ökonomien. Der von unserer Arbeit produzierte Mehrwert muss jeden Tag wieder irgendwo investiert werden. Wenn KapitalistInnen diesen Mehrwert nun aus irgendeinem Grund (ArbeiterInnenkämpfe, gesättigte Märkte, gesetzliche Vorschriften) nicht auf profitable Art und Weise in Produktion für existierende Märkte investieren können, müssen sie entweder neue Märkte öffnen, oder den Preis bestehender Vermögenswerte hochbieten (Immobilien, Aktien, Währungen…). Dies ist die Ursache der vielen Finanzblasen und –krisen, die wir in den letzten 15 Jahren erlebt haben.
Finanzialisierung beschreibt die massive Ausweitung finanzieller Instrumente, zum Beispiel Derivate, während der letzten 30 Jahre, sowie die wachsende Macht finanzieller Institutionen (Banken, Ratingagenturen, Hedge Fonds) gegenüber anderen sozialen Kräften.
Christian Frings lebt in Köln und beschäftigt sich seit längerem mit der Entwicklung des kapitalistischen Weltsystems, respektive seiner Überwindung durch die Kämpfe der globalen Arbeiterklassen.
English translation here.
Order Turbulence 4
The magazine is out, now!
If you’re interested in getting a bundle to distribute or can help out in any other way, we’d love to hear from you. Email us here.
If you’re in the UK, you can order individual copies directly from us. They’re free, but we’d ask for a small donation to cover postage costs. Email us. Copies will also shortly be available from AK Press and Active Distribution.
In North America, copies can be ordered from PM Press.
And in Germany, copies will be available via Red Stuff.
And, of course, individual articles are all available to read online here, or you can download the whole magazine as a PDF.
Octavia Raitt’s ‘Today’ Drawings
Where does the future start?
What we take to be the present is made up of the apparent repetition of ordinary, regular points. In fact we become so accustomed to these regularities that we lose sight of the subtle differences that occur in their actual repetition. Octavia Raitt’s Today drawings, done at the rate of one a day for 143 days, are a beautiful portrayal of the difference that occurs in the repetition of ordinary points. She shows that finding the singular in the ordinary is a matter of selection. But every singular point means a break from what is ordinary, an opening up of possibility. In order to stop the future being erased by the present, we need to exploit this potential for singular points to change the rules of the game.
- Turbulence
All artwork and images are published under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives licence. If you copy, distribute and transmit artwork, you must credit the work to the artist. You may not use this artwork for commercial purposes, and you may not alter, transform, or build upon this artwork. More details from http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Move into the Light? PM Press Edition

‘Move into the Light? Postscript to a Turbulent 2007′ has been republished by PM Press.
Copies can be ordered directly from PM Press here. (Or from Amazon.com).
Product Details
Written by: Turbulence Collective
Published by: PM Press
ISBN: 978-1-60486-031-3
Pub Date: July 2008
Format: Pamphlet
Page Count: 20
Size: 5.5 by 8.5
e-Newsletter 2
CONTENTS
1) Turbulence 04 out now!
2) Help distribute Turbulence
3) Turbulence website relaunch
4) ‘Move into the Light? Postscript to a turbulent 2007′ Republished by PM Press
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1) TURBULENCE 04 OUT NOW!
Turbulence: Ideas for movement No. 4: ‘Who can save us from the future?’
Today, the very act of thinking about the future has become a problem. What both capitalism and ‘really existing socialism’ had in common was the belief in a future where infinite happiness would spring from the infinite expansion of production: sacrifices made in the present could always be justified in terms of a brighter future. And now? The socialist future has been dead since the fall of the Berlin wall. After that we seemed to live in a world where only the capitalist future existed (even when it was under attack). But now this future, too, is having its obituaries composed, and impending doom is the talk of the town. The ‘crisis of the future’ – that is, of our capacity to think about the future – is born out of these twin deaths: today it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.
With this in mind we’ve assembled a collection of articles that, in different ways, speak to us about futures. As much as we didn’t want people’s ten-point programmes when, in June 2007 we asked ‘What would it mean to win?’, our interest here has nothing to do with futurology. There are no grand predictions. No imminent victory, because comfort-zone wishful thinking is the last thing anyone needs now; but no apocalyptic doom either. Neither are there any forward-view mirrors where capitalism recuperates everything and always gets the last laugh. We must have the modesty to recognise that the future is unknown, not because today is the end of everything or the beginning of everything else, but because today is where we are. What we do, what is done to us, and what we do with what is done to us, are what decide the way the dice will go. This requires the patient and attentive work of identifying openings, directions, tendencies, potentials, possibilities – all of which are things that amount to nothing if not acted upon – and of finding out new ways in which to think about the future.
CONTENTS
Introduction: Present Tense, Future Conditional by Turbulence
Today I See the Future by Turbulence
1968 and Doors to New Worlds by John Holloway
Starvation Politics: From Ancient Egypt to the Present by George Caffentzis
Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast by The Free Association
Global Capitalism: Futures and Options by Christian Frings
The Measure of a Monster: Capital, Class, Competition and Finance by David Harvie
Et tu Bertinotti? by Sandro Mezzadra, with an Introduction by Keir Milburn and Ben Trott
There is No Room for Futurology; History Will Decide by Felix Guattari, with an Introduction by Rodrigo Nunes and Ben Trott [read as a PDF here (recommended)]
This is Not My First Apocalypse by Fabian Frenzel and Octavia Raitt
The Movement is Dead, Long Live the Movement! by Tadzio Mueller
Network Politics for the 21st Century by Harry Halpin and Kay Summer
Inside art work by Octavia Raitt. Cover design, Kristyna Baczynski
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Turb_01, _03, and now _04 are freely available to download as PDFs or read online as plain text. Numerous translations of articles from Turb_01 are available, as well as the whole of ‘Move into the Light?’ Translations of articles from _04 will be posted online as soon as they’re available (a couple are up there already!)
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4) ‘MOVE INTO THE LIGHT? POSTSCRIPT TO A TURBULENT 2007’ REPUBLISHED BY PM PRESS
‘Move into the Light? Postscript to a turbulent 2007’, originally published by Turbulence in December 2007 has been republished as a beautiful little booklet by PM Press (www.pmpress.org)
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(July 28, 2008)
‘There is no scope for futurology; history will decide’: Félix Guattari on Molecular Revolution
Rodrigo Nunes and Ben Trott examine Félix Guattari’s trip to Brazil in the early 1980s, and the way he analysed the transformations taking place at the time, asking: how can they resonate with the experiences of today?
[Read this as a PDF here (recommended)]
Introduction
The rise of a new political generation at the turn of the century put a swagger in the step of people doing ‘movement politics’. The resurgence of the global left had essentially taken place outside political parties and institutions, sometimes openly against them. There was not only a tremendous optimism about the possibility for change, but a similar conviction that this time it was not going to be a top-down affair.
In 2001 the world’s only existent superpower changed gears in its foreign policy. The new, unilateral political landscape provided a temporary solution for the management of what seemed like a global crisis of systemic legitimacy. It sent ripples across much of the globe, signifying a severe cramping of the space in which movements had been thriving. They became squeezed between growing criminalisation, a clampdown on civil liberties and a militarisation which left them up against a degree of force they could not match. Across much of Europe and Australasia, this translated as a macro-political shift to the right. It was the same process, but with inverted signs, that took place in Latin America. The quagmire effect of the ‘war on terror’ on a US administration, which would otherwise have been far more ‘interventionist’ in the region, helped create the conditions in which popular opposition to neoliberalism translated into victories for the institutional left. Desires and demands of diverse movements became inscribed in legislation and policy experiments, and new room for manoeuvre was opened. At the same time, in various cases, movements found themselves in a ‘lesser evil’ double bind whereby governments banked on unconditional support as a way of ‘keeping out the right wing’, even when making highly unpopular decisions.
This alone should be enough to demonstrate that the relations between movement and institution are too complex to be posed in ideological terms. If one pole is automatically ‘good’ and the other ‘bad’, or one side ‘real’ politics and the other only its ‘fantasm’, one misses the most important, and essentially practical, point: both are real, and relate to each other in real ways; and however much those doing ‘movement’ politics may wish to ignore it, the field of possibilities open to them is always affected by institutions. Conversely, however much institutional politics may cover it up under the narratives of governmental ‘decisions’, the acts of ‘great leaders’ are always conditioned by the field of constantly transformed social relations in which movements, well, move.
Today’s conjuncture suggests a real possibility that the political sequence opened by 9/11 may be coming to an end with the twilight of neo-conservatism in the US. Much of this hope for change has been invested in Barack Obama, a charismatic figure onto whom the symbols of ‘young outsider’, ‘ethnic minority’ and ‘multicultural background’ have been projected.
To be sure, he hardly represents radical transformative politics. His record is that of a left-of-centre Democrat. Even if one takes his pledge for ‘change we can believe in’ at face value, there are obvious limits to what he promises (and generally to what can be done within the constraints of the Washington beltway). Yet the reactions he has stirred, and the meanings with which he has been invested, suggest the possibility of a transformation in sensibility, a change in the way ‘politics’ is seen and related to. Most importantly, this implies a potential which is not necessarily limited to its object, nor entirely eliminated by the probable disappointment which will follow an equally probable victory.
Yes, of course we’ve seen this film before: (1) change is promised; (2) a lot is banked on the promise; (3) the promise is betrayed, or left partly unfulfilled. But isn’t just falling back on the comfortable, age-old narrative, that institutional politics always betrays transformation, simply stating the obvious, disguised as world-weary experience? Moreover, it precisely avoids asking what movements can/should do in a space that is opened up, for however short a moment. It is a way of dodging the practical problems of political work, similar to saying that revolutions are not desirable because they always fail or turn out bad.
In an interview, Gilles Deleuze once ridiculed those who had ‘discovered’ that revolutions turn out bad: revolutions always fall short of their stated objectives, not to mention the desires invested in them. But a revolution must be distinguished from a becoming-revolutionary: the moment when people undergo a radical transformation as a result of their increased, shared capacity to shape the world in which they live. This is not exhausted by the failure to achieve any particular goal, and can go beyond any betrayal.
It is, of course, too early to speak of what the situation opened by an Obama presidency might or might not be. Instead, we’d like to reopen a discussion on the interplay between movements and institutions, desires and demands, practices and policies, micro- and macro-politics by looking at a different historical moment. In the early 1980s, at the end of two decades of military dictatorship, Félix Guattari travelled to Brazil on the invitation of fellow psychoanalyst and cultural critic, Suely Rolnik, who wanted to expose him to the boiling culture of changes – in racial, gender, political and personal relations – taking place. They organised a series of meetings, interviews and talks across the country, debating those changes with people who were directly engaged in producing them. Some of these were edited and reworked by Rolnik into a book, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, only now made available in English, and from which we have taken the following extracts.
Part of Guattari’s interest lay in seeing how micropolitical changes in sensibility and subjectivity could find support in a focal point provided by the charismatic figure of an outsider relayed by the mass media – Lula – and be given a certain consistency through the formation of the young Workers’ Party (PT). Of course, both Lula and the PT finally won the elections in 2002, and it didn’t take long for cries of ‘betrayal’ to ring out. Soon after electoral victory, one of Lula’s aides, Frei Betto, explained, “We are in government but not in power. Power today is global, the power of big companies, the power of financial capital.” But to merely repeat the narrative of betrayal is to miss what is really important in what has happened, is still happening, and will always happen again in the future: the relations between global, non- or para-State powers and what can be achieved in the framework of the nation-State; and the dynamics between movements and institutions, or micro- and macro-politics. Once an open field of concrete relations is reduced to an empty division between ‘good’ (movements) and ‘bad’ (institutions), it is this complexity – which is always unique to each case – that is entirely erased.
- Rodrigo Nunes & Ben Trott
Sonia Goldfeder: In your view, how does the participation of minority groups in a process of social mutation take place? Should they be coopted by society as a whole, or should they remain apart in order to maintain their difference?
Guattari: It’s necessary to distinguish two levels of reality. Firstly, the level of present reality, in which minority groups are marginalized— their ideas and their way of life are repressed and rejected. Secondly, the level of another reality, where there is a linking up of the left, and where these groups are taken into account, listened to, and have some weight in society. Homosexual groups, for example, obtain new legislation, or groups of psychiatrized people question current methods. All this forms part of a normal, traditional logic of power relations, pressure groups, and so on. Does this mean a cooptation of everything that’s dissident in the movement? That’s the kind of thing I can’t answer. Will Lula’s PT coopt the whole dissident movement that can be seen in part of its grassroots support? I hope not. I only know that among the final points of the PT program there’s one that speaks specifically about “respect for autonomy.” This kind of affirmation in a political program is extraordinary. I’ve never seen it anywhere.
To reject this attempt because of a fear of cooptation isn’t justified in the name of an incapacity to completely express our desire in the situation, in the name of a mythical ethics of autonomy, in the name of the cult of spontaneity. This is an attempt of great importance (…).
Question: Don’t you think it’s a bit over-optimistic to consider that this kind of good faith by the parties in relation to autonomy is possible?
Guattari: There’s always the risk that the parties will crush the minorities. It’s not a matter of optimism or pessimism, but of a fundamental, definitive questioning about all the systems of party, union, group, and sectarian group involved in the course of a liberation struggle. There’s nothing that provides an a priori guarantee that they won’t again transmit the dominant models in this field. Not their program, nor the good faith of their leaders, nor even their practical, concrete commitment to minorities. So what might intervene to prevent this kind of “entropy” (a term that I don’t much like, but I’ll use it) in this field? Precisely the establishment of devices (which we can call whatever we like—analytic devices, devices of molecular revolution, of singularization, and so on), devices on the scale of the individual or the group, or even broader combinations, which would make us raise the issue of the collective formations of desire.
Luiz Swartz: I would like to make an observation. It seems to me that the great paradox in your whole explanation lies in the question of the coexistence of parties with autonomous movements. In your first statement you said that certain kinds of struggle should be routed through that kind of organization, the parties. And that another kind of struggle takes place autonomously. And now you’ve put the question in terms of the party being an instrument that has to be used at a certain point, and not used again afterwards. It seems to me that there’s something very important here: perhaps there’s an incorrect evaluation of the strength of the party. The party, in my opinion, doesn’t lend itself to being used as an instrument, because it eventually acquires a bureaucratized, disciplinary dynamic of its own that practically prevents the continuity of these molecular struggles.
Guattari: I think the treatment of these issues calls for great prudence, because history shows us that this kind of view can have disastrous consequences. First of all, I would like you to understand that I’m not saying that the PT is the eighth wonder of the world (…). I know that there are many problems precisely in relation to the articulation of these minorities with a certain relatively traditional conception of organization. I also know that a trace of what I would call “leaderism” is being established, leaderism that is embodied in the media, and that triggers off a whole series of mechanisms, precisely in the field of collective subjectivity. This, of course, always introduces a certain risk of reification of subjective processes. However, when all is said and done, I believe that even so, there is great novelty, great experimentation, in what is being done here in the PT. It’s not my place to give lessons on revolution, for the good reason that, in my view, there are no possible lessons in this field. Nevertheless, there is at least one thing that I think Europe can try to transmit: the experience of our failures.
In France, after 1968, there was an intense movement of waves of molecular revolution on all levels (…). But the problem was that none of those modes of action was able to pass to another level of struggle. The only link with that other level of struggle, the struggle of other sectors of the population, continued to be the old systems of sectarian groups, the old party and union systems. What happened was that the nonintellectuals who took part in those movements became intellectuals of a kind during the experiments. So there was a gradual agglutination of those nonintellectuals—some militant immigrants, for example, who, by the very nature of the movement, eventually became isolated from the rest of the immigrant population. (…) The problem with this kind of experiment does not have to do with the establishment of an intensive contact between intellectuals and a particular group. But if those groups are actually isolated from all the other social movements, if there is an absence of essential links, they eventually lead to processes of specialization and degeneration. It’s like a kind of wave ceaselessly breaking on itself.
What I think is important in Brazil, therefore, is the fact that the question of an organization capable of confronting political and social issues on a large scale is not going to be raised after some great movement of emancipation of minorities and sensibilities, because it’s being raised now, at the same time. It is clear that it isn’t a question of creating some kind of collective union in defense of the marginal, a common program, or some kind of reductive unifying front. That would be utterly stupid, because it certainly isn’t a question of the minorities and marginal groups making an agreement or adopting the same program, the same theory, or the same attitudes.
That would take us back to the old mass movement conceptions of the socialists and the communists. It’s not a question of adopting a programmatic logic, but a “situational logic.” On the other hand, it also doesn’t mean that tendencies seeking to affirm their singularity should abandon machines such as that of the PT. If that happened, gradually we would find only one kind of singularity in the PT: that of the “hard line” professional militants (…). That’s where the problem lies. Of course, I’m not trying to outline a philosophy of this issue. But it seems to me that it’s necessary to invent a means that allows the coexistence of these two dimensions. Not just a practical means, a means of real intervention in the field, but also a new kind of sensibility, a new kind of reasoning, a new kind of theory.
Néstor Perlongher: I think that not enough importance is being given here to the problem of political statements, in the following sense: the big problem of the connection of these small micropoliticalmovements (…) is the statement with which those micropolitical movements are articulated. If this is true, I think that the power of those declarations is being underestimated. The conventional guy, whether he’s a worker or not, becomes totally unglued when a pretty, intellectual fag appears, speaking on behalf of the PT. A guy like that isn’t going to connect with this kind of statement. (…) So what I ask is: up to what point are we from the micropolitical, minority, molecular movements going to defend these archaic statements like democratic censorship, or the reduction of the idea of revolution to a modification of the economy, which leads, as has been seen, to overexploitation and superdictatorship?
Guattari: I don’t suppose you’re going to prepare a notebook of complaints for Lula, asking him for proof that he has an accurate conception of what the fate of homosexuals, blacks, women, the psychiatrized, and so on is going to be. What Lula has to be asked is to contribute to the overthrow of all molar stratifications as they exist now. As for everything else, each person has to assume his responsibilities in the position he’s assembled socially. I don’t think that Lula is the “Father of the Oppressed,” or the “Father of the Poor,” but I do think that he’s performing a fundamental role in the media, and that’s essential at this point in the electoral campaign. He’s the vehicle of an extremely important vector of dynamics in the current situation, such as the well-known power that he has to mobilize people who are totally apolitical. In this respect, Lula is not identifiable with the PT. The role that Lula is performing in the media is very important, because nowadays one can’t consider the struggles at all the levels without considering this factor of the production of subjectivity by the media.
Suely Rolnik: I’ve been thinking about how the book should deal with the considerable space that the discussions about the PT took up during the trip. Perhaps it isn’t appropriate to reproduce the “electoral campaign” facet, for the simple reason that it’s no longer a topical issue. But at the same time, it could be important to do so as long as it’s in a way that reveals, and even emphasizes, what in my view was central in your investment in the PT: not to focus on the PT itself, as something sacred, but on the kind of device that the PT represented at that time. A device that made possible the expression of issues concerning formations of desire in the social field; and, above all, a device that made possible the articulation of that plane of reality with the plane of the struggles that require broad social and political agglutinations. I would even say that the agglutination of these two planes was the leading figure in your campaign for the PT. What was unusual about your position was precisely the fact that you called attention to the need and possibility for that articulation to take place. And throughout the trip you never stopped recalling the fact that, recently, this tendency to downplay the broader social struggles has caused damage at least as serious as the disregard for the problematics related to desire.
In addition to having made it possible to highlight this kind of issue, the discussions about the campaign also helped us to tune in to the frequency of a completely deterritorialized official political voice in the voice of Lula (a kind of free radio station, but with the peculiarity of broadcasting directly from within the official media). Those discussions also helped to make it possible to see, in the PT at that time, a collective assemblage that was drawing the political scene outside its traditional domain. In short, a “war machine.” But now things are different. In addition to the fact that we are no longer in the electoral campaign, there’s no guarantee that the PT still is and is still going to be that device, which makes the presence of this element in the book questionable, at least with that emphasis. That’s why I was saying that it would only be interesting to preserve it in order to share the understanding that the existence of this kind of device is essential in order to make the processes of singularization less vulnerable. Therefore it’s necessary to be sensitive to its emergence in a great variety of social fields—not only in political parties, of course, and not only in the PT.
Guattari: It seems to me important that the problems of the organization and the constitution of a new kind of machine for struggle should be concealed as little as possible. Even as a failure—which, after all, may not be the case—it seems to me that the experience of the PT is primordial. How can we make the new components of subjectivity emerge on a national scale (in terms of the media)? What is important here is not the result, but the emergence of the problematics. There is no scope for futurology; history will decide. There are two possibilities: either the PT will be completely contaminated by the virus of sectarianism, in which case each autonomous component will “make tracks,” and the PT can go to hell; or else the process that seems to be being triggered off in some places will tend to neutralize these sectarian-style components, and it may even happen, according to Lula’s hypothesis, that, depending on the strength of the movements, those components may eventually dissolve. Everything will depend on the local circumstances and the usefulness or not of the instrument of the PT. If all this goes “down the drain,” if the PT becomes another PMDB and Lula becomes a leader of heaven knows what, then that’s it, it’s over. It would only mean that the consistency of the process didn’t take hold in this kind of assemblage, and that the struggles of molecular revolution will continue through other paths.
If we insist on dealing with the problems of a political practice from a classical viewpoint—a tendency, a group, or a method of organization versus autonomous groups that do not want to know about leaders, or to articulate themselves—we shall find ourselves in a total impasse, because we shall be revolving around an eternal debate that sets modes of apprehension of the domain of centralism against “spontaneism” or anarchism, considered as sources of generosity and creativity, but also of disorder, incapable of leading to true transformations. It does not seem to me that the opposition is this—between a supremely efficient, centralized, functional device on the one hand, and autonomy on the other.
The dimension of organization is not on the same plane as the issue of autonomy. The issue of autonomy belongs to the domain of what I would call a “function of autonomy,” a function that can be embodied effectively in feminist, ecological, homosexual, and other groups, but also—and why not?—in machines for large-scale struggle, such as the PT. Organizations such as parties or unions are also terrains for the exercise of a “function of autonomy.” Let me explain: the fact that one acts as a militant in a movement allows one to acquire a certain security and no longer feel inhibition and guilt, with the result that sometimes, without realizing it, in our actions we convey traditional models (hierarchical models, social welfare models, models that give primacy to a certain kind of knowledge, professional training, etc.). That is one of the lessons of the 1960s, a period when, even in supposedly liberating actions, old clichés were unconsciously reproduced. And it is an important aspect for consideration, because conservative conceptions are utterly unsuitable for developing processes of emancipation.
The question, therefore, is not whether we should organize or not, but whether or not we are reproducing the modes of dominant subjectivation in any of our daily activities, including militancy in organizations. It is in these terms that the “function of autonomy” must be considered. It is expressed on a micropolitical level, which has nothing to do with anarchy, or with democratic centralism. Micropolitics has to do with the possibility that social assemblages may take the productions of subjectivity in capitalism into consideration, problematics that are generally set aside in the militant movement.
In my view, it is necessary to try to construct a new kind of representation, something that I call a new cartography. It is not just about a simple coexistence of centralized apparatuses and processes of singularization, because, at the end of the day, the Leninists always had the very same discourse: on one side the Party, the Central Committee, and the Politburo, and on the other, the mass organizations, where everyone does his own little job, everyone cultivates his garden. And between them are the “transmission belts”: a hierarchy of tasks, a hierarchy of instruments of struggle, and, in fact, an order of priority that always leads to manipulation and control of the struggles of molecular revolution by the central apparatuses.
The construction of machines for struggle, war machines, which we need in order to overthrow the situations of capitalism and imperialism, cannot have only political and social objectives that form part of a program embodied by certain leaders and representatives. The function of autonomy is not that of a simple degree of tolerance in order to sweeten centralism with a pinch of autonomy. Its function is what will make it possible to capture all impulses of desire and all intelligences, not in order to make them converge on a single arborescent central point, but to place them in a huge rhizome that will traverse all social problematics, both at a local or regional level and at a national or international level.
Explainers
‘Lula’ and the Workers’ Party (PT): The Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party) was founded in 1980 by workers and intellectuals. Luiz Inácio da Silva (Lula), leader of the metal worker strikes of the late 1970s, was one of the founders and is currently President of Brazil, elected in 2002 and again in 2006.
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PMDB: From 1965 to 1979, the military enforced a two-party system in Brazil, where the MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement) gathered all the politicians who opposed the regime (and who hadn’t been persecuted or had their political rights suspended). This made it into a strange amalgam of forces ranging from regional oligarchs to liberals and infiltrated leftwing elements. When a plural political system was reintroduced, many of these forces broke away and formed their own parties – many PT founders were MDB members at some point. The newly named PMDB stayed the largest Brazilian party, but without any politics of its own: a hugely contradictory, often corrupt, loose association of interests that uses its size to negotiate with each government. It is part of Lula’s parliamentary base. From 1965 to 1979, the military enforced a two-party system in Brazil, where the MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement) gathered all the politicians who opposed the regime (and who had not been persecuted or had their political rights suspended). This made it into a strange amalgam of forces ranging from regional oligarchs to liberals and infiltrated leftwing elements. When a plural political system was reintroduced, many of these forces broke away and formed their own parties. Many PT founders were MDB members at some point. The newly-named PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) remained the largest Brazilian party, but without any politics of its own: a hugely contradictory, often corrupt, loose association of interests that uses its size to negotiate with each government. It is part of Lula’s parliamentary base.
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The arborescent and rhizomatic: ‘Arborescent’ means tree-like and describes centralised and hierarchical structures, where the only connections between the various parts that make up the whole pass through its single core. In botany, ‘rhizomes’ are horizontal roots systems, usually underground. They do not have a centre and tend to be characterised by numerous transversal connections. They are not static. Yet these are two tendencies that can be distinguished in thought rather than completely opposite realities: arborescent structures contain and can become rhizomes, and vice-versa. The text you are reading is probably best read rhizomatically. There is no single clear argument, beginning or end, but rather a distribution of connected thoughts and questions to be taken up and deployed in different contexts. The coloured lines (not shown here) connecting words, sentences and segments of text only illustrate a small number of some of the most obvious connections.
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Micropolitics: For Guattari and his long-term collaborator, Gilles Deleuze, with whom he wrote Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, ‘desires’ (productive, living, material flows) are always in excess of any stable system in which they can be articulated (the state, capital, but also a social or political group). Micro-politics largely refers to this excess, to the fact that there are always new connections, flows, and desires that take place. ‘Micro’ and ‘macro’ is not a matter of scale, but of levels – the first has to do with transformations in sensibility and ways of relating, the second with conscious positions, demands, open struggles. This does not mean that a ‘micro’ transformation cannot happen to a large number of people – for instance, in the way in which a figure in the mass media can serve as a relay for subjective transformations to communicate with each other.
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Molar and molecular: In chemistry, a ‘mole’ is the name given to a (large) unit of molecules dissolved in a solution. For Deleuze and Guattari, ‘molar’ and ‘molecular’ form a paired concept: not exactly opposites, connected yet distinct, whose use is ‘dependent on a system of reference’ (whether an object is seen from its ‘closed’ or ‘open’ side) and scale (the cell is molecular in relation to the organism, the organism is molecular in relation to the social group etc.). To the extent that it refers to larger aggregates, the political meaning of molar tends to be associated with the level of governance, the state, political parties, but also social movements, policies, demands: what is extensive and can be measured. The molecular generally refers to the micro-political level, to processes which take place below the level of perception, in ‘affects’ (impersonal sensations which transform a body’s capacity to act and be acted upon). To think of politics as composed of both molar and molecular transformations, and of the two levels as distinguishable by right but not distinct or separate in fact, provides a model for thinking the complexity of relations through which political movement and struggle takes place.
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Minority: ‘Minority’ can be understood in reference to the molar/molecular distinction. Whilst ‘major’ is taken to represent a relatively fixed, stable, perceptible and measurable mode of being, the ‘minor’ is what is potentially capable of unsettling it, being open to movements of becoming that open the major to new compositions and make deterritorialisations possible.
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War machine: The [nomadic] ‘war machine’ has nothing to do with the military-industrial-complex. It is opposed to the ‘State machine’ as exteriority is opposed to interiority. The latter always works by incorporating what is outside it, putting it to work. The former is a positive (non-antagonistic), productive, restless movement that, while always creating the territories where it gathers some temporary consistency, is always going beyond the sedentarism (stillness) and centralisation that characterise the State.
The extracts reprinted here are taken from Félix Guattari and Suely Rolnik (2008) Molecular Revolution in Brazil (Semiotext(e)). Alongside several of his essays, the book contains interviews and talks given by Guattari, recomposed and edited by Rolnik.
The extracts published here were selected by Rodrigo Nunes and Ben Trott who also wrote the Introduction and accompanying explanatory texts. Both are editors of Turbulence. Rodrigo Nunes revised the translation of the English language edition of Molecular Revolution in Brazil. editors@turbulence.org.uk
Suely Rolnik is a cultural critic, curator, psychoanalyst and professor at the Universidade Católica de São Paulo, where she conducts a transdisciplinary doctoral program on contemporary subjectivity, and at the Programme of Independent Studies of the Museum of Contemporary Art of Barcelona.
Félix Guattari was a French activist, psychoanalyst and philosopher, with a long-term involvement in the experimental La Borde clinic, institutional analysis, and different movements. Best known for his collaborative works with Gilles Deleuze, particularly Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, he also authored books such as Chaosmosis and The Three Ecologies.
Today I See the Future
We can only ever think the future in the conditions of the present. And one of the most powerful myths is always that the present is the natural order of things: ‘It has always been like this, and it always will be.’ Ten years ago, against that closure of the future, a multiplicity of movements arose which claimed that other worlds were indeed possible. It went by a multitude of names: the ‘movement of movements’, alter-globalisation, anti-globalisation, the anti-capitalist movement. We knew it by the names of the cities where, in flashes, it would become most visible – Seattle, Chiang Mai, Genoa, Porto Alegre, Cancun.
Looking back today, it’s hard to avoid two simultaneous impressions: success and failure. On the one hand, the movement of movements, compared to those days, appears a spent force; yet the situation it opposed has changed. The faint outlines of a victory? The door of history is open – or at least more open than it appeared ten years ago. Things that were necessary articles of faith have been discredited even in the eyes of their proponents. Political freedom goes hand-in-hand with free markets? The invisible hand of the free market, unburdened by regulation, knows best? Utter rubbish. In the words of the UK government’s Chief Economist, Nicholas Stern, climate change is “the biggest market failure in history”. Lawrence Summers, former US-Treasury Secretary and World Bank Chief Economist publicly defects from neoliberalism when he argues that “what is good for the global economy and its business champions” isn’t necessarily good for workers. Of course, it’s easy to overstate the point. The door of history wasn’t forced open only by ‘the movements’ – not unless we re-define ‘the movements’ to include millions who’ve never heard of Seattle or Chiang Mai or Genoa. But this much is clear: the liberal-democratic-free-market-capitalist future that was the only flavour on offer at the turn of the century has gone out of fashion in 2008, and the futures paraded before us all look rather different.
We see a few stifled yawns: yet another crisis and the end, if not of capitalism, then at least of its latest manifestation – bored now! Anti-capitalists are renowned for seeing every little downturn as the precursor of complete economic meltdown. And of course, CAPITALISM IN CRISIS! is the perennial headline of choice in left-wing newspapers the world over. We’ve all been there. Exactly a decade ago, two of us sat with a stack of envelopes and sent letters with precisely that title to hundreds of the world’s social movements, in the hope of finding more people to shut down the summits of the WTO, the G8, the IMF etc. So maybe it is hard for us to say this with any credibility. But this time it’s different. Honest. Back then, the crisis was an emerging one, and it had more to do with the growing perceived illegitimacy of neoliberalism than with anything more ‘material’.
OK, don’t take it from us. Read the Financial Times, Economist or Wall Street Journal. Every day there are articles asking what is to come now that the ‘American Century’ has ended, now that food prices can’t be kept in check, climate change rolls on, the world’s financial architecture seizes up, oil production finally has peaked… It is ironic that, while on the left it seems impossible to conjure up an image of revolution – a rupture with the past and the end of capitalism – the FT imagine it all the time. If it happens, it’s the end of their readership’s power; so they’re keen to discuss what to do about it. Or take the new Shell report,Energy Scenarios to 2050. They state boldly that the era of Thatcher’s ‘There is No Alternative’-doctrine is over. Now the choice is a “scramble” for resources and some nightmarish Hobbesian war of all against all, or “blueprints”. That’s right, “blueprints”: some sort of organised supra-national planning. Meanwhile on the left, we only seem able to imagine the end of the world as Mad Max-style mayhem arising from our fashionable new friend ‘eco-collapse’.
PRESENT TENSE
The food crisis. The climate crisis. The oil price crisis. The Iraq crisis. The financial crisis. Crises are nothing new. We should know: we’ve cried wolf before. Back in 1997, in the midst of the Asian financial crisis, when millions of people were thrown out of work, governments fell and South America teetered on the brink of joining the crash-fest, some of us were excited. It was tempting to see those millions out of work, the race-to-the-bottom wage reductions, as bringing us closer to rupture, to radical change. But far from heralding capitalism’s downfall, these crises are in fact precisely what capital needs to constantly revolutionise itself and the world around it. So why think that now is different? Why think this is a turning point, and not simply another turn of the screw of capital’s waves of creative destruction? Are we not all Schumpeterians now?
Joseph Schumpeter was an economist who popularised the term ‘creative destruction’ to describe the regular revolutionising of economic and regulatory structures and institutions needed to ensure new ‘long waves’ of economic growth. Crises were seen as a helpful way of sweeping away the old and creating room for the new. In The Shock Doctrine Naomi Klein outlines the way economic crises, natural disasters, and military conflicts have been transformed into moments of creative destruction by neoliberalism over the past 30 years. Turning disaster into an opportunity seems to have become so much a part of neoliberal ‘common sense’ as to be comparable with US President Nixon’s 1971 assertion that – when it came to government intervention into the economy in order to stimulate growth – “We are all Keynesians now”.
The answer lies not in pathological optimism, but in the possibility of crisis management – or its impossibility, as it were. We can look at this from two perspectives. First, that of capital’s activity. Crises aren’t necessarily productive for capital, nor do they necessarily increase states’ power. They have to bemanaged to have those effects. One crisis – say, the surging oil price – is relatively easy to handle. Two can still be manageable. But five or six major crises occurring at the same time? Of course, it’s not only about numbers, because any amount of crises would be manageable if they all had the same cause or proximate causes: the solution to one would probably also solve or at least contribute to solving another. But in this case, the various crises have multiple causes that are apparently independent of each other. More importantly, the most obvious solutions to any one crisis may exacerbate one of the others to a point of unmanageability.
Take the food price crisis. This year, food riots occurred in big cities in 37 countries: arguably a speedier and more widespread revolt than anything pulled off by the movement of ’68 or the ‘movement of movements’. People in a quarter of the world’s countries said ‘enough is enough’ in a matter of weeks. A couple of governments fell; many gave rare concessions to the poor. There was panic on the first class deck, and an emergency global summit in Rome was called in June.
Then there’s the climate crisis, caused by human emissions of greenhouse gases, most of which come from the burning of fossil fuels. And then there’s the oil price crisis, caused by our inability to kick our oil habit, rapidly rising demand in ‘emerging’ economies, chronic underinvestment in the oil industries of most oil-producing countries, and perhaps a growing belief that global oil production has peaked. And then there’s the financial crisis, caused by… You catch the drift.
But something very important is lost if we only look from the point of view of what capital has done to produce this situation, and what capital will do to manage it. Crises don’t just ‘happen’ all by themselves; they are also the outcome of struggles that are ongoing and constantly spilling over boundaries and borders. Sometimes these pit different capitalists’ interests against one another – for example, the OPEC countries against the world’s leading economies. But the desires and actions of people too are constantly reshaping the field of play. The food crisis isn’t just the by-product of neoliberalism’s attack on any reproduction independent of the market: growing demand in developing countries is also the result of long-term pressures for increases in real wages and wealth redistribution policies. If we simply dismiss this process as the way capital reduces the risk of large-scale uprising (by ‘buying us off’), then we end up playing the old teleology game, at the expense of other people’s lives – ‘hang in there, comrades, just one more sacrifice for the revolution!’. More importantly we ignore the fact that transformations such as access to education and basic needs also create new bases for struggle. One of the factors in the rapid spread of the food riots is the fact that since some point last year, for the first time in history the majority of the world’s population now live in urban areas, and access to means of communication allows tactical information and agitation to travel much more quickly. It’s the same with the oil crisis, where rising prices are also due to the victories of struggles in oil-producing regions as far apart as Venezuela and the Niger delta. More fundamentally, in an oil-dependent world, oil is used to do the work that workers have successfully refused: machines that are driven by oil get introduced only when labour power becomes too expensive.
In this respect, we don’t have to choose between either mourning the death of the mythical proletariat as unitary world-subject, or giving up on it and accepting that the only force of transformation in the world is the aggregate of capital’s decisions. It’s not a question of whether we can act in the face of these crises: people have always acted, and are always acting, in ways that change the world. The real problem is this: how is it possible to act on a global scale in ways that can take advantages of conjunctures like the one we have now?
FUTURE CONDITIONAL
Back to the view from the top: let’s imagine it’s your job to sort this mess out. Let’s start with high oil prices and energy security – crucial in a world where economic ‘development’ has so far been linked to access to fossil fuels. Many of the world’s governments are getting interested in the production of agrofuels, one of the very few ‘renewable’ energies that is pretty much a straight swap for oil. The problem? Growing more crops for agro-fuels would almost certainly exacerbate the food price crisis, and thus cause more of those food riots that governments would rather avoid. So what are you going to do? Annex an oil-producing country? Easier said than done: Iraq has proven that even the largest military power can become overstretched. And it doesn’t deal with climate change, which must be managed because extreme weather events interfere with production, and voters expect you do to something about it. Solving climate change? Cut back on fossil fuel use. Not really, as that would mean less economic ‘development’. More renewable energy. But what about the food riots? Ignore climate change and adapt. What about a sudden spread of infectious diseases in the wake of major flooding? This is complex stuff.
Crisis management in an overly complex and open situation becomes very difficult, and that difficulty is obvious when listening in on the conversations of global elites. Which is where we return to the beginning: it seems that the power of those who control the present has unravelled to such an extent that the future once again appears unwritten, probably in a way that it hasn’t been since the 1970s. There really are plenty of similarities: then, too, a phase of capitalist development was drawing to an end (Fordism/Keynesianism then, neoliberalism now); US hegemony was being challenged (by Germany and Japan then, by China and India now), while the country fought a neo-colonial war it couldn’t win (Vietnam/Iraq); the dollar was weak, financial systems were in crisis, stagnation and inflation were setting in, oil prices had some nasty shocks in store.
More importantly, the present seems to be a point in which various historical series are crossing each other. And they’re doing so in ways that could make them diverge in new directions. First and foremost, the series set in motion during the 1970s, where various crises – of public debt, the oil price boom, and a high level of working class organisation – overlapped and brought a ‘solution’ that involved financialisation, deregulation, the rolling back of social guarantees, and an internalisation of all risk by individuals (i.e. ‘globalisation’) appears to be coming to and end. The new wave of regulations introduced by the US Federal Reserve, along with the cries that the credit crisis is a result of ‘the free market gone too free’, would appear to point in this direction. What’s more, this seems to be happening at a moment when the decades of effort to put climate change on the agenda appear to have borne fruit; whilst the series of world events opened by 9/11 – and which had a tremendous impact in holding down the cycle of struggles begun in the 1990s – seems to be drawing to a close.
With this in mind we’ve assembled a collection of articles that, in different ways, speak to us about futures. As much as we didn’t want people’s ten-point programmes when, in June 2007 we asked ‘What would it mean to win?’, our interest here has nothing to do with futurology. There are no grand predictions in what follows. No imminent victory, because comfort-zone wishful thinking is the last thing anyone needs now; but no apocalyptic doom either. Neither are there any forward-view mirrors where capitalism recuperates everything and always gets the last laugh. We must have the modesty to recognise that the future is unknown, not because today is the end of everything or the beginning of everything else, but because today is where we are. What we do, what is done to us, and what we do with what is done to us, are what decide the way the dice will fall. This requires the patient and attentive work of identifying openings, directions, tendencies, potentials, possibilities – all of which are things that amount to nothing if not acted upon – and of finding out new ways in which to think about the future.
Turbulence, July 2008
So who is this aimed at?
The short answer is: anyone wanting to think about how to change the world. That is, potentially everybody. But doing so isn’t straightforward. This isn’t a collection of lowest common denominator writings aimed at some abstract ‘public’ whose common sense we can second-guess. Even if we could, we’d much rather undermine it. To go through the experience of thinking differently – in a different way or from a different perspective – creates new possibilities. And perspectives aren’t different takes on a same thing, but each one a world in itself. Likewise, words aren’t different ‘clothes’ for one object, but can create their own objects. So thinking differently involves engaging with ideas that seem alien because they go against some of our assumptions about the world, or come from within contexts we are unfamiliar with. Some of the writing here might seem difficult or abstract – we have tried to contextualise pieces and explain technical jargon – but each article is open to anyone prepared to make the effort of reading it. Reading is a two-way violence: a text can change us to the extent that we are willing to appropriate it to our own ends. It’s the same wager as love: if you jump in, you won’t come back to the same point (and may regret it, or be disappointed); but if you don’t jump in, how can you know what you’re missing?
Science Fiction’s Double Feature
Sci-fi movies, books and comics tend to have two common features. First of all, they all tell us much more about the present than what is to come. That which is fantastically projected into the future reflects what appears to be just beyond our current scientific limits. The Matrixtrilogy – where hacker Neo finds himself up against a simulated reality, governed over by intelligent machines which feed on the energy of humanity – could only have been created in the 1990s, in the context of the rise of both Virtual Reality and internet technology.
Second, it is precisely this first feature which allows sci-fi to demonstrate how our ‘situated-ness’ – our present lived realities and immediate histories – determines the kinds of utopias and dystopias we are able to imagine.
But maybe there is an exception: The role monsters, like Frankenstein’s, often play in sci-fi is generally less determined by the present than, for instance, the technologies used to create or destroy them. They imply a potential for, or at least fascination with the idea of, transformation. They defy easy categorisation: they’re often part-human, and tend to be embroiled in a process of becoming less so. They are the aspect of science fiction which can help open our imaginations to possibilities of becoming, rather than limit them to what seems possible from within the matrix of the present. They are an antidote to the idea of humanity as a ‘species-being’ whose essence is static; and a nod towards the idea of flight-lines out of this world.
Where does the future start?
What we take to be the present is made up of the apparent repetition of ordinary, regular points. In fact we become so accustomed to these regularities that we lose sight of the subtle differences that occur in their actual repetition. Octavia Raitt’s Today drawings, done at the rate of one a day for 143 days, are a beautiful portrayal of the difference that occurs in the repetition of ordinary points. She shows that finding the singular in the ordinary is a matter of selection. But every singular point means a break from what is ordinary, an opening up of possibility. In order to stop the future being erased by the present, we need to exploit this potential for singular points to change the rules of the game.
Turbulence is a journal/newspaper that we hope will become an ongoing space in which to think through, debate and articulate the political, social, economic and cultural theories of our movements, as well as the networks of diverse practices and alternatives that surround them.
We don’t want Turbulence to become yet another journal or yet another edited collection claiming to offer a ‘snapshot of the movement’. Instead we want to carve out a space where we can carry out difficult debates and investigations into the political realities of our time – engaging the real differences in vision, analysis and strategy that exist among our movements.
David Harvie, Keir Milburn, Tadzio Mueller, Rodrigo Nunes, Michal Osterweil, Kay Summer, Ben Trott, David Watts
editors@turbulence.org.uk www.turbulence.org.uk myspace.com/turbulence_ideas4movement
All articles are published under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike licence. You are free to share or remix as long as you attribute it to Turbulence and the author; you may not use this work for commercial purposes; you may only distribute under the same conditions. More details from http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
All artwork and images are published under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives licence. If you copy, distribute and transmit artwork, you must credit the work to the artist. You may not use this artwork for commercial purposes, and you may not alter, transform, or build upon this artwork. More details fromhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Front & back artwork by Kristyna Baczynski
geek.chic@hotmail.co.uk
‘Today’ cartoons by Octavia Raitt
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0845 1300 667
The movement is dead, long live the movement!
There’s a new big story: climate change. Tadzio Müller suggests a way for anticapitalists to deal with the issue’s urgency without falling into catastrophism or quietism.
R.I.P., or: the death of a movement
The movement’s dead! More precisely: the alterglobalisation movement as a common place for movements and ‘activists’ to meet and to become-other, together, linking their struggles under and against the common referent of neoliberal globalisation, is dead. Not that the particular struggles are dead. Nor have we seen the end of countersummit mobilisations: as I’m writing this, preparations for engaging the G8 in Japan are in full swing, and at every gathering of the radical and not-so-radical left, plans are busily being made to shut down one summit or another: the G8 in Italy in 2009; NATO’s 60-year birthday bash in France; and so on and so forth: countersummits-r-us?
But somehow these mobilisations don’t pack the same punch as they used to: how many last hurrahs have there been, how many times have people mobilised and thought “if it fails this time, we’ll stop doing this”? Even the comparatively powerful German movement could do little more at the G8 in Heiligendamm than to realise that it’s one thing to bring tens of thousands onto the street, but quite another for their actions to resonate beyond the immediate circle of participants.
Don’t get me wrong: the movement didn’t die the ignominious death of the defeated. In many ways, it also won. And for movements, who must move to survive, their victories are also often their deaths, for they live and breathe antagonism, they need an enemy. So what of our enemy? Let’s ask Martin Wolf, the Financial Times’ chief ideologue, an eloquent and considered spokesman for the neoliberal offensive. Talking about the day when the US Central Bank bailed out a huge bank to prevent the financial crisis from spreading, he wrote: “Remember Friday March 14 2008: it was the day the dream of global free-market capitalism died.” So neoliberalism is dead (in some ways), as is (again: in some ways) the movement against it, of which the explicitly anticapitalist current from within which this text is written was only ever one part. It seems to have lost precisely that which can forge a movement out of an irreducible multiplicity of struggles, that which can counter the decomposition of resistance that capital and the state constantly seek to impose on us. We need a story, a hope, a hook to move: and at this point, the alterglobalist movement is clearly a movement without a hook, without an enemy, without a goal.
The new ‘big one’?
But as much as there’s a movement without a story, there’s also a story without a movement: climate change. An increasing number of policies (even many that have hardly anything to do with the subject) are being justified in terms of their relation to ‘the climate’. And ever since being outmanoeuvred by the G8 and especially chancellor Merkel at Heiligendamm, the European movements have realised that they must develop a position and a practice around climate change or risk irrelevance in this brave new world of green issues. The most advanced fractions of capital and government apparatuses have spotted a great way to create political support for a new ‘green fix’ to both the crisis of overaccumulation (the problem of too much money chasing too few profitable investment opportunities) that has given us the current financial chaos, and to the legitimation crisis that global authority has been suffering since the power of the story of ‘global terrorism’ began to wane. In a way, the fact that everybody is now talking about this issue is a massive victory for the green movement – but at the same time it’s meant the final nail in that movement’s coffin: every single large green NGO is involved up to its neck in the negotiations about the Kyoto follow-up treaty, and thus unlikely to articulate a political position that would diverge significantly from the dominant agendas in the field.
So there’s a movement without a story, and a story without a movement – which means that, as it stands right now, there is little hope that climate change will be dealt with in ways that don’t simply further the interests of states and whatever happens to be the dominant fraction of capital. And since the default anticapitalist position on climate change is that there is a fundamental contradiction between the requirements of the continued accumulation of capital (i.e. economic growth) on the one hand, and the requirements of dealing with climate change on the other, this would seem to constitute the perfect opening for a reenergised anticapitalist politics that can manage to connect to people’s widespread worries about climate change, and the impression that what is being done (Kyoto, Bali, emissions trading, etc.) is far too little, far too late. These are precisely the situations where radical social movements have the greatest capacity to act and ‘make history’, when the usual problem-solving approaches (these days: create a market around it, or repress it) don’t seem to provide any believable way of dealing with something that is widely perceived as a problem. It’s precisely when it seems impossible to find any solutions that openings exist for social movements to expand the limits of the possible. On the face of it, the perfect storm…
The politics of pointlessness
… or so it seems. In reality, if the practical difficulties faced by most really existing attempts to contribute to the emergence of an effective anticapitalist movement around the climate change issue are any guide, things seem a lot more difficult. Looking at it from the perspective of the global North, there are definitely attempts to develop an anticapitalist climate change politics, but each of them is facing a mounting set of difficulties. Seen from here, it all begins in the UK in 2006, with a ‘climate action camp’ that aimed to “shut down for a day” a coal-fired power station in northern England, but more importantly, to provide a space for developing new ideas and practices for an anticapitalist climate change politics. The idea of organising similar ‘climate action camps’ has since then inspired people in Germany, Sweden, the US, Chile, Australia and New Zealand and elsewhere, and currently this seems to be the main ‘weapon’ in the emerging climate movement’s repertoire of action (somewhat ironically, the initial idea for the camp also arose out of the lessons learnt about the shortcomings of one-off summit protests).
I really don’t want to talk down the importance of these camps – after all, inspiring so many people in so many different countries is no mean feat – but from the many critiques of the climate camps, one thread stuck out: the question of whether these camps were in fact doing much good beyond satisfying a desire to do something? It feels good to hang out and camp with your mates and comrades, but there’s that nagging question: what do we want? What can we achieve? And does this whole camping-business, trying to shut down power plants one at a time, while at the same time constantly fighting not to be drowned out by the more powerful voices that crowd this political field, stand in any relation to the magnitude of the challenge of climate change? That’s the kind of question that’s likely to leave people pretty frustrated.
To be clear: this is not to say that people shouldn’t organise climate camps – only that these camps need to be part of a wider project that gives them some political meaning beyond their highly localised intervention. We could of course hope that this wider meaning, a certain kind of political globality, would emerge from the links being formed between the various climate camps happening this year, but this kind of coordination has been limited to non-existing. No common ‘demands’ (other than that of being ‘against climate change’, which is about as politically useful and distinguishing as being against clubbing baby seals), no common story, no ‘shut down the WTO’, not even a vague compromise like ‘fix it or nix it’: no ‘another world is possible’!
So if the UK-movement’s way of dealing with the challenge of climate change comes across as somewhat limited in its political scope, at the other end of the spectrum there’s the way the issue has been approached in Germany. Attempts to kick-start a climate camp-process here have not only been beset by the usual leftist bickering and infighting, and there has even already been a split in the process, it has also come up against another political problem: here, the radical left is so academic and steeped in the tradition of ‘critical theory’ and ‘deconstruction’ that the main response to the challenge posed by climate change is to engage in a ‘critique’ of the ‘dominant climate change discourse’ and the ‘hegemonic role of scientific knowledge’ in constructing climate change as a crisis. Sure, it’s important to remember that the reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) come from a deeply conservative institution, and to critically reflect on how recourses to ‘scientific knowledge’ are often used to shut ‘non-experts’ out of political debates, but Diskurskritik can’t be the only response to the climate change issue. It feels a bit like throwing copies of Adorno and Foucault at a coming flood and hoping that it’ll just go away.
From timelessness to effectiveness
But let’s be honest: the anticapitalist left in the global North should be pretty used to being politically ineffective and marginal, small outbursts of transformative power in particular moments of excess notwithstanding. What does one ‘social centre’ in Hackney, Kreuzberg or Las Ramblas really contribute to the struggle against gentrification? Does an anti-war-demo in San Francisco really, as a film made on the occasion claims, ‘interrupt this Empire’? Does shoplifting, even conducted en masse, significantly disrupt processes of capitalist commodity circulation? To be honest, I don’t know, and I think very few people who engage in these practices have a clear idea either. But, and this is the important point, when talking about ‘capitalism’, anticapitalists feel they don’t really have to have an answer to that question. One way of dealing with that is to point to the non-linear dynamics of change in complex (social) systems, meaning that we can’t know what effects our actions of today will have tomorrow (think butterfly in Bali and hurricane in Haiti). Or, by referring to an argument that’s achieved nearly dogmatic status in anticapitalist discussions: ‘look, capitalism hasn’t been around forever, it began in some place at some point, so it’ll also end at some point’ – much the same could be said about the universe! I could go on enumerating the various intellectual tricks that exist to rationalise our relative political irrelevance, but hope the point is made: that anticapitalist politics in the global North exist in a sort of timelessness because we either can’t or don’t dare to think their effects in the future. Ostriches come to mind. As does the graffiti sprayed on the wall of a school in Gothenburg that had been stormed by the cops: “But in the end, we will win!”
And this is where we get back to why it seems so hard for the anticapitalist movement to develop a politics around climate change: whatever rationalisation makes it possible to think that ‘in the end we will win’ against capital, it’s pretty impossible to think that in relation to climate change. Against the usual timelessness of anticapitalist politics, climate change poses the issue of urgency. And the problem then becomes how to deal with that urgency. Both positions described above (the overly ‘activisty’ as well as the overly ‘critical’ one) are attempts to do so, and both are pretty unsatisfying. The first takes this urgency far too seriously, and jumps head over heels into a political field dominated by much stronger players. The second position recognises that the construction of urgency and the resulting politics of fear are often strategies of domination – but then contents itself with criticising that construction, rather than engaging with the urgency of the issue behind the discourse. And this urgency emerges precisely from a conflict of times, of temporalities, between the exponential temporality of capital (where capital perpetually speeds up social life and production) and the temporality of complex eco-social-systems, which are of course not static, and can adapt to new circumstances, but generally not at the speed required by capital – if change is too fast, that’s when the by now infamous ‘tipping points’ are reached, where changes to particular eco-systems become irreversible and catastrophic (the infamous ‘switching off’ of the Gulf Stream being one such example, the melting of polar ice caps another).
So how do we deal with this problem of urgency? First, by admitting that it’s unlikely, actually impossible, that the politically marginal radical left will be able to effectively slow down the production of greenhouse gases such as CO2, in a world where the accumulation of capital is inseparable from the burning of fossil fuels (someone called this ‘fossilistic capitalism’). Neither are we able to somehow force the faster adaptation of ecological systems to the speed of capital. But we can intervene into the temporality of politics, of governmental ‘climate change politics’, whose role it is to insulate the speed-up effected by capital from social criticism by creating the illusion that the continued accumulation of capital is compatible with socio-ecological stability: that, in other words, we just need to make a few (preferably market-based) adjustments, and can otherwise continue more or less as we were. The result of this insulation is that the potentially explosive force of the increasingly widespread realisation of this antagonism between capital and a humanity that exists embedded in complex ecological systems is contained, even captured. Captured so as to provide support for a new round of accumulation (think: ‘green capitalism’) and the further extension of political regulations ever deeper into our lives.
Forget Kyoto!
So again: the anticapitalist left in the global North can’t ‘stop’ or even significantly mitigate climate change. To assume that we could would necessarily leave us trapped in our timelessness, because we could only ever hope to achieve our goal at some point far, far in the future – out of real time, as pie in the sky. But we can, with our limited strength and resources intervene into the insulation of capital’s time from the ‘slowness’ of genuine democracy. If we once again leave the depressed certainty of our own decomposition and timelessness, if we remember that as movements we have the capacity to be faster than the state, then we can escape from and intervene into their capture and internalisation of antagonistic energies.
And how do we do that? How do we keep open the political space created by the increasingly widespread concern about climate change, which has the potential to produce new ideas and solutions, new possibilities, that might in turn promise to go beyond capitalism? How can there be an intervention into the powerful pressures towards the constitution of a new ‘green capitalism’, towards an ‘eco-Empire’, a global authoritarian eco-Keynesianism? If urgency forces us to think in terms of effectiveness and, what’s more, efficiency, how can our small, resource-poor wing of the movement effectively deploy our limited strengths to achieve a maximum outcome with respect to the goal of creating and/or maintaining space for the development of multiple, bottom-up, non-capitalist solutions to the climate crisis?
The answer to this question begins with two further questions, and then takes us back to the beginning of the whole argument. First question: what is probably the single most important process by which the governments of the world are trying to insulate capital from public criticism in relation to climate change? Answer: almost certainly the Kyoto/Bali-processes, where the world is treated to the dramas of international high politics, but which in the end produce little or nothing that would actually protect the climate (just as an aside: since the signing of the Kyoto-accords, global CO2-emissions have exceeded even the worst-case scenarios projected by the IPCC), and where a tiny bit of emissions reductions legitimate a huge pile of continued production of greenhouse gases – not to speak of the creation of a whole new market in emissions credits (expected to value about US$2 trillion by 2020), much to the delight of global capital. The follow-up process to Kyoto, which began in Bali in December 2007, is supposed to be signed at an international summit in Copenhagen in December 2009.
Second question: where do the strengths of the radical global movements lie both in comparison to our enemies and to our more moderate allies? Answer: in the organisation of large-scale, disruptive summit mobilisations. It is precisely in summit mobilisations that we have developed something that could be called ‘best practice’, where we have before achieved a substantial political effect. In Seattle, we not only managed to shut down the conference by being on the streets, we also exacerbated the multiple conflicts that existed ‘on the inside’ between the negotiating governments. If we manage to do the same thing again, and to build a political coalition around and momentum behind the demand to ‘Forget Kyoto’, we would both be able to keep open the political space to discuss potential ‘solutions’ to climate change that go beyond the reigning, market-driven agenda, and also provide a focal point and common demand for the emerging global climate movement to rally around. Forget Kyoto – Shut down Copenhagen 2009!
But why suggest organising yet another big summit protest after arguing that countersummits have become a lot less effective than they used to be? Because the politics of climate change in 2008 look very different from the politics of neoliberal globalisation in 2008 – in fact, they look more like the politics of globalisation did before the WTO summit in Seattle was shut down. Back then, during the decade of the ‘end of history’, many knew that neoliberal capitalism wasn’t flawless, but there was no recognition, not even on ‘the left’, of a movement, or maybe even a ‘movement of movements’ that could oppose it. Seattle created the possibility of seeing the commonality in many different struggles, of seeing them as all fighting the same enemy. Of a ‘movement’ in the first place, which is where the argument comes full circle: the alterglobalist cycle of struggles may have ended, but its lessons have not gone away, like the importance of avoiding the ‘one-week-a-year’ movement problem of focusing only on big events. The emerging climate movement must be rooted in sustainable and everyday practices of resistance and transformation at all levels, not just global, but also regional, national or local. But before ‘it’ can even see itself as ‘a movement’, something is needed to make a mark, show that there is a position on climate change that’s more radical than simply asking for more and better emissions trading. That there are those who don’t just focus on climate change, but also on the cause of climate change: capitalism. And for that to happen, we might just need what some people once called a ‘moment of excess’, where time speeds up, and changes become possible that were impossible before. A countersummit can do it. So in that sense: the movement is dead – long live the movement!
The ‘Kyoto Protocol’ (short: Kyoto), which was signed in 1997 and came into force in 2005, is an international treaty whose signatories pledge to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases such as CO2 and methane. The protocol’s key mechanism is ‘emissions trading’, where countries and/or companies buy and sell licences to pollute. As the Kyoto protocol is set to expire in 2012, a major international summit was held in Bali in December 2007 to begin negotiations on a follow-up accord to be signed in Copenhagen in 2009.
Tadzio Müller lives in Berlin, where he is active in the emerging climate action movement, and teaches political science at Kassel University. He is an editor of Turbulence.
Danish translation here. Finnish here. Spanish here.
The Measure of a Monster: Capital, Class, Competition and Finance
Pundits are describing the global ‘credit crunch’ as potentially the worst crisis to befall capitalism since the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed. We doubt the value of such comparisons, but there is no doubt we need to make sense of the origins, nature and meaning of the current financial crisis. Most important, we need to grasp its potential and its dangers for us. Here we print two analyses. In the first, Christian Frings suggests that not only was neo-liberal ‘financialisation’ a response to struggle, but that its crisis is now opening up new possibilities for movements. In the second (below), David Harvie argues that finance plays a role that goes to the heart of competitive calculation, accumulation and class struggle; the present crisis is thus a crisis of both measure and capital.
- Turbulence
“International financial markets have developed into a monster that must be put back in its place”
– Horst Köhler, German President and former head of the IMF
The numbers associated with finance are mind-boggling. The entire value of annual global output changes hands in just six days’ trading on the world’s financial markets! Sometimes – like now, in the midst of the ‘global credit crisis’ – finance seems to get out of control. The voices of those – such as Horst Köhler or, from the Left, Walden Bello – denouncing finance and calling for its regulation rise to a crescendo.
Is all of this financial activity merely ’speculative’? Is it a symptom of capital’s flight from ‘a stagnant real economy’, that is, from ‘production’ where it has to struggle with living labour to extract surplus value? Certainly much financial-market activity is speculative in that traders are taking risks in the hope of making a profit. But all capitalist activity is speculative in this sense. There’s nothing more speculative than throwing money into production – that is, purchasing means of production, including labour-power – and then trying to make the breathing, struggling, desiring human bearers of this labour-power work hard enough to make you a profit.
Speculation isn’t the whole story, though. In fact arguing whether financial markets are primarily about ’speculation’, or whether they are ’stabilising’ or ‘destabilising’, easily falls into the trap of implying that investment in the ‘real economy’ – the accumulation of alienated labour in factories, fields, call centres and schools – is somehow more ‘ethical’. This sort of critique of finance also misses its most important function, which goes to the heart of capital accumulation, competition, class and the class struggle.
The financial markets, and in particular those arcane instruments known as ‘derivatives’, are all aboutmeasure, measuring the production of value, measuring capital accumulation. Financial derivatives allow all the different ‘bits’ of capital (across time, across space and across sectors) to be priced against – orcommensurated with – each other. Derivatives even turn the very contingent nature of value – its contestability – into a tradeable commodity.
The ‘performance’ of different assets – that is the ‘performance’ of its associated ‘bit’ of capital, including the workers exploited by that bit of capital – can be measured by its rate of return. And thus each asset, if it is to survive, must deliver a competitive rate of return. Each must meet or beat the market ‘norm’. Financial investors, speculators – call them what you will – do not care whether they trade cocoa futures, the Argentinian peso or some index linked to the FTSE100. They seek simply the greatest return (taking risk into account). And so, by their trading actions, the ‘performance’ of those ‘top’ 100 companies is compared to the ‘performance’ of the entire Argentinian economy (if that economy is ’strong’ the peso will rise in value) and to cocoa farmers everywhere. The implications for workers across the planet are clear. Our‘performance’ is being measured. The performance of a Detroit car-worker can be compared not only with that of his neighbour on the production line, or even with her counterpart in Alabama or South Korea, but with garment workers in Morocco, programmers in Bangalore and cleaners on the London Underground. Competition is intensified, as is class struggle.
Which brings us to the present crisis. At the heart of the crisis lay ’subprime’ borrowers and so-called Collateralised Debt Obligations or CDOs, another type of derivative instrument linked to these borrowers’ mortgages. Not only is our access to housing dependent upon capitalist exchange. Not only has our struggle to keep a roof over our heads become a profit-making opportunity for investors. Our ‘performance’ as debtors is measured by the global financial market and is yoked to that market, and through it to the performance of all other ‘assets’ – the programmers and the cleaners, the farmers and the garment workers. In short, we become – in our reproductive activity as well as our waged work – subjects of competitive calculation.
Those who invested in mortgage-backed CDOs clearly believed that those borrowers, ’subprime’ and otherwise, and the US economy in general, would ‘perform’. In other words, that US householders and workers would perform their assigned role in competitive calculation. Of course, a small proportion of borrowers would not ‘perform’, but these risks had all been taken into account in CDOs’ ‘risk-and-return profiles’. Risks had been calculated and priced. In the event, many more borrowers failed to perform and, as the defaults spread, the financial system in its entirety was threatened.
At one level this crisis is a crisis about needs versus profits. Our needs for housing versus those of investors – or capital – for a rate of return. It’s a crisis that, like all crises, reveals how our access to social wealth, such as housing, is rationed by money. Just look at the growing ‘tent cities’ – American shanties – whilst houses made of timber, bricks and mortar stand empty as a result of foreclosure.
But the present crisis is also a crisis of measure. Investors mispriced risk, they miscalculated. Bankers are now talking about market ‘corrections’. What’s interesting about this crisis is not so much that financial institutions have lost a lot of money – so far $300 billion has been ‘written down’ – but that, almost a year on, they still don’t know exactly how much. Through the duration of the crisis, financial markets have failed to measure value and thus to commensurate capital. Capital – for it to be capital – must be commensurated. If ‘bits’ of capital cannot be measured and entered onto a balance sheet as so many dollars or euros, then they’re just so many barrels of Brent crude or such-and-such a number of tonnes of coffee: their status as capital is threatened. Thus a crisis of the measure of value is a crisis of value, and of capital itself.
Part of our politics must take the form of resistance to competitive calculation. The holders of sub-prime loans showed this potential negatively: the capacity of a (generally black) working class in the US triggering crisis by refusing to perform the role assigned them and the calculation implied. The challenge is to work out how to frame this power positively.
Subprime borrowers are those with ‘poor credit histories’, individuals with no secure income or assets, who may have defaulted on loans in the past. In short, the precarious!
Derivative instruments are financial assets or securities whose value derives, in principle at least, from the price of some underlying commodity, asset or set of assets. A future, for example, is a firm commitment to exchange a certain commodity or asset at an agreed price at some point in the future; an option is similar, but gives its holder the right to buy or sell, but with no obligation to do so. With swaps, the two parties exchange income streams or debt repayment commitments, e.g. a variable-interest rate loan denominated in yen is swapped for a fixed-interest rate payment in dollars. In practice, prices tend to be established in derivatives markets first, and the price of the underlying asset or commodity is derived from these. So the price a Guatemalan coffee farmer receives for her crop is actually set by traders on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) – occupied during 1999’s Carnival Against Capital. Derivatives may be linked to commodities (coffee, cocoa, pork bellies, oil and so on), shares or share indexes (such as the FTSE100), interest rates, currencies… There are now even derivatives based on the weather and, for a few a months, there existed a ‘Policy Analysis Market’, which allowed trading on coups d’état, assassinations and terrorist attacks.
The word mortgage has its roots in Norman French; literally it means ‘death grip’.
In the 1970s, another decade of escalating oil prices, Western banks ‘recycled’ petrodollars to many ‘Third World’ governments in the form of loans (at variable interest rates). Whole economies were thus exposed to the measure and discipline of international financial markets. The real meaning of discipline became apparent in the course of the international debt crisis of the 1980s and the various financial crises throughout the 1990s and the first decade of this century.
Credit has its origin in the Latin word credere, ‘to believe’.
David Harvie is a member of The Free Association and an editor of Turbulence.
Starvation Politics: From Ancient Egypt to the Present
‘Food riots’ in response to huge food price hikes have hit numerous countries around the world this year. George Caffentzis explores the current food crisis, its causes and implications.
Food prices are rising so much and so fast that millions are now on the verge of starvation. Between May 2007 and May 2008, corn prices increased by 46%, wheat prices by 80%, and soybeans by 72%; while rice increased by 75% in 2008 over its average 2007 price.
People in many cities throughout the world have responded to the explosion of staple food prices in the last few months by demanding that their national governments reduce them immediately. From Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to Cairo, Egypt, the demonstrations often turned into riots, shutting down these cities for days. Millions are now calculating that unless they obstruct the ‘normal’ circuit of capitalist reproduction by taking to the streets they will face starvation.
Indeed, the scenes from these places are no less dramatic in the suffering and anguish they suggest than those coming from Burma after the cyclone. The price hikes themselves have taken on the character of a natural disaster. They are treated by many commentators as a sort of ‘perfect storm,’ to use the deceptive jargon of our day. According to Steve Hamm, a Business Week journalist, a multiplicity of unrelated factors from the drought in Australia, to the “richer diets” in China and India, to “the soaring cost of oil” and “the increased use of corn for ethanol” have come together to make food unaffordable for a substantial part of the world’s population.
This explanation, however, is far from convincing. It does not explain why these millions of people are exposed to international markets and hence at risk from the ‘perfect storm’. The apparently unrelated factors listed by Hamm would not lead to widespread starvation if people were not dependent on world grain markets in a way that they were not a few decades ago.
In reality, the latest grain price hikes are the last act in a long process that started in the mid-1980s with the implementation in much of the world of the World Bank’s and IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), whose first task was to privatise agricultural lands and totally commodify food production and distribution.
If we look at the policies that governments across the world, but especially in the South, were forced to adopt in the name of the ‘debt crisis’ or ‘economic development’ we see that each of the recommended policies was geared to raise people’s dependence on the world market for access to food:
• government subsidies for agricultural inputs (from fertilisers to seeds) were eliminated, as were price control and marketing boards;
• land privatisation was instituted with drives to titling and registration;
• large amounts of acreage were removed from local food production and devoted to mining, oil extraction, or the production non-edible or export crops;
• most important, violating a long tradition, the World Bank and IMF insisted that governments in the South dismantle their food reserves and put them on the market, arguing they were no longer needed in a global economy.
Not surprisingly, countries that in the past had always been self-sufficient as far as food production was concerned were by the end of the millennium net food importers. A good example of this dynamic is the case of Mexico and corn. Millions of corn-growing peasant farmers have been driven from their ejidos(inalienable land held in common or by families) over the last decade due to their inability to compete with US corn exported to Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a model neoliberal trade treaty. As a result, Mexicans are now dependent on corn imports from the US for the provision of their basic staple food at a moment when corn prices are soaring.
Once this history is understood, no one can see the price hikes as in any way caused by a surprising conjuncture of unrelated factors. For the crucial question to be posed both logically and politically is: Why is it that billions of people are now dependent on an international grain market that literally condemns them to death? For if they were not so dependent, then the storm in the international grain exchanges, however perfect, would have passed by without hurting many. Far from being natural, this dependence has been constructed step-by-step, policy-by-policy despite a long series of oppositional demonstrations, general strikes, and rebellions throughout the world, and the criticism of anti-globalisation scholars.
Capitalist planners’ obstinate attachment to this strategy is not hard to decipher, for it is at the heart of the neoliberal agenda that strives to:
• establish international capital’s ever tighter control of all natural resources, especially staple food stocks, which constitute a formidable weapon, already used throughout history to impose discipline over recalcitrant workers and reward compliant governments;
• eliminate populations not considered productive;
• reduce the real wage everywhere.
In sum, these price hikes are the dénouement of a long war on the people of the planet to eliminate the most elementary right: the right to eat to live.
This is not a new strategy discovered by geniuses like Larry Summers on H Street in Washington. In fact, as the novelist Sol Yurick writes in his forthcoming autobiography, Revenge, the biblical Joseph was the archetype for the IMF/World Bank officials of today. Joseph, as financial advisor to the Pharaoh, recognised a cycle of seven “good years” and seven “lean years.” He cornered the market by hoarding the grain in the good years and was able to use the stored grain in the lean years both to sell at an exorbitant price and to buy the peasants’ land cheaply in the face of their imminent starvation. What is important to note about this story is that Joseph and the Pharaoh were not ‘middlemen’ interested in the money they made in selling the hoarded grain; they were using their control of grain to enslave Egyptian workers and to appropriate their land.
What is to be done to prevent a repetition of this ancient tale? Across the world people are rioting in desperation, as they often did in response to the introduction of SAPs. The pace of these riots and rebellions will increase, since for most people the affordability of food is a question of life and death. These uprisings might bring some restraint in the grain markets and cause governments to bend the neoliberal rules by providing more subsidies.
However, a reversal of the trend towards increasing dependence of people on the world grain market for accessing their staple food will require the strengthening of the already existing long-term international movement of both farmers and city dwellers committed to restoring land to the people producing food for their localities. The hunger generated by the food price hikes on the world market, which was meant to breed docility, will give this movement a tremendous impetus.
George Caffentzis is a member of the Midnight Notes Collective and co-editor of Midnight Oil: Work Energy War 1973-1992 and Auroras of the Zapatistas: Local and Global Struggles in the Fourth World War.
Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast
In a world saturated with capital’s antagonisms, a politics based exclusively on openness and affirmation is bound to fail. But The Free Association suggests that attempting to found our practice on antagonism brings its own set of problems…
Mildred: What’re you rebelling against, Johnny?
Johnny: Whaddya got?
The Wild One (1953)
Alice laughed. “There’s no use trying,” she said. “One can’t believe impossible things.”
“I dare say you haven’t had much practice,” said the queen. “When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.”
Alice in Wonderland
One of the key novelties of the movement of movements over the past decade has been its openness, unity-in-diversity and sense of affirmation. From startling alliances on the streets of Seattle, to experiments in political forms, we’ve been swept up in its global reach and sense of potential. But more recently, older themes seem to be re-emerging: antagonism, resentment, class hatred and rupture. It feels like shaking hands with a long-lost friend. You repair to a bar to renew your friendship over a few drinks, and end up drunkenly chanting, ‘The rich… the rich… we’ve gotta get rid of the rich!’
We’re on shaky ground here. Perhaps it’s just tempting to retreat to old, worn-out certainties. Yet aren’t they certainties because they express a truth about our world? A shot of realism that clarifies a problem? We don’t want to lose the sense of openness and the commitment to experimentation that we found with the turn-of-the-century cycle of protests. Yet that cycle seems to have stalled. The movement of movements has reached an impasse; innovation and expansion appear out of reach. In these circumstances a re-examination of out-of-time concepts like antagonism and class hatred might just prove timely.
WE ARE THE WRECKERS
Of course rupture and antagonism in the recent anti-capitalist movement are nothing new. They’ve been a continuous thread from San Cristobal and Seattle to Genoa and Oaxaca. But the way they’ve been woven has changed enormously.
Summit protests, for instance, reached a low point with the media-driven Make Poverty History campaign at the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles. All political contestation was hollowed-out, to the extent that the campaign’s ‘demands’ were ones that everybody could agree with. Before 2005, summit demonstrations had been at least protests, if not concerted attempts to physically shut meetings down. In stark contrast, Make Poverty History welcomed leaders of the G8 to Scotland and turned a whole history of summit-stopping on its head.
The lessons of 2005 were not lost on the wider movement. Two years later, when the G8 met in Heiligendamm, the explicit goal of all major actions around the summit was to delegitimise the G8. For some, the strategy was clear: open resistance to the world the G8 represents. A mass demonstration in Rostock turned into a mini-riot with banks attacked and cars set alight. Antagonism pure and simple.
But is it so simple? Sure, the message was unequivocal, but property destruction on this scale at a summit is hardly new. And despite claims that the riot “made resistance incalculable for the police and state apparatus”, the evidence suggests that it was wholly calculable – not just in terms of the financial costs of damage, but in its timing and location. In this respect, a return to Black Bloc tactics represented not the emergence of something new but a retreat to familiar patterns of behaviour – with familiar outcomes. Antagonism as identity, with its own dress code.
Others took a more innovative line. Block G8, for example, was a broad coalition of more than 200 organisations from autonomous groups and the ‘far left’ to church groups but, crucially, it was based on a clear antagonism to the G8. After many months of discussions an agreement was drawn up; one of the clauses was a declaration that the G8 was illegitimate, another was on acceptable levels of militancy. This opened up exciting prospects for transformation, with people acting outside their comfort zones, but it too experienced problems. First, there were clear differences among the signatories about what this pre-agreed antagonism might mean in practice. Serious fissures emerged within the coalition following the mini-riot in Rostock. For some, attacking banks and fighting with police was taking antagonism too far. Yet, later on in the week, with the summit under complete siege by Block G8ers and with a festival atmosphere deep inside the ‘Red Zone’, others criticised demonstrators for not being antagonistic enough. Why didn’t we make a concerted attack on the fence itself? The antagonism against the G8 was kept within clearly defined boundaries.
A second problem of organising around a pre-agreed antagonism is that it limits your mobility once the situation changes. At Heiligendamm, the initial success of the road blockades depended on a closed group with a secret plan. But getting thousands of people from the camp to the road was one thing; maintaining a successful blockade once there was something else. At the East gate there were a number of highly frustrating meetings on Wednesday evening, as the Block G8 ‘action committee’ dominated discussions – taking full advantage of their ‘ownership’ of megaphones and the sound system, and of their authority as organisers. They suggested that those who disagreed with them were undermining the ‘action consensus’ (i.e. the pre-agreed antagonism) and were only intent on ‘escalation’. In fact, the blockade was in danger of falling apart altogether when Block G8 proclaimed ‘victory’ and told us to withdraw. This retreat was halted only when two people sat down in the road in front of the sound system to prevent it leaving: blockading the blockaders!
Finally, a more general criticism of the 2007 counter-mobilisation was that antagonism tended to remain at the level of the G8 itself, rather than capitalist social relations understood more widely. In fact over the past decade we can chart a narrowing, rather than an expansion, of the focus of antagonism. The movement came into being at Seattle around a shared opposition to the related neo-liberal policies that the G8, WTO and World Bank were enforcing globally. This allowed a resonance of movements from startlingly diverse places. The international neo-liberal institutions were used to stand in for much wider processes; in turn the Red Zone acted as an attractor for our desires. The G8’s response was to change its focus, attempting to legitimise itself as an essential arena of governance. Just as at Gleneagles in 2005, when the G8 presented itself as the organisation best placed to tackle global poverty, so in Heiligendamm it created the impression that it is the leaders of the world’s largest capitalist economies who will solve the ‘global challenge’ of climate change. They evaded the antagonism we had created by shifting the topic to one so large that movement-based solutions were harder to envisage.
GREENHOUSE EFFECTS
Concern over climate change is now indisputably mainstream. Al Gore’s film An Inconvenient Truth, the various IPCC reports, the Stern Report all spell out the seriousness of the challenge. This is a huge change from a few years ago when scientists and other climate activists struggled to force the issue. In these conditions it’s no longer a question of ‘raising awareness’, but of how to innovate, to creatively push an agenda that opens up new problematics.
Social movements typically grow from ‘cramped spaces’, situations that are constricted by the impossibilities of the existing world with a way out barely imaginable. But precisely because they are cramped, these spaces act as incubators or greenhouses for creativity and innovation – “creation takes place in bottlenecks”. Social movements that grow from these spaces might form around antagonistic demands (more money, better housing, withdrawal of the police) but they also produce their own problematics. They throw up concepts, desires, forms of life that don’t ‘make sense’ within existing society and so call forth new worlds. But just as social movements take root and slow down, so these problematics stop moving. What was once new becomes codified. It’s a vicious circle: as problematics slow down, they acquire baggage; as they acquire baggage, they slow down. Rather than being innovative and productive, the problematic loses its purchase and becomes cliché. It becomes saturated in meaning.
The victory in the battle to raise awareness of climate change has had strange consequences. When you’ve been banging your head against a brick wall, it’s hard to know what to do when the wall gives way. Some have maintained momentum by focusing disproportionate levels of energy against a tiny handful of climate-change deniers. Others are looking towards governments and supranational institutions to provide solutions, in the same way that Make Poverty History asked the G8 to solve the problems of world hunger. On one level, this is driven by a sense of urgency, and the (mistaken) notion that the problem is so massive that nothing short of a centralised body can tackle it. But on a deeper level, it’s symptomatic of a ‘politics without antagonism’, where we can make our feelings known (by marching, wearing ribbons or white wristbands, or refusing to fly) and all the rest is administration.
This idea of a politics without antagonism is an illusion. Many of the state’s ’solutions’ – which some climate activists are clamouring for – will limit our freedom and our autonomy; they will make us poorer, will impose more work on us. They involve a shift of wealth and power from the poor to the rich. The individualism of ‘ethical’ consumption, for example, leads to an implicit antagonism with those who make the ‘wrong’ choices, and/or to ‘militant lobbying’ of governments and other authorities to impose the ‘right’ choices on people. At the 2007 Camp for Climate Action in the UK, one prominent speaker warned that ‘we’ had to be ready to put down riots against austerity. (We intend to do the opposite.)
THE CAT EATS THE RAT, THE PIMP BEATS THE WHORE
Surely we can’t be suggesting that we need more antagonism? Isn’t there enough hatred and violence in the world? Isn’t there enough separation and rupture already? Yes. And this is the point. The ongoing history of humanity’s separation from the commons is written in “letters of blood and fire”. Across the world, whether you’re picking through garbage in a slum, or struggling to make the next mortgage payment, the capital relation is one of violence, of separation, of antagonism.
This ceaseless, debilitating antagonism is central to how capitalism works. Compared with feudalism or slavery, capitalism is a dynamic and relatively resilient social system for two related reasons. The first is its ability to feed off antagonism, to use antagonism to fuel its own development. One example of this is the move from the production of absolute surplus value to relative surplus value. As the workers’ movement became stronger in England in the 18th and 19th centuries, factory owners were forced to shift from a strategy of extensive exploitation (longer working day and shorter breaks) to one of intensive exploitation (using machines to increase productivity). This launched a new cycle of accumulation, celebrated as the Industrial Revolution. The strategy reached its zenith with Henry Ford’s mind-numbing production lines.
A different relationship to antagonism can be seen in the post-war ‘welfare states’ and the Keynesian policies that underpinned them. These societies institutionalised the antagonism between capital and the industrialised working class; a certain level of welfare provision was negotiated in exchange for rising productivity. The fierce autonomous struggles of the 1960s and ’70s exploded this frozen antagonism by asserting new problems and new antagonisms.
The second reason for capital’s resilience is the fact that its inherent antagonism is constantly displaced. Capital as a social relation dominates our lives yet it’s virtually impossible to get a grip on it. Some have argued that it’s just a matter of ‘false consciousness’, as if all we have to do is pull aside the curtain and reveal the man pulling the levers. But it’s not about ideology. Capitalism doesn’t need us to believe that commodities have a life of their own, or that capital produces wealth. We simply have to act as if those things are true when we work or consume. That’s the way in which reality cannot but appear under capitalism. Nothing else ‘makes sense’, because of the presuppositions that capital places on us. It’s the same with the violence that separates us from the commons, as people are forced off the land in the global South or, in the North, find their working hours seeping into the rest of their lives. “It is very difficult to pinpoint this violence because it always presents itself as pre-accomplished… From a standpoint within the capitalist mode of production it is very difficult to say who is the thief and who is the victim, or even where the violence resides.”
Even in the most exploitative workplace, it’s difficult to be precise about where the antagonism lies. Are you up against your line manager? The chief executive? The foreign pension fund investing other workers’ savings in the company? Through its strategies of class decomposition, marketisation, the naturalisation of individualism and so on, neo-liberalism forces an intensification of competition: that is, an intensification of the competitive struggle between every worker on the planet. With trade liberalisation, a coffee farmer in Ecuador now competes directly with one in Indonesia, whilst the growth of global financial markets means both are now competing with teachers in Leeds and call centre employees in Bangalore. Thus, capital’s antagonistic nature manifests itself less as a clash between worker and boss than as a bitter struggle between worker and worker, as everyone struggles to meet or beat the market-determined norm (and set a new one).
This displaced antagonism is aggravated by climate change – and not simply by wars over water and other resources. As we’ve hinted, capital’s solution is a new round of austerity, a redistribution of income from workers to capital. Measures like carbon taxes and road pricing will increase the cost of basic items like food, heating and transport, so limiting our mobility and our autonomy. Climate change is a double whammy for the vast majority of the world’s population. Not only are we more likely to suffer from its effects – the rich don’t have to live in areas susceptible to flooding and always have insurance – we will also suffer more from capital’s solutions to the problem. Moreover, given capitalist social relations, the best individual response lies in trying to get more money (since money buys mobility, etc), just as the best individual response in a workplace is to get ahead at the expense of fellow workers. It ‘makes sense’. The net effect is to intensify competition, the war of all against all that is capital’s lifeblood.
The enormous changes in the structure of capitalist relations over the last three decades have also had major implications for how antagonism appears in our everyday lives. With outsourcing and privatisation it’s increasingly unclear who our enemy might be at any one time. Governance is multi-layered, with responsibility always lying ‘elsewhere’. Politicians and decision-makers at every level, from local councils to national governments, can honestly say “our hands are tied”. Politics, as it’s traditionally understood, is replaced by administration, with the result that a political antagonism often makes no sense. Take the Private Finance Initiative which operates across schools, hospitals, prisons and so on in the UK: it’s a way of injecting private capital into public services in return for long-term service contracts. Under the school scheme, for example, the local authority doesn’t own the building, but leases it from a company. Widely seen as a disaster, the PFI scheme is almost impossible to oppose: “There is no other funding available…” It’s the fundamental cry of neo-liberalism: There Is No Alternative. It’s non-negotiable. Neo-liberalism is a totalitarianism not based on belief but simply on ‘efficiency’, on getting the job done.
ANGER IS AN ENERGY
Yet, despite all this, hatred of the rich and powerful persists. People resent the ‘fat cats’. The torched BMW is the scream of refusal, of rage. NO! It’s a current that has a long history, existing in parallel with more affirmative politics. Alongside the Anabaptists’ cry of Omnia sunt communia [all things are common] and the Diggers’ notion of an immanent republic of heaven on earth went hatred of the gentry and all they stood for.
Violence can play a part in antagonism, but they are not the same thing. It’s hard to disentangle them because we’re used to dealing with a very restricted notion of violence. It’s easy to see the violence in a street robbery; it’s harder to see the violence meted out to us over the course of our working lives; and it’s nearly impossible to see the violence in the way we are daily separated from the commons.
But can we found a politics on an antagonism formulated in this way? There are three major problems. The first is that of simply identifying our antagonist. It’s too glib to simply say that the enemy is capital. Capital is horribly real, it dominates our lives, but it is an abstraction. We experience it in its effects, which means that the antagonisms it produces run right through us. The problem is not so much that of revealing antagonism, as if we just have to show people the true nature of capital as a social relation. Instead it’s one of re-composing the antagonism that we experience.
This leads to a second difficulty: it’s hard to re-compose that antagonism without falling into the trap of personalising capital. In the 2004 film The Edukators, one of the characters explains, “It’s not who invented the gun, man. It’s who pulls the trigger.” There’s a contradiction here. For us, one of the most liberating moments in the 1980s was the way that anarchist politics gave names (and addresses) to the people who dominate our lives. It broke the rules of the game. It rejected the power imbalance between rich and poor, the asymmetry of a world where profits are privatised but loss is always socialised. (Look at the current credit crisis: whilst the ’subprime’ poor are being turfed onto the streets, top bankers are selling third homes or luxury yachts.) In a bizarre way, naming the rich re-asserts a common humanity by denying them the ability to hide behind limited liability companies, off-shore tax havens, and multi-layered management. It is an echo of Lucy Parsons in 1885 when she said “Let us devastate the avenues where the wealthy live.”
There are a huge number of dangers here. Besides the obvious dead-end of terrorism, this approach can easily slide into populism. Naming capital (a social relation) as the enemy doesn’t offer an easy course of action; naming the rich simplifies the social field, offering us some grip on the world. But it does this by providing a scapegoat. This stand-in might be the aristocracy, the ruling class or investment bankers – any element that is seen as ‘parasitic’ or ‘unproductive’. And historically it has often been linked with violent anti-Semitism.
Populism dovetails neatly into the moments of piety that pass for ‘politics’ under neo-liberalism. One minute we’re asking the G8 to solve hunger in Africa, the next we’re condemning young mothers for feeding their children junk food. Each wave of po-faced moral panic absolves capital of responsibility for the state of the world it dominates. Yet because neo-liberalism doesn’t rely on any of these beliefs in particular, each one collapses in turn and their serial nature robs us of all belief. De-politicised politics is precisely that wild swing between piety, like Make Poverty History, and a numbing cynicism.
The third problem is even more fundamental. By themselves resentment, antagonism and so on will only take us so far. Because an antagonistic relationship with capital is still a relationship with capital, it still involves defining ourselves in relation to capital. But we don’t want any relation with capital (or the state), antagonistic or otherwise. We want to destroy these relationships, just as we want to refuse definition. We want exodus, autonomy. And this is the paradox. Although autonomy is about movement – “by our own efforts bringing ourselves to happiness” – it still has to contain some sort of ‘No’, a break with the world-as-it-is, it’s difficult to start swimming in open water: it’s much easier to push off against something. Antagonism provides that ‘No’ by simplifying social space enough to offer some purchase on the world and so allow political action.
We can’t pretend that antagonism doesn’t exist, and nor can we wish it away. But we must act in recognition of that antagonism in order to dissolve it. These simplifications have an excess to them, which we might think of as their impossibilities. This is the cramping that each problematic contains. And it is in these cramped spaces that we can create new problematics, tracing a path between impossibilities… and so open up new possibilities.
THE REVENGE OF THE RED QUEEN
If we find ourselves at an impasse when we try to think through antagonism, perhaps that’s not the fault of the concept but rather of the impasse we are placed in, “in both our lives and our thinking”, by capital and governmentality. The problematic of antagonism makes a different kind of sense when placed alongside the problematic of exodus. After all, antagonism can help tell us about what we are but it can’t tell us what we can become.
Traditional political concepts such as solidarity or alliance imply a calculation of pre-existing interests. They rest on separate discrete bodies, with a beginning and an end, whose paths can be mapped in advance. It’s as though the identities involved aren’t transformed by the relationship the concepts represent. That’s why we like the idea of love as a political concept, because love involves a reciprocal transformation. It’s a relationship of mutual becoming. As such it operates beyond a rational calculation of interest. You quite literally lose your self in love as the boundaries of separate, discrete bodies become indistinct.
We might recognise such a politics in the periodic peaks of shared intensity, which we can experience, for example, in collective political action. During such moments of excess the fictions of capital’s fetishism dissolve and we face a repotentialised world. Capital’s antagonism becomes clearer, yet it loses its motivating force for us: instead we are animated by the affect of increasing collective capacity. We can escape our antagonistic identity and transform into something new.
Of course we can’t just wish a political relationship of love into existence. The riot cop advancing towards us is trained to resist any relationship of mutual transformation (unrequited love is the most painful kind). Such experiences are concrete and specific, they can’t be unproblematically universalised. We’d do better to think of them as trainings in love. Taken a-historically and non-specifically, love can descend into piety and opens itself to neo-liberal administration. If we’re to reach a materialist love, we need the realism of recomposed antagonism.
Mired as we are in the deadening fictions of this world, a politics based on love can seem impossible. Just as a politics of antagonism is an impossibility to neo-liberalism. But that shouldn’t be of any concern to us. Like the Red Queen, we must train ourselves to believe “six impossible things before breakfast”. As one problematic becomes saturated we look to the next impossibility to give us purchase. This is how we’ll make our escape, with LOVE tattooed on the knuckles of one hand, HATE on the other.
The quote about “pre-accomplished” violence is from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze writes about the creativity of bottlenecks and tracing a path between impossibilities in Negotiations; the “in both our lives and in our thinking” quote is from his book Foucault. United Colours of Resistance wrote of “incalculable” resistance in ‘Black Block’, in Voices of Resistance from Occupied London, 2 (http://www.occupiedlondon.org/issuetwo). John Holloway writes about fetishisation and our scream of refusal in Change the World Without Taking Power and elsewhere. William Morris talked about “by our own efforts bringing ourselves to happiness” in 1891. The Free Association’s virtual home is www.freelyassociating.org.
French Translation here.
Present Tense, Future Conditional
When work on this issue began, tracking down the author of a quote turned out to be more difficult than we thought. You may have heard it too: ‘today it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism’. Everyone knew it, but had seen it attributed to someone else. Someone even thought they’d been around the time it was first uttered, by somebody at a meeting a few years ago. Further research proved inconclusive: like the story about the man who woke up in a bathtub full of ice without his kidney, it was everywhere, but came from nowhere in particular. Yet, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, this omnipresence seemed to count as its own confirmation. Everyone’s saying it, so it must be true…
Today, it’s the very act of thinking about the future that has become a problem. What both capitalism and really existing socialism had in common was the belief in a future where infinite happiness would spring from the infinite expansion of production. From Lenin’s ‘communism = soviet power + electrification’ to capital’s ‘trickle down effect’, the sacrifices made in the present were always justified in terms of a brighter future. And now? The socialist future has been dead since the fall of the Berlin wall. After that we seemed to live in a world where only the capitalist future existed (even when it was under attack). But now this future, too, is having its obituaries composed. Impending doom, be it ecological, financial, or the result of soaring commodity prices, is the talk of the town. The ‘crisis of the future’ – that is, of our capacity to think about the future – is born out of these twin deaths.
For anti-capitalists, socialism offered two articles of faith. First, a teleological view of history as something that would eventually, and inevitably, take us to communism. Second, a belief in a historical subject – a working class, personified in ‘The Party’, which would become conscious of its historical role and accomplish it. Both these dogmas lie shattered. It’s impossible now to imagine that infinitely expanding production will ever be able to deliver us the good life. And it’s impossible to picture, in any simple way, a subject of social change for whom history is just the inert matter it can transform at will. That’s precisely why it’s easier to visualise catastrophe than transformation – as if capital is the only existing revolutionary force, and its end can only come as the (unwanted, but necessary; conscious, but inevitable) outcome of its own actions.
So as work on this issue drew to a close, we stumbled across another quote we liked (and this time we even know who said it: Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi): “The future now seems imaginable only as the intersection of catastrophic tendencies. Paradoxically, only from the interference between the various planes of catastrophe does it seem possible to imagine a salvation.” How can we think a path between these two poles, between salvation – the idea that religion or science will save us – and catastrophe? Can we still imagine a future?
Read on: Today I See the Future
Network organisation for the 21st century
Will the upsurge in activity around climate change and the food crisis repeat the cycle of the movement of movements over the past decade – momentary visibility then dissolution? Harry Halpin and Kay Summer say ‘yes’, unless different models of organising are embraced.
“Then perhaps we would discover that ‘organisational miracles’ are always happening, and have always been happening.”















































